In this thesis I present an account of the formal semantics of counterfactuals that systematically deals with impossible antecedents. This, in turn, allows us to gain a richer understanding of what makes certain thought experiments informative in spite of the impossibility of the situations they consider. In Chapter II, I argue that there are major shortcomings in the leading theories of counterfactuals. The leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued logic) are unable to account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In such accounts, everything and anything follows from an impossible antecedent. In Chapter III, I examine some crucial notions such as conceivability, imaginability, and possibility. Herein I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the notions of conceiving and imagining. Conceivability, it turns out, is a sufficient condition for being a case. Recent literature on the semantics for relevance logic have made some use of the notion of a “state”, which differs from a world in that contradictions are true in some states; what is not done in that literature is to clarify how the notion of a state differs from an arbitrary collection of claims. I use the notion of a case as a (modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, one for which, unlike the notion of states, it is clear why arbitrary collections of claims do not count. In Chapter IV, I propose a new account of counterfactuals. This involves modifying existing possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals by replacing possible worlds by the “cases” identified in Chapter III. This theory discerns counterfactuals such as: “If Dave squared the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel” which seems true, from others like: “If Dave squared the circle, the sun would explode”, which seems false. In Chapter V I discuss one of the main pay offs of having an account of counterfactuals that deals systematically with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. To apply the new account of counterfactual to thought experiments, first we have to transform the thought experiment in question into a series of counterfactuals. I show how this is to be done, in Chapter V. There are two advantages of such an account when we apply it to thought experiments: First, for thought experiments with impossible scenarios, our new account can explain how such thought experiments can still be informative. Secondly, for thought experiments like the Chinese Room, where it is not clear whether there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not, this new account with its continuous treatment of possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate about such thought experiments looks the way it does. The crucial question is not whether there is such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we would say there (about the intentionality of the room). On traditional accounts, it becomes paramount to deal with the possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different from the ones we learn if it is possible. There are no available theories of thought experiments that account for thought experiments with impossible/incomplete scenarios. With the new account of counterfactual and by applying it to thought experiments we over come this difficulty.

The present study constitutes one of the first attempts to establish the extent to which Russian military thought became westernized by the end of the eighteenth century. The task is an important one in light of Soviet and Russian scholarship that maintains that Russia developed a unique, different, and, some argue, superior way of war to the West. This work argues that Russian military thought was greatly influenced by the ‘military enlightenment’ of Europe, and that the ideas proposed by Russia’s foremost military theoreticians were not as novel as previously claimed. Therefore, the final intellectual product was more a continuation of, rather than a break with, Western practices and traditions of warfare. In this respect, the underlying theme of this thesis clashes with traditional Russian national military historical scholarship. The second major theme of this study is to challenge the pervasive but flawed and often simplified interpretation of the Russian army and its soldiers as undisciplined and uneducated barbarians. Contrary to these misleading views, the writings of Russian theorists bring to light the concerns about discipline and education for the officers, personal hygiene and hospital care for the soldiers and Russian awareness of complex strategic theoretical issues. The humanitarianism and sophistication of early-modern Russian military thought thus becomes abundantly clear. The scope of this work is inescapably restrictive, and the period that it examines, roughly from 1757 to 1800, has been consciously chosen to reflect the ideas of Russia’s two most important and influential military statesmen: Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov.

The 21st century mathematics classroom looks and operates differently than it did half a century ago. Not only are teachers expected to facilitate activities rather than lecture, they are also expected to utilize technology. The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics established the technology principle to guide teachers into this practice in 2000. Today there are middle school mathematics teachers who use technology effectively in the classroom. However, there is a dearth of literature in this area on how they select and use technology. The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand the process by which these teachers select and use technology in their classroom. Activity theory and teacher thinking process model provided a conceptual framework for this study. The guiding research questions are: (1) How do successful urban middle grades mathematics teachers, who use technology effectively, describe their teaching practices? (2) What are the strategies teachers use when integrating technology effectively in the classroom? Using a case study approach, the researcher collected data over 4 months from 3 urban middle school teachers – one on each grade level 6th, 7th, and 8th. Data sources included lesson plans, semi-structured interviews, and classroom observations. Findings revealed that teachers consider the types of learners when deciding what technology is appropriate to use. Teachers also preview technology prior to using it in the classroom. Emerging themes were grouped in five categories to describe how teachers plan and implement technology effectively. They are preparation, engagement, assessment, communication, and evaluation. The research findings give strategies to support teacher’s decisions about using technology for all types of learners and how to be effective in every phase of learning – whether it is introducing a lesson, remediating skills, or assessing knowledge. These findings also enable stakeholders to make informed decisions about technology in their school so that teachers will be able to elevate the quality of instruction with appropriate technology resources. Extended research should measure the impact that technology has on student learning. The likelihood of teachers using technology and using it more often would increase at a faster rate if there is evidence that the growth of student achievement occurs more rapidly when using technology.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of arguments such as the zombie-argument.

In this thesis I present an account of the formal semantics of counterfactuals that systematically deals with impossible antecedents. This, in turn, allows us to gain a richer understanding of what makes certain thought experiments informative in spite of the impossibility of the situations they consider. In Chapter II, I argue that there are major shortcomings in the leading theories of counterfactuals. The leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued logic) are unable to account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In such accounts, everything and anything follows from an impossible antecedent. In Chapter III, I examine some crucial notions such as conceivability, imaginability, and possibility. Herein I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the notions of conceiving and imagining. Conceivability, it turns out, is a sufficient condition for being a case. Recent literature on the semantics for relevance logic have made some use of the notion of a “state”, which differs from a world in that contradictions are true in some states; what is not done in that literature is to clarify how the notion of a state differs from an arbitrary collection of claims. I use the notion of a case as a (modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, one for which, unlike the notion of states, it is clear why arbitrary collections of claims do not count. In Chapter IV, I propose a new account of counterfactuals. This involves modifying existing possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals by replacing possible worlds by the “cases” identified in Chapter III. This theory discerns counterfactuals such as: “If Dave squared the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel” which seems true, from others like: “If Dave squared the circle, the sun would explode”, which seems false. In Chapter V I discuss one of the main pay offs of having an account of counterfactuals that deals systematically with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. To apply the new account of counterfactual to thought experiments, first we have to transform the thought experiment in question into a series of counterfactuals. I show how this is to be done, in Chapter V. There are two advantages of such an account when we apply it to thought experiments: First, for thought experiments with impossible scenarios, our new account can explain how such thought experiments can still be informative. Secondly, for thought experiments like the Chinese Room, where it is not clear whether there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not, this new account with its continuous treatment of possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate about such thought experiments looks the way it does. The crucial question is not whether there is such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we would say there (about the intentionality of the room). On traditional accounts, it becomes paramount to deal with the possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different from the ones we learn if it is possible. There are no available theories of thought experiments that account for thought experiments with impossible/incomplete scenarios. With the new account of counterfactual and by applying it to thought experiments we over come this difficulty.

The present study constitutes one of the first attempts to establish the extent to which Russian military thought became westernized by the end of the eighteenth century. The task is an important one in light of Soviet and Russian scholarship that maintains that Russia developed a unique, different, and, some argue, superior way of war to the West. This work argues that Russian military thought was greatly influenced by the ‘military enlightenment’ of Europe, and that the ideas proposed by Russia’s foremost military theoreticians were not as novel as previously claimed. Therefore, the final intellectual product was more a continuation of, rather than a break with, Western practices and traditions of warfare. In this respect, the underlying theme of this thesis clashes with traditional Russian national military historical scholarship. The second major theme of this study is to challenge the pervasive but flawed and often simplified interpretation of the Russian army and its soldiers as undisciplined and uneducated barbarians. Contrary to these misleading views, the writings of Russian theorists bring to light the concerns about discipline and education for the officers, personal hygiene and hospital care for the soldiers and Russian awareness of complex strategic theoretical issues. The humanitarianism and sophistication of early-modern Russian military thought thus becomes abundantly clear. The scope of this work is inescapably restrictive, and the period that it examines, roughly from 1757 to 1800, has been consciously chosen to reflect the ideas of Russia’s two most important and influential military statesmen: Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov.

This research is to discuss the Chinese pre-Qin legalist school, Shang Yang's political thought. First, the purposes of the research are as follows: 1.To understand the background of Shang Yang¡¦s political thought and analyze the foundation of his political thought. 2.To discover the principles of Shang Yang¡¦s political thought. 3.From the principles of Shang Yang¡¦s political thought, analyze his political objectives. 4.To analyze Shang Yang¡¦s actual policies of agriculture and fight. 5.To sum up this research results to comment on Shang Yang's political thought. Therefore, based on the purposes of the research, the principles of Shang Yang¡¦s political thought is rule by law, attempt to achieve the powerful nation. The concrete method is the policies of the agriculture and fight. So, the following are the results of the analysis of this research: 1.Shang Yang advocates ¡¥rule by law.¡¦ 2.Shang Yang promotes anti-wisdom. 3.Shang Yang advocates despotism. 4.Shang Yang contends that clear reward and hard punishment can make the monarch rule smoothly. 5.Shang Yang proposes that the monarch rules by the system, rather than by man.

<p>The present thesis is based on a scientifically informed reading of Fleck. In addition to the monograph, the material includes his additional philosophical writings and also his internationally published scientific articles. The sources provided by Fleck have been traced back to the time of their origin. Based on the above material, it is argued that rather than relativizing science, and thereby deeply influencing Kuhn, Fleck, attempting to participate in the current debates, is an ardent proponent of science, offering an internal account of its pursuit that accords with his often-contested epistemic concepts. The exposure of his description of the Wassermann reaction discloses a highly selected reading of the, at the time, available sources, but also its relation to the current debate on Einzelwissenschaften, or the standing of new emerging disciplines versus age-old ones, all occasioned by the remarkable progress of science that also affected philosophy. The divide between philosophers and scientists on the philosophical implications of modern physics is exposed as well as Fleck’s heuristic use of the latter topic in his epistemology. A more realistic account of his scientific accomplishment is provided that includes the unfeasibility of the manufacturing of an anti-typhus vaccine based on urine. It is finally argued that the modern interpretation, or the received humanist view of Fleck, is based on the, at the time of the rediscovery of the monograph, already endorsed program of STS writers opposing a scientifically informed reading of his texts.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2001. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 245-251). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001. / Bibliography: leaves 116-117.