The question of animal culture has been of interest for decades. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have played a key role in the debate of whether or not it is appropriate to use the term ‘culture' to describe animal behaviour and they continue to be one of the prime species for the study of the origins of human culture. Data suggesting that chimpanzees can be considered a cultural species continue to accumulate, but this has only enhanced the debate between proponents and opponents of animal culture. Opponents do not deny that behavioural diversity exists between different populations of the same species, but they maintain that such phenomena have little to do with human cultures and may be the result of genetic and environmental influences. In their view, human cultures are centred on socially shared sets of ideas, not behavioural traditions. In this thesis, my goal is to tackle this problem and to investigate whether a cognitive dimension can be found in some behavioural patterns of chimpanzees that have been put forward as examples of animal culture. To this end, I examine the different factors that could account for the development of tool use in animals (genetics, ecology, social). My first empirical contribution is a study of the tool use behaviour of the chimpanzees' closest relative, the bonobos, which are known to be limited tool-users in the wild. I show that captive bonobos are as flexible tool-users as chimpanzees, suggesting that genetic factors are unlikely to account for differences in tool use behaviour in the Pan clade. Second, through the use of field experiments, I show that wild chimpanzees from different Ugandan communities respond to the same apparatus and task in strikingly different ways. I interpret this finding as an outcome of differences in cultural knowledge, mainly because the affordances of their immediate environment do not determine their tool use behaviour. Finally, through a broad ecological and tool use survey of different chimpanzee communities in Uganda, I show that current ecological differences are poor predictors of tool use. I conclude that, if ecology plays a role in the development of tool use, then its influence is that of a selective force. Finally, when reviewing the outcome of this research I will argue that there is a profound cognitive dimension to tool use in wild chimpanzees, suggesting that behaviourally based definitions of animal culture may miss a key feature of the phenomenon, at least in chimpanzees. Chimpanzees are not only a cultural species, they also have a cultural mind.

For young infants, knowledge of physical objects and animate agents seems highly rigid, with no information combined across domains. Adult cognition, however, is more flexible. In this thesis, I use a special category of object—a tool—that can only be reasoned about appropriately if information is combined across domains. Using this special case, I examine whether older infants are capable of integrating functional information about the tool while making inferences about the intent of the tool-user. Experiment 1 shows that infants can reason about complex means-end sequences involving tools; and Experiments 2 and 3 both show that under some circumstances, infants can take into account functional information about the tool when making these sorts of inferences. Together, these studies extend previous findings about how infants understand complex means-end sequences, and demonstrate that by 13 months, infants are already combining knowledge across domains. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2007-08-28 11:26:07.974

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This thesis compares the tool-using behaviors and environments of nine chimpanzee study sites. In addition, tool-use in other animals is discussed, as is the social behavior of chimpanzees and the different contributions of wild and laboratory studies. Research centers on two primary questions:  Do chimpanzee study sites differ significantly in the types of tool-using behaviors they employ?  Is the amount of tool-using behaviors related to annual variability in rainfall or the overall wetness of a site? No significant differences exist between the different communities being studied. A significant correlation was found between diversity of tool-using behaviors and perhumidity index, a measure of overall wetness of a particular area. Finally, no correlations were found between diversity of tool-using behaviors and annual variability and rainfall. This analysis casts further doubt on the hypothesis that hominin technology evolved as a response to living in dryer, more open environments. / Tool-use and evolution -- Chimpanzee behavior -- Wild vs. captive studies -- Tool-use by chimpanzees -- Environment, study sites and methods -- Results / Department of Anthropology

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Gibbons (Hylobatidae), taxonomically apes, have been largely ignored in cognitive research. This is surprising given their unique phylogenetic position, being intermediate between the monkeys and great apes, and the available diversity of extant species. They are therefore, ideally placed to study the evolution of cognitive abilities in the hominoid line; they offer the opportunity to determine how the mental capacities of primates have changed through the transition from monkey to ape. This research aimed to begin to fill the void in our knowledge regarding the cognitive abilities of this family through investigations of their object manipulation and tool-use skills, relating the findings to the evolution of the hominoid brain. In a raking-in task, where the gibbons were presented with a tool that could be used to draw in an out-of-reach food item, these apes evidenced potentially insightful comprehension of object relationships when the tool and goal object were presented in direct alignment. They also proficiently used a rake to retrieve a reward while avoiding a trap that presented an impediment to goal attainment; however, in general, they required a period of learning to perform consistently. Once the necessary relationships between the tool and goal object were not physically situated in the task layout, as in true tool-use manipulation, the gibbons performed poorly. In a raking-in task where the necessary orientation for success had to be produced by the subject, no individual evidenced foresightful comprehension of the required action. There was some suggestion of learning the correct behaviour through associative processes. This finding was also supported by evidence from dipping experiments where the gibbons were provided with a transparent box containing a liquid reward and sticks that could be used as tools to access it. No individual developed dipping behaviour. The gibbons therefore, performed well on tasks when the salient relationships between tool and goal were directly perceivable. Once they became responsible for producing that relationship, performance was poor. When the necessary orientation between the tool and goal was not provided by the experimenter, the gibbons evidenced low motivation to manipulate the objects. Given the gibbons’ requirement for direct visual feedback to comprehend the causal interactions between objects, this likely hindered their learning process. Failure therefore on the true tool-use tasks may not represent a particular cognitive limitation in these apes. A consistent finding was that the hoolock gibbons (Bunopithecus) were the most attentive and effective of the four gibbon genera. This is potentially due to the more variable natural environment experienced by these apes, driving selection for greater exploratory tendencies and flexibility of behaviour. The findings from this, and other work on primate cognition, suggest that contrary to propositions put forward by proponents of modular accounts of hominid brain evolution, the cognitive architecture of non-human primates contains neural mechanisms capable of processing technical information that may not be completely encapsulated. Suggestions that no non-human possesses specialised cognitive machinery for understanding objects as tools are also challenged.

No description available.

The concept of culture has recently been used to explain behavioural variation and trans-generational continuity of behaviour in non-human animals and in chimpanzees in particular. However, few studies in the wild have systematically investigated how the environment and behavioural adaptation might influence behavioural diversity. In this context, one habituated community of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) at Bossou, Guinea, and two neighbouring non-habituated communities in the Nimba Mountains region of Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire were the subject of a detailed study of behavioural variation at the intra- and inter-community level. An ecologically-based approach was adopted to investigate variation in nest building, in the use of the oil-palm tree (Elaeis guineensis), in ant-dipping and in tool-choice and -manufacturing. A significant influence of environmental variables on nesting parameters emerged explaining much of the variation observed between the three sites. However, some differences that arose are more likely to reflect differences in social structure and organisation. The comparative study of the utilisation of the oil-palm tree failed to reveal proximate environmental parameters that might explain significant observed variations in use. These findings raise interesting and important questions pertaining to diffusion of behaviour between neighbouring chimpanzee communities. Dipping for driver ants, Dorylus spp., is often cited as one of the best examples of culture in chimpanzees. A detailed analysis of this behaviour at Bossou suggests that risk exposure affects frequency of performance in the developing chimpanzee and reveals a strong influence of prey characteristics, including aggressiveness and/or gregariousness , on tool length and technique employed. Variations in tool-choice and tool-manufacturing within and between three tool-use behaviours at Bossoui nvolving the use of a stick or a stalk were found to be significantly associated with the nature of the task and its predictability, emphasising the importance of environmental affordance and constraints on these processes. In addition, efficiency in behaviour across another set of three tool-use behaviours was explored focusing chiefly on age-class differences. An analysis of individual and community-level patterns of laterality in hand-use between these three tool-use behaviours is also provided. The data supply some evidence to support the selective advantages of lateralization in hand-use with respect to behavioural efficiency. The findings also suggest that haptic tasks have played an important evolutionary role in driving population-level handedness, and reveal that although complex tool-uses exhibited high levels of lateralization, these failed to show task specialisation across individuals. Finally, this thesis presents a comprehensive review analysis of individual and community-wide variation across a range of behaviours observed in chimpanzees and identifies paths and hypotheses that warrant further exploration and testing with the aim to gain further insight into cultural processes in nonhuman animals.

In this thesis, I argue that at least some animals have the sort of intentionality philosophers traditionally have only ascribed to humans. I argue for this through the examination of tool-use among New Caledonian crows and Bottlenose dolphins. New Caledonian crows demonstrate advanced tool-manufacture and standardization, while Bottlenose dolphins use social learning to a much greater degree than other animals. These two case studies fit nicely with many of the non-linguistic accounts of intentionality employed by philosophers. This thesis is aimed at showing that our basic philosophical concept of intentionality leaves room for intentional behavior on the part of non-human animals. Descriptions of human behavior are often contrasted with that of "lower" animals. Many have taken rationality as the characteristic that separates us from animals, and our notions about the superiority of humans have been passed down through theology and philosophy. From Plato onward, philosophers have created divisions that put humanity in a special position relative to all other creatures. Neglecting a careful analysis of animal behavior in making these divisions does a disservice not only to the animals themselves, but also to humans. This thesis is an attempt to start pulling a thread of the discussion about the specialness of humans out for examination. Specifically, I examine the case of intentionality in the framework of the tool-related behaviors of crows and dolphins. / Master of Arts

<p>This master thesis investigates the principal capability of artificial evolution to produce tool use behavior in adaptive agents, excluding the application of life-time learning or adaptation mechanisms. Tool use is one aspect of complex behavior that is expected from autonomous agents acting in real-world environments. In order to achieve tool use behavior an agent needs to identify environmental objects as potential tools before it can use the tools in a problem-solving task. Up to now research in robotics has focused on life-time learning mechanisms in order to achieve this. However, these techniques impose great demands on resources, e.g. in terms of memory or computational power. All of them have shown limited results with respect to a general adaptivity. One might argue that even nature does not present any kind of omni-adaptive agent. While humans seem to be a good example of natural agents that master an impressive variety of life conditions and environments (at least from a human perspective, other examples are spectacular survivability observations of octopuses, scorpions or various viruses) even the most advanced engineering approaches can hardly compete with the simplest life-forms in terms of adaptation. This thesis tries to contribute to engineering approaches by promoting the application of artificial evolution as a complementing element with the presentation of successful pioneering experiments. The results of these experiments show that artificial evolution is indeed capable to render tool use behavior at different levels of complexity and shows that the application of artificial evolution might be a good complement to life-time approaches in order to create agents that are able to implicitly extract concepts and display tool use behavior. The author believes that off-loading at least parts of the concept retrieval process to artificial evolution will reduce resource efforts at life-time when creating autonomous agents with complex behavior such as tool use. This might be a first step towards the vision of a higher level of autonomy and adaptability. Moreover, it shows the demand for an experimental verification of commonly accepted limits between qualities of learned and evolved tool use capabilities.</p>