Yes / Matt Meselson, Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology, Harvard University, 'Biotechnology and Weapons of Mass Destruction - the Future? ' November 2002.

No

In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention started to discuss the potential malign application of biological research and technology. This thesis examines how this issue of dual-use has been developed, discussed, and how solutions have been proposed. In order to do so, the thesis follows a neopragmatist approach. As a neopragmatist methodology is largely underdeveloped, the thesis explores some of the key aspects of neopragmatism, specifically its openness to various methods and theories, by directly applying it to the topic. As a result of this approach, the thesis starts with exploratory empirical research, which follows Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory. This research reviews how the problem of dual-use has been discussed in three communities: politics and security, ethics, and science. One of the results is that dual-use has primarily been discussed in the security community while the other two were only marginally involved. The proposed solution to the problem by the security community is to place the burden of responsibility on the scientific community. The second part of the thesis then uses theory, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Martin Heidegger’s work on questioning technology, to critically challenge this solution developed in the security community. The thesis concludes by identifying approaches to help deal with the dual-use issue. It also examines how the adoption of a neopragmatist methodology has influenced and guided the thesis.

This thesis addresses the role of education to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease, including biological weapons. Specifically, it aims to analyse how education was constructed as a potential instrument to mitigate specific security risks; if and how education could impact on risks; and how effectiveness of education as a risk mitigation measure could be improved. The research framework combines concepts of security, risk and education within a general constructionist approach. Securitization is used to analyse attempts to construct education as a tool to mitigate specific security risks; risk assessment is used to identify and characterize risk scenarios and potential for risks mitigation; and instructional design and evaluation models are used for the design and evaluation of education. The thesis contends that education has been constructed as a mitigation tool for what were presented as urgent security risks of deliberate disease. Nine attempted securitization moves are identified and assessed. Improved competences identified in four thematic areas, and built with education, can mitigate risks in specific scenarios via impacting factors that primarily influence risk likelihood. The thesis presents several examples of achieved learning objectives, and tools that can be useful to evaluate behavioural and risk impacts, though empirical results on these levels here are still scarce. Design and evaluation tools, illustrated through a large amount of original and pre-existing data from a range of countries and contexts, are presented that can improve effectiveness of education as a deliberate disease risks mitigation measure.

In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention started to discuss the potential malign application of biological research and technology. This thesis examines how this issue of dual-use has been developed, discussed, and how solutions have been proposed. In order to do so, the thesis follows a neopragmatist approach. As a neopragmatist methodology is largely underdeveloped, the thesis explores some of the key aspects of neopragmatism, specifically its openness to various methods and theories, by directly applying it to the topic. As a result of this approach, the thesis starts with exploratory empirical research, which follows Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory. This research reviews how the problem of dual-use has been discussed in three communities: politics and security, ethics, and science. One of the results is that dual-use has primarily been discussed in the security community while the other two were only marginally involved. The proposed solution to the problem by the security community is to place the burden of responsibility on the scientific community. The second part of the thesis then uses theory, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Martin Heidegger’s work on questioning technology, to critically challenge this solution developed in the security community. The thesis concludes by identifying approaches to help deal with the dual-use issue. It also examines how the adoption of a neopragmatist methodology has influenced and guided the thesis.

This thesis addresses the role of education to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease, including biological weapons. Specifically, it aims to analyse how education was constructed as a potential instrument to mitigate specific security risks; if and how education could impact on risks; and how effectiveness of education as a risk mitigation measure could be improved. The research framework combines concepts of security, risk and education within a general constructionist approach. Securitization is used to analyse attempts to construct education as a tool to mitigate specific security risks; risk assessment is used to identify and characterize risk scenarios and potential for risks mitigation; and instructional design and evaluation models are used for the design and evaluation of education. The thesis contends that education has been constructed as a mitigation tool for what were presented as urgent security risks of deliberate disease. Nine attempted securitization moves are identified and assessed. Improved competences identified in four thematic areas, and built with education, can mitigate risks in specific scenarios via impacting factors that primarily influence risk likelihood. The thesis presents several examples of achieved learning objectives, and tools that can be useful to evaluate behavioural and risk impacts, though empirical results on these levels here are still scarce. Design and evaluation tools, illustrated through a large amount of original and pre-existing data from a range of countries and contexts, are presented that can improve effectiveness of education as a deliberate disease risks mitigation measure.

Yes

Yes / In the discussions that have taken place over the past six years since the establishment by the Third Review Conference1 in 1991 of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts,known as VEREX, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint, there has been an increasing debate about the role of non-challenge visits in a regime for a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The arguments as to why on-site investigations are an essential and central element to such a strengthened regime were addressed in the Briefing Paper issued2 in July 1997. In this Briefing Paper, the necessity for non-challenge visits is addressed drawing upon the previous VEREX, Ad Hoc Group (AHG), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experience. The advantages and disadvantages of a regime containing non-challenge visits are considered and the conclusion is reached that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages and that non-challenge visits are an important element which could contribute significantly to the effectiveness of a future legally binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC.

Yes / Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention sets out the obligation for States Parties to implement the BTWC through appropriate national measures. Although some States have enacted such legislation, others have not and the Aum Shinrikyo incident in Tokyo in March 1995 underlined the importance of appropriate penal legislation both to implement the BTWC (and the Chemical Weapons Convention) and to criminalise any development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of such weapons for terrorist or criminal purposes. This Briefing Paper reviews the development of the language relating to Article IV of the BTWC by the four Review Conferences, notes the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention and then addresses the opportunity provided by the Ad Hoc Group negotiations to strengthen the BTWC through stronger implementation measures.

Yes