This study attempts to explore the strains that terror organization members experience prior to the training process in the organization. The primary goal of this research is to understand the relationship between the earlier experienced strains of terrorists and their violent behaviors. In the study a Turkish Hezbollah terror organization sample (N = 144) was utilized in the frame of Agnew's (1992) general strain theory. Initially, quantitative methods, such as bivariate analysis and multivariate analysis, were utilized to identify the cumulative effect of strains on the violent behaviors of terrorists. Later, by utilizing case studies with a qualitative approach the mediating effect of negative emotions (anger, frustration, depression and fear) were identified. This study found that among Turkish Hezbollah members, prior to joining the terrorist organization, individuals who experience higher levels of strain are more likely to perform violent acts when compared to individuals who experience lower levels of strain. This study affirmed earlier studies on strain-crime relationship. Moreover, utilized case studies support that negative emotions -specifically anger- mediate between strains and violent actions. In sum, this research retests and builds on Agnew's theory and argues that general strain theory can help terrorism studies to understand the sources of strains of terrorists and the effect of strains on their violent behavior.

This study aims to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into joining their terrorist organization. This study based on the assumptions that social networks and institutional structures are two main tools that are used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college educated students. In this sense, the researcher claims that Social Learning theory and Social Control Theories can be used to provide theoretical explanation to the Hezbollah’s recruitment strategy. Parallel to these theories assumptions, while having militants within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions. The researcher uses individual level secondary data related to members of the Turkish Hezbollah. The data comprised of self reports that each member submitted to the Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment process. The data are derived from the Turkish National Police’s database. Initially, frequency table is used to determine which structure and which theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah’s recruitment strategies. Then, to decide which demographic factors increase or decrease the likelihood of being recruited through social networks (social learning theory) or institutional structures (social control theory), logistic regression is used. Eight independent variables are used to identify those factors such as having Hezbollah militants within social networks, pursuing college education while being away from family, family’s religious ideology, having online or campus education, family size, income level, college student’s religiosity level, and reason for attending Hezbollah. The findings indicated that social networks and institutional structures are two important tools that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Social networks are more effectively used structures comparing to institutional structures. According to the results, there are two important variables have more weight on dependent variable comparing to other variables. While having militants within the social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, being away from families during college education increases the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.

Terrorism is a historical problem; however, it becomes one of the biggest problems in 21st century. September 11 and the following Madrid, Istanbul and London attacks showed that it is the most significant problem threatening world peace and security. Governments have started to deal with terrorism by improving security measurements and making new investments to stop terrorism. Most of the governments' and scholars' focus is on immediate threats and causes of terrorism, instead of looking at long-term solutions such as root causes and underlying reasons of terrorism, and the recruitment style of terrorist organizations If terrorist recruitment does not stop, then it is safe to say terrorist activities cannot be stopped. This study focused on the recruitment process by observing two different terrorist organizations, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. The researcher brings 13 years of field experience and first-person data gathered from inside the terrorist organizations. The research questions of this study were: (i) How can an individual be prevented from joining or carrying out terrorist activities?; (ii) What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?; (iii) What are the recruitment processes of the DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah?; (iv) Is there any common process of being a member of these three terrorist organizations?; and (v) What are the similarities and differences these terrorist organizations? As a result of this analysis, a terrorist recruitment process map was created. With the help of this map, social organizations such as family and schools may be able to identify ways to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations. Also, this map will also be helpful for government organizations such as counterterrorism and intelligence to achieve the same goal.

This study examines the patterns of involvement in terrorist activities for the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and Turkish Hezbollah members. The study is based on the assumption that terrorists differ in terms of their involvement in terrorist activities. In this sense, there are full-time and part-time terrorists. Full-time terrorists act professionally and do the assignments given by their commanders. Part-time terrorists, on the other hand, act on a non-professional basis and have their own motivations to participate in terrorist activities. For part-timers, there are various factors that may have an effect on their degree of involvement in terrorist activities. Their decisions regarding whether to participate in a specific terrorist act can be influenced by individual factors as well as the instructions and assignments given to them. In this study, these factors are categorized under four different headings; demographic, relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning. Data regarding the involvement in terrorist activities (as measured by arrest records) and demographics (age, gender, marital status, social class), relative deprivation (education, work status), frustration (school dropout, loss of a loved one in a counter-terrorism operation, family arrest), and social learning (family association to a terrorist group and recruitment method) was collected from terrorists’ autobiographies. Research hypotheses were tested using bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses. The findings indicated that relative deprivation, frustration, and social learning models can explain the differences in the degree of involvement in terrorism for DHKP/C members, but not for Turkish Hezbollah members (controlling for demographic variables). The results showed that these three models may account for some of the differences in involvement in terrorist activities.

This study examines the motivation factors that make some individuals (terrorists) confidential informants. The study is based on the assumptions of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories. Accordingly, main assumption of the present study is that some individuals with unsatisfied needs in religion-abusing terrorist (RAT) networks choose to become confidential informants to satisfy their predominant needs. The main hypothesis for the purpose of this study is “The individuals’ decision-making processes to cooperate with law enforcement intelligence (LEI) as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors during recruitment process.” The present study tests 27 hypotheses in order to answer two main research questions. To meet its objectives the present study uses quantitative research methodology, constructs a cross-sectional research design, and employs secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses of the research questions. A dataset was formed based on official records of Turkish National Police by including all confidential informants within eight different RAT networks in Turkey. First, individual effect of each motivation factor on being a confidential informant is tested and discussed in detail. Then two group specific multivariate models for being an informant in Al-Qaeda and Turkish-Hezbollah are illustrated, compared and contrasted. Both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses not only revealed the extent of individual effects of motivations among RAT groups, but also helped us to build fitting multivariate models that explain the probability of being informants in certain RAT networks. By doing so, the present study aims to make contributions to the literature and practice on this relatively unexplored phenomenon. Findings indicate that while some motivation factors are common among all RAT networks, the strength and direction of their effects vary among different RAT networks.