In the first chapter, I examine a variety of the factors that affect the price and demand of natural gas. Prior natural gas price research approaches utilized well-defined time series models. I have taken these historical approaches and explored an alternative approach to estimating the model- defined equilibrium market price based on the market clearing condition. Assuming that the natural gas market is a relatively efficient market, the market equilibrium price induced by the model should track the observed market price. A two-step estimation process includes - reduced formed regression estimations for each market component in the material balance equation, and solves for the market balance equation with identified coefficients and parameters for the market equilibrium price. The model results track the market price quite well, in both one period ahead forecasts and a simulated 36 months forecast case. The second chapter in the series "The Game that Drives the LNG Train" analyzes the strategies and decisions of major oil companies’ on selecting regasification terminal sites for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) along North American coastlines and delivery of regasified gas into regional domestic markets. Each participating firm’s decision is extensive and complex, involving multi-years of capital and human investments. Furthermore, fierce competition exists among firms procuring LNG cargos and servicing the same set of demand areas, i.e. the North America market. This paper will attempt to condense the whole strategy and decision-making process into a simplified multistage model. The model will focus on exploring the strategic elements of decisions for each participant firm in the competition through a game-theory lens. Extending from previous work on tying, the third chapter seeks a more structured result on the relationship of pre-commitment and exclusion due to tying under a Hotelling framework. A three-stage model is set up, which includes a conditional pre-commitment stage and an entry decision stage preceding the third stage of pricing competition. The paper concludes that: first, exclusion is possible even with zero fixed cost, and it is executed by conditional pre-commitment of tying upon entry. Second, conditional pre-commitment of tying only occurs if entry can be excluded, otherwise, tying is not profitable as independent pricing upon entry. / text

A Rationale for Tying Merchants' Membership of Platforms Serving Independent Markets. This thesis was submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Social Sciences in the Faculty of Humanities by Michael King during September 2010. I analyses the effect of tying sellers' membership of a monopoly platform to membership of another platform, which operates in an otherwise competitive market. Visa's contentious use of the honour-all-cards rule to tie their debit and credit cards is an example of such a tie-in. There has been a move to judge tying cases under "rule of reason", which permits dubious practices when they are indispensable to creating economic benefit. However, a proportion of the extra-surplus must be passed on to consumers ("pass on test"). Rochet and Tirole (2008) claimed that tying payment cards raised Visa's profit without harming end-users. However, this doesn't fully address the concerns of regulators. Hence, my thesis investigates whether tying satisfied the "pass on test". Part I: In Rochet-Tirole (2008) sellers operate in two independent markets (ç and d). Network A runs platforms in both markets; and Network B only operates in market d. The price-level (buyer-fee plus seller-fee) on a network's platforms is exogenously determined but they can choose the price-structure. My study extended this framework by explicitly modelling competition in the product market. Part II: Platform competition leads to a price-structure that maximizes the net-benefit received by buyers and sellers. In contrast, a monopoly platform extracts most of the surplus by encouraging excessive use of payment-cards. Therefore, if tying is prohibited, then competition for sellers in market d leads to an optimal price-structure. However, Network A extracts most of the surplus created by its monopoly platform. Finally, if the average transaction-cost, τ, exceeds the price-level, ρ, then the net-benefit generated by a monopoly platform remains strictly positive. Part III: By tying its platforms Network A can exclude Network B. However, Network A is unable to exclude Network B just by matching the net-benefit it generates; rather, it must "compensate" sellers for the extra competition they face from being on the same network. Therefore, if tying is permitted, then the total net-benefit on Network A exceeds the maximum benefit that can be generated by a single platform. Part IV: It was found that if transaction-fees, ρ, are high relative to transaction-costs, τ, then tying always increases the consumer surplus. However, if transaction-fees, ρ, are low relative to transaction-costs, τ, then tying doesn't benefit consumers; and will reduce the consumer-surplus if their transaction-costs are sufficiently high.

This paper analyses the effects of tying arrangements involving IP rights on innovation. Tying, with its ability to temporarily exclude others from the potential benefits deriving from innovation, is pro-innovative by providing firms the incentive to allocate resources to realize newer and better products. However, when tying is used with or in place of IP rights to only help protect entry or growth into a market, it could discourage innovation. Market dominance, especially coupled with technological tying can create a barrier towards competition. It is shown that most pro-competitive effects of tying can also be seen as pro-innovatory as intense competition in the marketplace is shown to lead to innovation. In more competitive markets firms are pushed to innovate in order to maintain or improve their positioning for their products. The courts are faced with a difficult balancing judgment regarding product tying involving IP.

This paper analyses the effects of tying arrangements involving IP rights on innovation. Tying, with its ability to temporarily exclude others from the potential benefits deriving from innovation, is pro-innovative by providing firms the incentive to allocate resources to realize newer and better products. However, when tying is used with or in place of IP rights to only help protect entry or growth into a market, it could discourage innovation. Market dominance, especially coupled with technological tying can create a barrier towards competition. It is shown that most pro-competitive effects of tying can also be seen as pro-innovatory as intense competition in the marketplace is shown to lead to innovation. In more competitive markets firms are pushed to innovate in order to maintain or improve their positioning for their products. The courts are faced with a difficult balancing judgment regarding product tying involving IP.

Apesar dos princípios da livre concorrência e da defesa do consumidor estar lado a lado em sede constitucional e terem uma relação bastante íntima, tendo em vista o objetivo comum que os une, percebe-se, com poucas ressalvas, que a defesa da concorrência e a defesa do consumidor, no Brasil, sempre se mantiveram quase que incomunicáveis. Um exemplo de conduta que realça essa íntima interface entre Defesa do Consumidor e da Concorrência é o abuso de posição dominante, que tem como uma das suas principais manifestações a venda casada (tying ou vente liée). A venda casada, por gerar danos à livre concorrência e constituir-se como uma falha interna na relação de consumo, vem a ser capitulada como prática abusiva no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (CDC) e como infração à ordem econômica na Lei de Concorrência. Assim, a prática comercial pode vir a ser reprimida simultaneamente pelas duas esferas, o que impinge um diálogo entre a tutela da concorrência e a tutela do consumidor. Desta feita, a presente dissertação visou a responder aos seguintes problemas de pesquisa: (i) qual o liame entre defesa do consumidor e da concorrência? (ii) Como essas defesas podem ser mais bem coordenadas e harmonizadas? (iii) É necessária a dúplice capitulação? (iv) como articular as defesas, a fim de que resultados mais efetivos no que toca ao bem-estar do consumidor possam ser atingidos? A conclusão que se chegou é que a dúplice repressão à venda casada – não só não constitui um bis in idem – como é necessária. Não há que se falar em repressão apenas pela esfera da concorrência ou pela do consumidor, uma vez que, como bem salientado ao longo do presente estudo, em ambas as hipóteses restaria o consumidor desprotegido, sem mecanismos de defesa. Dessarte, poderá haver a aplicação simultânea da Lei Antitruste e do Código do Consumidor a uma prática de venda casada, sendo que cada uma irá atuar em um nível diferente de proteção ao consumidor: a primeira de forma macro e a segunda, micro. No entanto, para que essa dupla tutela se torne eficaz, é necessário uma coordenação entre essas duas leis, a fim de que se preserve a coerência do sistema. / Although the principle of free competition and consumer protection are side by side in the constitutional seat and have a very intimate relationship, In view of the common goal that bind them, it is clear, with few exceptions, that antitrust and consumer protection in Brazil, always remained almost unreachable. An example of conduct that emphasizes this intimate interface between Consumer and Competition is the abuse of a dominant position, which has as one of its main manifestations the tying. The tying, since generates damage to competition and to the consumers, is typified as a violation of the economic order in the Competition Act and as an abusive practice in the Consumer Protection Code. Thus, commercial practice is likely to be suppressed simultaneously by the two spheres, which enforces a dialogue between the protection of the consumer and the protection of competition. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following research problems: (i) what is the link between consumer protection and competition protection? (ii) How these defenses can be better coordinated and harmonized? (iii) The dual capitulation is required? (iv) How to articulate the defenses to achieve more effective results, when it comes to the welfare of the consumer? The conclusion reached is that the twofold repression of tying - not only isn't a bis in idem - as it is needed. There is no way to speak of repression only by the sphere of competition or of consumer, since, as stressed throughout this study, in both cases the consumer would be left unprotected, without defense mechanisms. Thus, is possible that in a practice of tying occurs the simultaneous application of the Antitrust Act and the Consumer Protection Code. Each of these laws will act on a different level of consumer protection: the first, in the macro level and the second, on the micro. However, for this dual control becomes effective, it is necessary coordination between these two laws, in order to preserve the coherence of the system.

Apesar dos princípios da livre concorrência e da defesa do consumidor estar lado a lado em sede constitucional e terem uma relação bastante íntima, tendo em vista o objetivo comum que os une, percebe-se, com poucas ressalvas, que a defesa da concorrência e a defesa do consumidor, no Brasil, sempre se mantiveram quase que incomunicáveis. Um exemplo de conduta que realça essa íntima interface entre Defesa do Consumidor e da Concorrência é o abuso de posição dominante, que tem como uma das suas principais manifestações a venda casada (tying ou vente liée). A venda casada, por gerar danos à livre concorrência e constituir-se como uma falha interna na relação de consumo, vem a ser capitulada como prática abusiva no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (CDC) e como infração à ordem econômica na Lei de Concorrência. Assim, a prática comercial pode vir a ser reprimida simultaneamente pelas duas esferas, o que impinge um diálogo entre a tutela da concorrência e a tutela do consumidor. Desta feita, a presente dissertação visou a responder aos seguintes problemas de pesquisa: (i) qual o liame entre defesa do consumidor e da concorrência? (ii) Como essas defesas podem ser mais bem coordenadas e harmonizadas? (iii) É necessária a dúplice capitulação? (iv) como articular as defesas, a fim de que resultados mais efetivos no que toca ao bem-estar do consumidor possam ser atingidos? A conclusão que se chegou é que a dúplice repressão à venda casada – não só não constitui um bis in idem – como é necessária. Não há que se falar em repressão apenas pela esfera da concorrência ou pela do consumidor, uma vez que, como bem salientado ao longo do presente estudo, em ambas as hipóteses restaria o consumidor desprotegido, sem mecanismos de defesa. Dessarte, poderá haver a aplicação simultânea da Lei Antitruste e do Código do Consumidor a uma prática de venda casada, sendo que cada uma irá atuar em um nível diferente de proteção ao consumidor: a primeira de forma macro e a segunda, micro. No entanto, para que essa dupla tutela se torne eficaz, é necessário uma coordenação entre essas duas leis, a fim de que se preserve a coerência do sistema. / Although the principle of free competition and consumer protection are side by side in the constitutional seat and have a very intimate relationship, In view of the common goal that bind them, it is clear, with few exceptions, that antitrust and consumer protection in Brazil, always remained almost unreachable. An example of conduct that emphasizes this intimate interface between Consumer and Competition is the abuse of a dominant position, which has as one of its main manifestations the tying. The tying, since generates damage to competition and to the consumers, is typified as a violation of the economic order in the Competition Act and as an abusive practice in the Consumer Protection Code. Thus, commercial practice is likely to be suppressed simultaneously by the two spheres, which enforces a dialogue between the protection of the consumer and the protection of competition. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following research problems: (i) what is the link between consumer protection and competition protection? (ii) How these defenses can be better coordinated and harmonized? (iii) The dual capitulation is required? (iv) How to articulate the defenses to achieve more effective results, when it comes to the welfare of the consumer? The conclusion reached is that the twofold repression of tying - not only isn't a bis in idem - as it is needed. There is no way to speak of repression only by the sphere of competition or of consumer, since, as stressed throughout this study, in both cases the consumer would be left unprotected, without defense mechanisms. Thus, is possible that in a practice of tying occurs the simultaneous application of the Antitrust Act and the Consumer Protection Code. Each of these laws will act on a different level of consumer protection: the first, in the macro level and the second, on the micro. However, for this dual control becomes effective, it is necessary coordination between these two laws, in order to preserve the coherence of the system.

Apesar dos princípios da livre concorrência e da defesa do consumidor estar lado a lado em sede constitucional e terem uma relação bastante íntima, tendo em vista o objetivo comum que os une, percebe-se, com poucas ressalvas, que a defesa da concorrência e a defesa do consumidor, no Brasil, sempre se mantiveram quase que incomunicáveis. Um exemplo de conduta que realça essa íntima interface entre Defesa do Consumidor e da Concorrência é o abuso de posição dominante, que tem como uma das suas principais manifestações a venda casada (tying ou vente liée). A venda casada, por gerar danos à livre concorrência e constituir-se como uma falha interna na relação de consumo, vem a ser capitulada como prática abusiva no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (CDC) e como infração à ordem econômica na Lei de Concorrência. Assim, a prática comercial pode vir a ser reprimida simultaneamente pelas duas esferas, o que impinge um diálogo entre a tutela da concorrência e a tutela do consumidor. Desta feita, a presente dissertação visou a responder aos seguintes problemas de pesquisa: (i) qual o liame entre defesa do consumidor e da concorrência? (ii) Como essas defesas podem ser mais bem coordenadas e harmonizadas? (iii) É necessária a dúplice capitulação? (iv) como articular as defesas, a fim de que resultados mais efetivos no que toca ao bem-estar do consumidor possam ser atingidos? A conclusão que se chegou é que a dúplice repressão à venda casada – não só não constitui um bis in idem – como é necessária. Não há que se falar em repressão apenas pela esfera da concorrência ou pela do consumidor, uma vez que, como bem salientado ao longo do presente estudo, em ambas as hipóteses restaria o consumidor desprotegido, sem mecanismos de defesa. Dessarte, poderá haver a aplicação simultânea da Lei Antitruste e do Código do Consumidor a uma prática de venda casada, sendo que cada uma irá atuar em um nível diferente de proteção ao consumidor: a primeira de forma macro e a segunda, micro. No entanto, para que essa dupla tutela se torne eficaz, é necessário uma coordenação entre essas duas leis, a fim de que se preserve a coerência do sistema. / Although the principle of free competition and consumer protection are side by side in the constitutional seat and have a very intimate relationship, In view of the common goal that bind them, it is clear, with few exceptions, that antitrust and consumer protection in Brazil, always remained almost unreachable. An example of conduct that emphasizes this intimate interface between Consumer and Competition is the abuse of a dominant position, which has as one of its main manifestations the tying. The tying, since generates damage to competition and to the consumers, is typified as a violation of the economic order in the Competition Act and as an abusive practice in the Consumer Protection Code. Thus, commercial practice is likely to be suppressed simultaneously by the two spheres, which enforces a dialogue between the protection of the consumer and the protection of competition. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following research problems: (i) what is the link between consumer protection and competition protection? (ii) How these defenses can be better coordinated and harmonized? (iii) The dual capitulation is required? (iv) How to articulate the defenses to achieve more effective results, when it comes to the welfare of the consumer? The conclusion reached is that the twofold repression of tying - not only isn't a bis in idem - as it is needed. There is no way to speak of repression only by the sphere of competition or of consumer, since, as stressed throughout this study, in both cases the consumer would be left unprotected, without defense mechanisms. Thus, is possible that in a practice of tying occurs the simultaneous application of the Antitrust Act and the Consumer Protection Code. Each of these laws will act on a different level of consumer protection: the first, in the macro level and the second, on the micro. However, for this dual control becomes effective, it is necessary coordination between these two laws, in order to preserve the coherence of the system.

No description available.

<p>  </p> <p>Knot tying boards are low fidelity surgical simulators used to practice tying suture, but devices on the market currently provide no feedback and no way of changing out bands. A simple-to-use knot tying board with interchangeable bands capable of measuring force was designed. This board is comparable in cost to products currently available on the market. The knot tying board was then prototyped and tested. Four MD students completed trials of one-handed and two-handed knot tying with three throws per trail. In testing, the knot tying board was capable of measuring force data, such as peak force during knot tying and the final force the knot exerts on the bands. The device used in conjunction with experienced surgical skills coaches could prove a powerful tool for providing feedback to trainees, and a similar approach could be used with other low fidelity surgical simulators to improve feedback.</p>

Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.