This thesis examines the contribution of the Private Military and Security Industry (PMSI), as an element of the United States (US) total force, to the US military capability in pursuing Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003 until 2011. In order to do so, the study proposes a typology of five types of contribution categories which define the link between the ends demanded by the US government (strategic goals) and the use of the PMSI as a tool to help achieve them. By incorporating a model from the operations management field, the Hayes and Wheelwright's Four-Stage model, this thesis identifies the categories of Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler as distinct forms of engagement, constituting a framework for the assessment of the nature of the relationship between the contractors’ activities and the strategic goals they sought to help achieve. Applied to the case studies of armed private security services and base support services, this framework reveals that contractors became the Crucial Supporter of the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. In the aftermath of the ill-planned regime-change, followed by unforeseen operational circumstances on the ground, and constrained by the US domestic policy reservations towards prolonged nation-building efforts, the US government found both armed security contractors and base support contractors to be a critical asset of the US military strategy on the ground. Through their constructive contribution towards the size of the deployable force, the available timeframe, the objectives and the strategic goal of these operations, they became a key partner of the US military efforts in Iraq. Utilising a descriptive and exploratory approach, and relying on a range of sources, including official documents, semistructured interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US veterans from Iraq, this thesis highlights the PMSI’s strategic value in a complex expeditionary operation while providing a detailed insight in the complexity of modern warfare.

The belief that Scotland showed undue patriotism by providing a high proportion of volunteers in 1914-16 needs to be looked at in a new light. While the New Armies of 1914-16 may have been volunteer in concept, they were not volunteer in actuality, and, while there was no doubt a proportion of men in Scotland, as elsewhere in the British Empire, who were prepared to come forward for purely altruistic or 'patriotic' ideals, the majority enlisted for more practical or realistic reasons. External forces either pushed or pulled those men and enticed or forced them to enlist. Previous analyses have been primarily top down. We know how many men served, and with what units, but not why. This thesis is an investigation of Scottish recruitment from the bottom up, to determine whether or not those who enlisted came from any particular section of Scottish society. This investigates and explains the driving forces behind voluntary recruitment in Scotland, August 1914 - December 1915, its methods, course taken, and its impact on the country as a whole.

Chapter one adopts a systematic review methodology in order to identify relevant evidence concerning the clinical effectiveness of weight management programmes in the military. It explores the success of such programmes that adopt cognitive-behavioural components as part of their treatment approach as opposed to standard care offered by the military. The paper also offers areas for further research, particularly focused on the need for more longitudinal evidence of the success of these programmes and the longer term outcomes for an individual‟s career. Chapter two presents the empirical paper of the thesis. It describes a phenomenological qualitative study of UK army veterans‟ lived experiences of transition from military to civilian life. It explores how veterans have perceived the challenges of this transition and their experience of the support they have received from various services. Analysis revealed three major themes that captured the lived experiences of these veterans; centred on the consequences of leaving the army, surviving initial civilian life and reconstruction of an identity as a veteran. Chapter three presents a reflective paper that offers insights into the research journey of the main author and reflections of being on a clinical placement within a community mental health team for the Ministry of Defence. It was found that this was an asset in understanding the applicability of research findings to an everyday clinical setting. This paper also offers experiences and reflections of being a woman in a patriarchal multidisciplinary team; many of whom served in the British army themselves.

Non-compressible haemorrhage from within the torso and junctional regions constitutes the leading cause of potentially preventable death on the battlefield. It can be defined as haemorrhagic shock arising from injury to named torso vessels, pulmonary parenchyma, high grade solid organ injury and/or disruption of the bony pelvis. Data from the US Department of Defence Trauma Registry demonstrate a torso injury rate of 12.7% with 17.1% of casualties exhibiting torso injury and shock. The overall mortality is 18.7%, with major arterial injury and pulmonary injury identified as independent predictors of mortality on multivariate analysis. The UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry reports similar findings with the greatest burden of mortality occurring prior to hospital admission (75.0%), a rate that has remained unchanged over a decade of war. Injury from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in particular are associated with non-compressible haemorrhage, frequently causing traumatic lower extremity amputation in combination with torso injury. Contemporary surgical strategy relates to early operative haemorrhage control in patients presenting with shock. In patients sustaining a circulatory arrest, resuscitative thoracotomy and aortic cross clamping can be used to control inflow and increase cardiac afterload. The UK experience over 5 years at Camp Bastion demonstrated a mortality of 78.5%, with greatest survival observed in patients with the shortest time to thoracotomy. In patients sustaining lower extremity amputation following IED injury, 1 in 5 require a laparotomy for proximal vascular control, with less than half requiring further intra-abdominal intervention. There is a pressing need for a haemorrhage control and resuscitation adjunct in non-compressible haemorrhage that can be deployed prior to or as an adjunct to operative haemorrhage control. Resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta (REBOA) is a technique that can occlude the aorta without the need for an operating theatre. It is an experimental technique, so its effect on survival and physiology is unknown. In a porcine model of uncontrolled pelvic haemorrhage, infra-renal REBOA was shown to be as effective as chitosan gauze in the setting of normal coagulation. However, REBOA was associated with a significantly greater survival in a coagulopathic setting. Similar results were obtained when using a porcine model of abdominal haemorrhage in conjunction with thoracic REBOA. In both studies, balloon occlusion demonstrated a significant improvement in systolic blood pressure and other haemodynamic measures compared to the no-occlusion control groups. Having demonstrated a survival and haemodynamic benefit in uncontrolled haemorrhage models, the metabolic and inflammatory consequences of thoracic REBOA were characterised in further detail using a porcine model of controlled hypovolaemic shock. Occlusion for 30 and 90 minutes was associated with a significant lactate burden when compared to animals undergoing shock alone. However, following resuscitation with blood and intravenous fluid, normal physiology was restored within 6 hours. The inflammatory sequelae were studied following 30, 60 and 90 minutes of shock and occlusion. Increasing occlusion time resulted in an escalating release of interleukin-6 which manifest clinically as an increase in ARDS and need for vassopressor support. In order to develop a fluoroscopy free REBOA system, a series of human studies were undertaken to examine the relationship between an external measure of torso height and aortic length in order to guide insertion length. A retrospective examination of computed tomography in male trauma patients demonstrated a correlation between torso height and aortic length. This was confirmed by a prospective study which was also used linear regression to develop equations predictive of insertion length. Finally, the UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry was used to determine the need for REBOA in a population of UK military personnel injured over 10 years of conflict. Of 1317 severely injured patients 70.2% had no indication, 11.2% had a contra-indication and 18.5% had an injury pattern indication for REBOA. Of those with an indication for REBOA, 66 (27.0%) patients died en-route to hospital and 29 (11.9%) died in-hospital. In conclusion, non-compressible haemorrhage constitutes a significant burden of potentially preventable battlefield mortality. REBOA is a technique that can be used in the thoracic or infra-renal aorta as a haemorrhage control and resuscitation adjunct, prior to operative haemorrhage control. While associated with a significant survival advantage in models of uncontrolled haemorrhage, it is associated with a significant metabolic penalty, although with resuscitation this can be ameliorated successfully.

The topic of my thesis is “The campaigns of the Norman dukes of southern Italy to Byzantium, in the years between 1071 and 1108 A.D.” As the title suggests, I am examining all the main campaigns conducted by the Normans against Byzantine provinces, in the period from the fall of Bari, the Byzantine capital of Apulia and the seat of the Byzantine governor (catepano) of Italy in 1071, to the Treaty of Devol that marked the end of Bohemond of Taranto’s Illyrian campaign in 1108. My thesis, however, aims to focus specifically on the military aspects of these confrontations, an area which for this period has been surprisingly neglected in the existing secondary literature. My intention is to give answers to a series of questions, of which only some of them are presented here: what was the Norman method of raising their armies and what was the connection of this particular system to that in Normandy and France in the same period (similarities, differences, if any)? Have the Normans been willing to adapt to the Mediterranean reality of warfare, meaning the adaptation of siege engines and the creation of a transport and fighting fleet? What was the composition of their armies, not only in numbers but also in the analogy of cavalry, infantry and supplementary units? While in the field of battle, what were the fighting tactics used by the Normans against the Byzantines and were they superior to their eastern opponents? However, as my study is in essence comparative, I will further compare the Norman and Byzantine military institutions, analyse the clash of these two different military cultures and distinguish any signs of adaptations in their practice of warfare. Also, I will attempt to set this enquiry in the light of new approaches to medieval military history visible in recent historiography by asking if any side had been familiar to the ideas of Vegetian strategy, and if so, whether we characterise any of these strategies as Vegetian?

This thesis examines the evidence for the involvement in warfare of clerks and religious in England between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the twelfth. It focuses on bishops and abbots, whose military activities were recorded more frequently than lesser clergy, though these too are considered where appropriate. From the era of Christian conversion until long after the close of the middle ages, clergy were involved in the prosecution of warfare. In this period, they built fortresses and organised communities of warriors in time of peace and war. Some were slain in battle, while others were given promotion or lands for their martial exploits. A series of canonical pronouncements aimed to forbid or restrict the involvement of Christian clergy in organised bloodshed, and some writers branded militant clergy as corrupted by the lure of earthly power or even as having surrendered their sacerdotal status. This study therefore approaches the military practices of clergy alongside the legal and narrative treatments, and treats the latter as reactions to, not the background of, the former. This requires consideration of a wide range of narrative, diplomatic and legal source material. A broad approach shows that clerics’ military activities cannot be separated from their spiritual powers, that canonical treatment was more fragmented and less influential than has been assumed, and that the condemnations of some authors existed alongside others’ praise for clerics’ valour, loyalty, or commitment to defending their flocks. In consequence, the extended study of clerical participation in warfare is shown to have significant consequences for our conception of the bounds of military history, the construction of the licit and the illicit, and the nature of clerical identity itself.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the 51st (Highland) division over the course of the First World War. Underpinning the study is an analysis of both change and continuity, at home and overseas, and the performance of the division as a fighting unit. The key themes identified for study have been training, esprit de corps, recruitment and reinforcement, and battle performance. Through the investigation of the key themes, other important characteristics have been analysed, such as command and control, organisation, and the level of centralisation in both the formation and in the wider Army. Key questions in the research apply to both divisional study and to wider academic understanding of the First World War. The thesis considers a number of themes that have been neglected by historians old and new, and brings into sharp focus some areas of research that may have produced inaccurate assumptions. In addition, a substantial range and quantity of primary sources have been utilised, many unexplored until now. The selection of the 51st (Highland) Division for study was based on a number of criteria. (Highland) Division experiences were both unique and not unique. In some areas it was a very individual formation, but in other areas or at particular times of the war it was not.

On battlefields and within organizations, a fog obscures subordinate activity from superior observation, producing an information asymmetry endemic to most superior-subordinate relationships. A superior’s ability to observe, to peer through this fog, distinguishes different types of organizations, largely determining what tasks an organization may accomplish and how superior control is balanced against subordinate autonomy (James Wilson, 2000). Yet modern technology is lifting this fog, with each day increasing the detail and depth of what superiors may observe. This thesis explores superior control with modern technology, by introducing and assessing a new term, nanomanagement—where superiors use technology to control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates. Through interviewing mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies, who served in Iraq between 2003 and 2008, this qualitative study explores two questions. “Why nanomanagement?” seeks to understand the causes, or what may motivate nanomanagement. “How does nanomanagement influence superior control and subordinate autonomy?” seeks to understand the effects of nanomanagement. This thesis employs five factors—organizational culture, ex ante controls, ex post controls, hierarchical control and exogenous factors—as different theoretical frameworks to understand nanomanagement. Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers, modern variants of police patrols that reduce transaction costs and may reverse information asymmetry, are introduced. This thesis also suggests three terms to describe when nanomanaging superiors take action undermining traditional hierarchical control: shifting (focusing attention on subordinate levels), drifting (acting at subordinate levels), and grifting (cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at levels beneath their immediate subordinates). These actions signal a new form of hierarchical control by exclusion—ex claudere control. By analyzing a case where much of the fog separating superior from subordinate thinned and lifted, this thesis assesses and updates the long fought battle between superior control and subordinate autonomy.

'To bewilder the enemy and mislead him continually as to our real positions and attentions is one of our most hopeful tasks and to do this ingenuity, imagination and daring are required.'(Ronald Penrose, 1941, Home Guard Manual of Camouflage, p.13) This thesis approaches the cultures and geographies of military conflict, charting the history of military camouflage through a multi-faceted biography of this technology’s life-path. By studying the scientific biography of Dr Hugh Cott (1900-1987), eminent zoologist and skilful artist turned camoufleur in WWII, entwined with the fragmentary mobile biographies of other camouflage practioners, including artists, animals and even a magician, the sites and spacings of camouflage’s life-path from the late-nineteenth century into the Desert War are traced. The military’s enrolment of diverse outside specialists practised in visual literacy is examined to reveal that technological development led to transformations, not only in military knowledge, but also in the militarism of knowledges such as science and art. Moving through the scientists’ fieldsite, the committee boardroom, the military training site and the soldiers’ battlefield, this thesis uncovers the history of a most ambiguous military invention, exposing its darker patterning and thus subverting a long-dominant narrative of camouflage as solely a protective technology. Furthermore, this camouflage biography is narrated from the perspective of the technology’s inventors and practioners as a means to encounter the situated and also embodied nature of technological innovation in military conflict. It demonstrates that, as camouflage transformed battlefields into unsettling theatres of war, there were lasting consequences not only for knowledge and technology, but also for both the ethics of battle and the individuals enrolled in this process. Overall, this geographically structured biography explores how camouflage is a jarring technology, combining aesthetic and artistic appreciation with complex scientific theory, to guileful and deadly effect.

Counter-insurgency assumed a status during the twentieth century as one of the British military‟s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after World War Two, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power the opportunity to regularly deploy against an irregular enemy. Yet this quantity of experience has been misguidedly conflated with quality. This thesis holds that the British, far from being the counter-insurgent exemplars that history has benevolently cast them, have in fact consistently proven to be slow learners and slow strategic burners in the realm of counter-insurgency warfare. The case study-based nature of this thesis, utilising the chronologically and geographically dispersed examples of Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Yemen (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟ (1969-79), culminates with an analysis of the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). This thesis will blend historical narrative with critical analysis in order to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse British inertia in counter-insurgency and help unpack the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. Three major dimensions emerge. These elements constitute a „Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model‟, and were carefully selected as comprising the major causal and impacting factors contributing to success or failure in counter-insurgency, and were settled upon after an exhaustive review of primary and secondary literature relating to counter-insurgency, both historical and doctrinal. The Tri-Partite Model is constructed by three interactive and interdependent factors: the counter-insurgent, the insurgent, and the international political context.