This thesis presents a comprehensive account of the complex relationship between the British government and the domestic military-naval arms industry from the armistice in 1918 until the period of rearmament in the 1930s. Challenging traditional 'declinist' assumptions, it offers a multifaceted interpretation of the industry's strengths and weaknesses and its place in national security. In this regard, British governments always prioritised national interests over the private armament manufacturers' particular concerns and never formulated a specific policy to help them adjust to peacetime conditions. Indeed, the wartime experience of industrial mobilisation – the mass production of war material by ordinary firms – made specialist arms producers appear less important in supply planning: a view that proved more important than disarmament and retrenchment in damaging state-industry relations and, together with Britain's liberal economic traditions, helped to foster an enduring but exaggerated sense of relative weakness. Faced with the government's apparent indifference, the overextended arms industry underwent comprehensive internal reorganisation, led by Vickers and supported hesitantly by the Bank of England. This reduced the overall number of manufacturers but it also brought modernisation and a comparatively efficient nucleus for emergency expansion. Internationally, British firms retained a large share of the global arms market despite rising competition. Policymakers rarely accepted widespread public criticism that private armaments manufacture and trading were immoral but believed that the League of Nations' ambition to enforce all-encompassing international controls posed a far greater risk to British security. Although the government imposed unilateral arms trade regulations to facilitate political objectives, and was forced to address outraged popular opinion, neither seriously damaged the manufacturers' fortunes as the country moved towards rearmament. Indeed, the arms industry was never simply a victim of government policy but instead pursued an independent and ultimately successful peacetime strategy, before rearmament led to a cautious renewal of state-industry relations.

BACKGROUND: Over 30% of the British Army‟s Infantry Recruits who underwent training between 1999 and 2003 failed to complete their training. Previous studies have focused predominantly on identifying the cumulative reasons for failure. There is a dearth of research investigating the effect of failure on the individual recruit and what influences their ability to pass training. AIM: The overall aims of this study were: to achieve an understanding of the role that antecedent personal, social and demographic factors play in a British Army recruit‟s ability to complete basic training; to investigate the possibility of identifying predictive factors that would identify infantry recruits who were at risk of being unable to cope with the transition to life in the British Army; and to explore the reasons given by those recruits who failed to complete basic training to develop a more comprehensive understanding of why recruits fail. METHODS: All new army recruits joining the first and second battalion between September 2002 and March 2003 were invited to take part in the study. A biographical questionnaire based on a modified version of the US Army‟s 115 item biographical questionnaire form was self-completed prior to infantry training by all those agreeing to take part in the study. Study participants were monitored weekly throughout their training and the training outcome (pass/fail) was recorded. The data was randomly split into a development dataset (two thirds) and a test dataset (one third). Independent variables were grouped into five categories (Demographic & Physical Measurement, Education, Outdoor Education, Non-Physical Activity and Conduct and Behaviour) and tested univariably and multivariably to examine their association with training outcome in the development dataset using logistic regression. The multivariable model was then used to construct a score and its sensitivity and specificity was tested using the test dataset. All those within the study who failed to complete Infantry recruit training were invited to take part in a qualitative semi-structured exit interview. These interviews were analysed using framework analysis methodology. Findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis were integrated to determine whether prediction of failure was practicable and to develop an increased understanding of the impact that antecedent factors and training experiences contributed to training failure. RESULTS: Of the study cohort of 999 recruits 36.2% (n=362) failed. Within the failure group 74.4% (n=269) gave reasons to suggest that this was attributable to difficulties in adapting to life in the British Army Infantry. Factors associated with higher odds of failure were: absence of female siblings (p=0.005), aggressive coping strategies (p=0.013), use of ecstasy (p=0.02), evenings per week spent at the family home (p=0.032), truancy (p=0.039), an increased number of schools attended (p=0.046) and classroom behaviour (p=0.052). The area under the curve on the test dataset was 0.58 (0.501-0.65 95% CI). Analysis of the qualitative data suggested that there was a marked difference between the socio-personal identity of recruits who failed training and the organisational identity of the British Army Infantry. Cognitive dissonance and varying extremes of stress were reported by those recruits that failed during the transition to military life. CONCLUSION: A screening tool constructed from items of the biographical questionnaire was unable to predict failure in training with sufficient accuracy to recommend its routine use for new recruits to British Army Infantry training. This study has identified that there is a lack of fit between military identity and the socio-personal identity of the infantry recruit which results in dissonance and stress during the transition into the military. It is recommended that future studies should focus on how to reduce the psychological impact of the transition into infantry training.

This Doctoral dissertation investigates non-state military formations. Kilcullen’s notion of ‘Hearts and Minds’, which suggests that through engagement and diplomacy, populations can be persuaded to believe that an enhanced military will protect them, tends to lack capacity to recognize the population as identifying their own role in the conflict. The core problem is that discussions about engagement regularly remain meta-theoretical, a tool of soft-power at most and based on theories of hegemonic narratives and ‘cultural awareness’, and have had arguably little effect on mapping different armed-campaigns in an insurgency. This doctoral research project seeks to analyse the operative elements of narrative that ultimately allow for communities to mobilise for an armed anti-insurgency movement and, more importantly, permit community militias to provide for their own security and governance, as well as strive to deny the territory and human capital to the insurgents. Hence, this investigation takes the notion of security, counter-insurgency and anti-insurgency as a sociospatial phenomenon than solely an ideological issue. Accordingly, this research revisits anthropological and sociological data with the aim of demonstrating that non-state military formations have fundamental political context and military preferences than determined by culture or solely military objectives. More specifically, it advocates that ethnography is the way forward to map the societies in conflict, arguing that collective action will develop even in the absence of assistance from a superior military. This dissertation takes care not to make an anthropological comparison of the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, but rather a political comparison. Local concepts and vocabularies are used, with supplementary presentations which map the sociospatial range which come to define the conflict and security. Local concepts and vocabularies provide background information on points in the anti-insurgency campaign, discussion of actors involved and information on specific context addressed. Each chapter in the dissertation contains very specific problematised issues which narrow the conditions of each case study, but adds to the overall understanding of non-state military formations. The set and study are designed to bring a parallel understanding to counter-insurgency engagement strategy that emphasise the local social structures over weak, centralised security structure.

This thesis considers the influence of secret intelligence on UK chemical and biological warfare related foreign policy. Using the Butler Report, published in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War as a reference, a model of intelligence and foreign policy interaction will be constructed. This model will then be used as a baseline against which to compare the interaction of intelligence and foreign policy relating to chemical and / or biological weapons from three case studies; the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya. Specifically, this thesis will consider how, in each of the three case studies: intelligence linked to foreign policy, what role intelligence had in the termination / exposure of those programmes, what factors might be seen to affect that relationship, and whether intelligence might be seen to be representative of state power. The thesis will argue that the 2003 Iraq War, as described by Butler, marked a paradigm shift in terms of the relationship between intelligence and foreign policy. In particular, it will be argued that the lead up to that war marks a transition in the function of intelligence from something that had always worked to gather information to inform foreign policy to hunting for information to directly support or justify a foreign policy decision that has already been taken. Each of the three case studies will also show the intelligence and foreign policy relationship is further influenced by other factors including personalities, organisational structures and cultures as well as the perceived importance of that case study as a political issue. The thesis will conclude by suggesting that the case studies examined provide several policy recommendations; that HUMINT is essential in counterproliferation efforts, that the development of technical specialists with UK intelligence agencies is vital to prevent future proliferation crises, and that pre-emptive war places such rigorous demands on the intelligence agencies it seems they are at present unable to respond quickly enough – this requires urgent action if UK foreign policy is to continue to purse counter-proliferation as a key objective.

Though the civil-military relations field has seen a lot of theoretical work in recent years, the field still lacks consistent overarching theories. This dissertation argues that the field requires a new and better theoretical framework. Scholars do not agree about how to define key concepts or how these concepts affect one another. They therefore have a tendency to talk past one another when debating and developing theories of civil-military relations. This dissertation develops a new and more sophisticated theoretical framework for elite civil-military relations. The field’s current theoretical framework was developed by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State. This dissertation uses his framework as a starting point for a larger conceptual analysis, where political and military sociology, international relations, political theory, and military science are used to define the key concepts of civil-military relations. There are two heterogeneous types of civil-military relations that should be studied separately: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. Political science approaches to civil-military relations, such as this dissertation, typically focus on the latter type. Elite civil-military relations consist of two separate fields of study: civilian control and military effectiveness. Elite civil-military relations function as a system that essentially depends on civilian overall preferences, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the institutional set-up of the state, and the actual skills of civilian and military elites. The dissertation challenges several of the field’s established truths. It shows that one cannot claim that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, the choice of policy depends on the situational circumstances. It also shows that military professionalism plays a less significant role than commonly thought. It clarifies that civilian control depends on both the internal norms of the officer corps and the external control institutions of the state. Finally, it demonstrates that Samuel Huntington’s work, though clearly impressive for its time, lacks the sophistication needed of a modern social science theory and theoretical framework. It therefore argues that the civil-military relations field should move beyond The Soldier and the State.

This thesis argues that contemporary views of the laws of arms among soldiers, and of the laws of war by legal theorists, influenced particular military campaigns and individual actions in a variety of armed conflicts. Elizabeth I’s officer corps were careful to act in wars so that their actions would be seen as honourable by outside observers in the belief that such actions would add to their personal glory. Their individual and corporate perception of the laws of war directly affected military practices. However, the Elizabethan military establishment was engaged in conflicts that did not conform to contemporary views of just war. Catholic popes funded military expeditions against England and its dominion of Ireland, where the leaders were granted commissions to wage holy war not just war. The suppression of armed rebellions in Ireland employed numerous soldiers, and much of the machinery of state was supported by the English military. Holy war and counterinsurgency operations had no parallels in just war theory. The laws of war provided an important new context for re-evaluating military practices. Although legal discourse was predominantly ordered towards fighting regular wars, with careful reading of contemporary sources, there are important indicators that illuminate contemporary justifications for some of the more brutal military actions associated with the English military establishment, particularly in Ireland. By re-examining the discourse on the laws of war, the thesis finds that soldiers took seriously the customs of war and through them, it reassesses the motivations and mentalities of commissioned officers. This discourse was then used as a basis by which the conduct of soldiers can be understood and contextualised within English political and ethical structures.

Individuals carrying threat objects inside secured areas possess significant risk to security of establishments and safety of public. Traditional weapon inspection equipment is limited in portability and requires trained operators in confined security checkpoints. Although various methods to screen people for threat objects have been employed at secured establishments, screening equipment and procedures have not been designed to work in open spaces like airport check-in areas, hospitals, schools and university entrances. Coupled to this, relatively large numbers of false alarms from non-threat metal objects are identified as a threat by the current Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) screening equipment, is a major cause of concern and is associated with higher operational costs. Hence, the design and development of a concealed weapon detection system, with reduced false alarms and increased detection along with classification capability that can operate in a large open area is essential. A comprehensive numerical model of a CWD system, using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) method, to detect and classify metal objects with accuracy within a single zone of a multi zone Open Area CWD (OACWD) system, was developed. A mathematical model was developed and applied to the time-domain transient electromagnetic field, which are modelled and simulated using FEA methods. The methods were then applied to a single zone of a multi zone OACWD system to create an object signature database utilising the decay time constant; a unique property of metal objects in time-domain transient electromagnetic fields. The objects were detected by the unique signature property in OACWD system, Since early and intermediate stages was found contain object signatures, receiver current for these stages are digitised and stored in a weapon database, which is then used to match target for identification within the OACWD system. The thesis analyses the following characteristics of a single zone OACWD system; target material variation, target shape (both geometric and common weapon shape) variation, size, rotational variation, proximity variation of targets, the successful estimation and comparison of these parameters lead to classification of metal objects in OACWD system. This work also explores the characteristic properties and components of OACWD models such aspublic safety and the privacy of individuals using the system. The system, when integrated with other screening devices, e.g. Close Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring system, is able to find individuals with threat objects in real-time detection space. Summarizing, In this thesis work, single zone detection system was designed by developing have developed an electromagnetic circuit to design, which can successfully detect threat metal objects irrespective of their orientation based on time constant decay. This system is a significant advance over the existing portal based detection system, as it would reduce the incidence of false alarms and traffic congestion at the security establishment.

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the reformed British militia between its reconstitution in 1852 and its abolition (and replacement by the Special Reserve) in 1908, addressing one of the major remaining gaps in our understanding of the auxiliary forces of this period. The post-1852 militia has generally been overshadowed by its eighteenth and early nineteenth century predecessor, and of the few major works that do examine the force after its reform, most do so as part of broader studies examining it from the point of view of the regular army, or as an epilogue to a much broader study of the militia of the earlier period, or the wider amateur military tradition as a whole. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to provide the first dedicated study of the reformed British militia in recent years. It will move beyond the limited ‘top-down’ approach characteristic of many works examining the wider Victorian army and instead tap into a more recent methodological trend which utilises a range of national and local archival material to examine the nuances of what remained a locally organised force. It will examine not just the role of the militia and the way in which it was organised, but also study the nature and composition of its officer corps, its rank and file, and will investigate areas which have been hitherto largely ignored such as the way discipline was maintained in what remained an amateur force. It will conclude with an examination of the militia’s unprecedented service during the South African War before going onto examine the process by which the militia was ultimately abolished and replaced by the Special Reserve (and ask whether or not this represented a moment of continuity, or an outright break with the past.) This study rejects the idea that during this period the militia largely became ‘an anachronistic auxiliary’ to the regular army. There can be no doubt that it became increasingly centralised under the control of the War Office and that it also provided a vital role as a source of both officers and men for the regular army. Yet by looking at a mix of both national and local archival material, a more nuanced picture emerges. Several units managed to retain a degree of organisational independence and a social distinctiveness from the wider army. Furthermore, many of the reforms which altered the organisation of the force had important benefits. Compared to the 1850s and 1860s, during which the newly reconstituted force was forced to yield to the exigencies of the regular army, the militia of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s was arguably better trained, better equipped and quantitatively stronger than during the preceding decades.

This thesis examines the utility of coercion theory in complex contemporary conflicts through a study of the Afghan conflict as it unfolded in the provinces of Faryab and Kunduz from 2005 to 2012. The last two decades have produced ample examples of incidents where the UN, international alliances or states have found it necessary to use force in order to coerce states or armed groups to stop unacceptable activities or change their behaviour. However, the potential of military force to induce behavioural change in such conflicts is understudied and poorly understood. In the Afghan conflict the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together with the Afghan security forces applied force in order to influence the Taliban and other groups who violently opposed the elected government to change their behaviour. Although neither ISAF nor the participating nations had articulated a coercive strategy, force was used consistent with coercion theory on a number of occasions. Coercion theory consists of a number of assumptions and presuppositions, the existence of which should be present on the ground for theory to have utility. This thesis argues that these were generally not, or only to a limited degree present in the Afghan conflict. It further argues that in the cases where ISAF and its Afghan allies applied force consistent with theory, it did generally not translate to the desired outcomes, in particular when coercion represented the dominant effort. This thesis consequently argues that coercion theory is not well suited to provide explanatory power to or predict outcomes in conflicts that are comparable to the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, theory’s presumption of unitary actors, the rationality presumption and the notion of the credible threat is insufficient. Theory’s notion of coercive mechanisms also assumes a connection between human behaviour and what may influence it that is overly simplistic. This consequently proposes a revised set of assumptions and presuppositions as well as a revised understanding of mechanisms that acknowledges that coercion alone is rarely sufficient to instil sustainable change.

The purpose of the thesis is to reinterpret Lord Wellesley's forward policy in India, with particular reference to his dealings with the Marathas, and to consider its motivation and the reasons for its failure. Lord Wellesley was the product of his age and environment. He was a colonial with ambitions to play a major role in metropolitan affairs. At the time of his appointment as Governor General of India the most important aspect of metropolitan concerns was the war with France, so that a major element in his policy was the protection of India from French interference. His policy was formed before he reached India, and had as its motivation, not only fear of the French, but fear of aggression by the Indian rulers, with or without French support. This fear derived from a conviction that Indian rulers were totally untrustworthy; only treaties permitting British control of their affairs (subsidiary treaties) could be effective to preserve peace in India. A balance of power between the Indian states, which was thought to have existed five years earlier, had been destroyed. Lord Wellesley succeeded at Mysore and Hyderabad, but failed with the Marathas. His primary target had been the Pune state, which was emphasised in the autumn of 1800 by conditional orders given to Arthur Wellesley to occupy Pune in certain circumstances. These did not occur and he retired. Meanwhile a new treaty had been concluded with the Nizam which was intensely provocative to the Marathas. It involved the British in protecting the Nizam's territory from all comers, including the Marathas who had legitimate claims on the Nizam. Their pursuit of them was liable to lead to war at some point and the British obligation made Lord Wellesley's forward policy towards them irreversible. The Peshwa of Pune was driven from Pune by Holkar and concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the British. This further provocation of the Marathas led to war with Sindhia and the Raja of Berar. The war was short lived and peace treaties were concluded with the Maratha chiefs separately by Arthur Wellesley who had been granted plenipotentiary powers in Western India. His policy was one of conciliation, not as Lord Wellesley's conquest. As a result the British failed to dominate Sindhia. Holkar now arrived on the scene and after abortive diplomatic exchanges war was declared on him. Lake the Commander-in-Chief failed to conquer Holkar, and Arthur Wellesley took no direct part in the war. Sindhia was sympathetic to Holkar and elements of his army, and, later, Sindhia himself, joined him. Lake's failure and Arthur Wellesley's divergent policy led to Lord Wellesley's failure to dominate the Marathas and, therefore, his failure to bring peace to India by conquest.