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Wanderers of Empire: The Tropical Tramp in Latin America, 1870-1930Werner, Jack 12 July 2018 (has links) (PDF)
U.S. public and private imperial interests confronted the problem of labor and labor power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the U.S. empire expanded into Latin America and the Caribbean. The question of how to make an empire work spurred the creation of new labor regimes reliant on black West Indians who traveled to work in the Panama Canal Zone and on United Fruit Company (UFCO) banana plantations. Just as importantly, new labor regimes engendered new categories for troublesome laborers. One of these classifications, “tramp,” surfaced in the United States after the U.S. Civil War as a shorthand for vagrant, vagabond, and hobo. This thesis examines the so-called “tramp crisis” of the late nineteenth century to show how questions of labor invariably shaped problems of empire. As a category, the tramp moved outside of the United States where various U.S. foreign policymakers, writers, and business officials created the idea of the “tropical tramp” in U.S. imperial spaces. This label, tropical tramp, offers scholars a different starting point to analyze larger issues of whiteness, masculinity, sexuality, class, and the U.S. empire. By following discursive formations of the tramp and tropical tramp into Central and South America, this thesis argues that the figure of the tramp represented someone unbefitting the U.S. empire’s desired sociopolitical order.
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The decision to apply a modified Reagan doctrine towards Mozambique : a case study of the bureaucratic political modelVenables, Robert Andrew 01 1900 (has links)
The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan
Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential
administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of
Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing
the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the
volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely
Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model,
this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met,
why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan
Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola
or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a
written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant
part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted
the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US
Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that
President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real
significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such
reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and
Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the
“Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the
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same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government
bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is
devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians
(both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making
process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the
doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan
Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their
objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other
factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)
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The decision to apply a modified Reagan doctrine towards Mozambique : a case study of the bureaucratic political modelVenables, Robert Andrew 01 1900 (has links)
The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan
Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential
administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of
Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing
the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the
volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely
Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model,
this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met,
why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan
Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola
or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a
written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant
part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted
the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US
Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that
President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real
significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such
reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and
Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the
“Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the
3
same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government
bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is
devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians
(both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making
process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the
doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan
Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their
objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other
factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)
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Les États-Unis d'Amérique face a la reconnaissance d'État : les cas des États balkaniques, du Kosovo et du QuébecLozeau Laplante, Frédérick 12 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire s’intéresse au comportement américain en matière de reconnaissance d’État. Il tente d’identifier quels sont les facteurs susceptibles d’être appliqués par les États- Unis d’Amérique dans l’hypothèse d’une éventuelle reconnaissance du Québec. Les évènements politiques survenus au cours des trente dernières années au Québec ont non seulement suscité un fort intérêt à Washington, ils ont également conduit le gouvernement américain à mettre en place une approche politique particulière à l’endroit du Québec. Utilisée à partir de la fin des années 1970, cette approche spécifique (qui fait maintenant office de ligne de conduite) demeure encore aujourd’hui celle qui prévaut à la Maison- Blanche.
En dépit de la tenue de deux référendums sur la souveraineté en 1980 et en 1995, le Québec demeure encore aujourd’hui une province de l’État canadien. Cependant, s’il devait un jour accéder à l’indépendance, il y a fort à parier que la décision des États-Unis de reconnaître le Québec serait modulée à partir d’intérêts sécuritaires ponctuels, mais aussi en fonction d’intérêts politiques ou économiques. Dans la majorité des cas depuis la dissolution de la Yougoslavie en 1991, les États-Unis d’Amérique ont agi ainsi. L’analyse du comportement américain lors de la reconnaissance récente du Kosovo en 2008 vient appuyer ces dires et démontre que Washington utilise la même approche pour reconnaître de nouveaux États depuis au moins 20 ans. / This master’s thesis focuses on the U.S. behaviour in matter of State recognition. It attempts to determine what are the determining factors that the United States would take into account in an eventual process of recognition of a sovereign Quebec. The political events over the last thirty years in Quebec have not only attracted great interest in Washington, they also led the U.S. government to define a policy towards Quebec. Used since the late 1970’s, this specific approach and line of conduct still prevails even today at the White House.
Despite the two referendums on sovereignty held in Quebec in 1980 and 1995 the issue of Quebec sovereignty is still relevant. However, if it were ever to achieve sovereignty, it's safe to say that the U.S. decision to recognize Quebec would be modulated on security interests as well as political or economical interests. In most cases since the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 such as been the position of the United States. The analysis of U.S. behaviour towards Kosovo in 2008 supports these facts and demonstrates that Washington has been applying the same approach in matters relating to the recognition of new States for the past 20 years.
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Les États-Unis d'Amérique face a la reconnaissance d'État : les cas des États balkaniques, du Kosovo et du QuébecLozeau Laplante, Frédérick 12 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire s’intéresse au comportement américain en matière de reconnaissance d’État. Il tente d’identifier quels sont les facteurs susceptibles d’être appliqués par les États- Unis d’Amérique dans l’hypothèse d’une éventuelle reconnaissance du Québec. Les évènements politiques survenus au cours des trente dernières années au Québec ont non seulement suscité un fort intérêt à Washington, ils ont également conduit le gouvernement américain à mettre en place une approche politique particulière à l’endroit du Québec. Utilisée à partir de la fin des années 1970, cette approche spécifique (qui fait maintenant office de ligne de conduite) demeure encore aujourd’hui celle qui prévaut à la Maison- Blanche.
En dépit de la tenue de deux référendums sur la souveraineté en 1980 et en 1995, le Québec demeure encore aujourd’hui une province de l’État canadien. Cependant, s’il devait un jour accéder à l’indépendance, il y a fort à parier que la décision des États-Unis de reconnaître le Québec serait modulée à partir d’intérêts sécuritaires ponctuels, mais aussi en fonction d’intérêts politiques ou économiques. Dans la majorité des cas depuis la dissolution de la Yougoslavie en 1991, les États-Unis d’Amérique ont agi ainsi. L’analyse du comportement américain lors de la reconnaissance récente du Kosovo en 2008 vient appuyer ces dires et démontre que Washington utilise la même approche pour reconnaître de nouveaux États depuis au moins 20 ans. / This master’s thesis focuses on the U.S. behaviour in matter of State recognition. It attempts to determine what are the determining factors that the United States would take into account in an eventual process of recognition of a sovereign Quebec. The political events over the last thirty years in Quebec have not only attracted great interest in Washington, they also led the U.S. government to define a policy towards Quebec. Used since the late 1970’s, this specific approach and line of conduct still prevails even today at the White House.
Despite the two referendums on sovereignty held in Quebec in 1980 and 1995 the issue of Quebec sovereignty is still relevant. However, if it were ever to achieve sovereignty, it's safe to say that the U.S. decision to recognize Quebec would be modulated on security interests as well as political or economical interests. In most cases since the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 such as been the position of the United States. The analysis of U.S. behaviour towards Kosovo in 2008 supports these facts and demonstrates that Washington has been applying the same approach in matters relating to the recognition of new States for the past 20 years.
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