This study takes an Institutional and Evolutionary Economic (IEE) approach to exploring the Taiwan lobby in the United States. This IEE approach encompasses many fields and borrows theory from diverse disciplines. These range from evolutionary psychology, political economic thought, organizational theory, economics, history, to other helpful tools in understanding economics and institutions. My study starts with some preliminaries, a history of the U.S. and Taiwan, an extensive survey of literature in the field, then dives into the exploration of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 1950-2010. It should be here stated that, to my knowledge, this is the first time such a time span has been tackled on the issue anywhere in international academia. What is so fortuitous is the fact that the Taiwan Relations Act was adopted in the middle of this 60-year timeframe, giving my study the ability to compare two 30-year timeframes. I then put this into the context of the Taiwan lobby while putting the Taiwan lobby in the context of arms sales. The four lobbies explored are: 1) The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, 2) TECRO, 3) AIT and 4) FAPA. These institutions are explored from the: 1) individual, 2) structural and 3) structure of interaction perspectives. My main drive is to understand the structure and structure of interaction of the Taiwan lobby and to apply this with a practical understanding for a student of management. I offer my own model about what makes a lobbyist successful in his art, craft and business.