This study takes an Institutional and Evolutionary Economic (IEE) approach to exploring the Taiwan lobby in the United States. This IEE approach encompasses many fields and borrows theory from diverse disciplines. These range from evolutionary psychology, political economic thought, organizational theory, economics, history, to other helpful tools in understanding economics and institutions. My study starts with some preliminaries, a history of the U.S. and Taiwan, an extensive survey of literature in the field, then dives into the exploration of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 1950-2010. It should be here stated that, to my knowledge, this is the first time such a time span has been tackled on the issue anywhere in international academia. What is so fortuitous is the fact that the Taiwan Relations Act was adopted in the middle of this 60-year timeframe, giving my study the ability to compare two 30-year timeframes. I then put this into the context of the Taiwan lobby while putting the Taiwan lobby in the context of arms sales. The four lobbies explored are: 1) The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, 2) TECRO, 3) AIT and 4) FAPA. These institutions are explored from the: 1) individual, 2) structural and 3) structure of interaction perspectives. My main drive is to understand the structure and structure of interaction of the Taiwan lobby and to apply this with a practical understanding for a student of management. I offer my own model about what makes a lobbyist successful in his art, craft and business.

1979年1月1日，美國與我國斷絕外交關係後，為因應新的外交關係發展，美國依其「臺灣關係法」成立「美國在臺協會」處理對臺事務，我國也相應成立「北美事務協調委員會」做為對口單位，雙方並互派駐代表機構，建立了有別於傳統國際法的準外交關係；同時，另依據雙方協定及各自的國內法，賦予對方派駐機構及人員享有相當於政府間國際組織的特權與豁免。此種非邦交國及不被承認政府之準外交代表機構的特權與豁免，經過多年的實踐，其結果如何？為本論文研究與探討的重點。 雖然就協定的內容，我國與美方派駐機構及人員僅享有相當於在美國政府間國際組織的特權與豁免。然經由本研究發現，由於兩國各自的國內法及執行面的因素，雙方派駐機構及人員享有之特權與豁免，在實踐上是有差距的，我駐美館處及人員享有的特權與豁免並不及「美國在臺協會」駐華機構及人員。此外，是否給予不被承認國家派駐之外交代表機構特權與豁免及給予其主張國家豁免的權利，也完全是國家基於政治考量之主權行為，而非國際法之規範；同時，給予一個不被承認國家派駐外交代表機構相當程度的特權與豁免或給予主張國家豁免的權利，也並不會因此就造成國際法上國家或政府承認的情形。由於現今時空環境與國際情勢已有很大的變化，與當年兩國斷交時之氛圍，實不可同日而語。據此，本文亦依研究所得，綜整幾點淺薄意見，以供相關單位及人員參考，期能提升雙方派駐機構及人員的特權與豁免地位，並有效維護我國家及人民的權益。 / In recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the government of China in January 1979, the United States derecognized the government on Taiwan, “the Republic of China,” previously recognized as the government of China. As a matter of public international law, severance of diplomatic relations and derecognition of the government carried some potential important consequences to the ROC government including that it is not diplomatic and sovereign immunity in the US. However, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was enacted by the US Congress in April, 1979 to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the US and the people on Taiwan. The TRA also created new, quasi-diplomatic agencies to enable the US government and the ROC government to communicate through a novel, non-diplomatic channel. Under the TRA, a Taiwanese official entity known as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) – previously known as the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) – has been permitted to act as the unofficial instrumentality of the Taiwanese people, in Washington, D.C. Also the Washington–based TECRO has had an American counterpart in Taipei, named the “American Institute in Taiwan” (AIT), specifically established pursuant to the TRA as a non-profit, private corporation responsible for conducting or carrying out all US programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan. Though it lacks official status, the AIT’s role in Taiwan closely resembles that of a diplomatic mission. Agreements between the two quasi-diplomatic agencies authorized by their respective government accord the two agencies and their staff the privilege and immunity similar to that of the public international organization. The purpose of this research is to analyze the privileges and immunities of the quasi-diplomatic agencies, and also give a detailed examination of the practice over thirty years on both sides. Through this research, we found that there are differences in practice between two sides due to different internal legal system and enforcement. On the other hand, we also found that the public international law and international circumstances give considerable latitude to the improvement of the privileges and immunities of the quasi-diplomatic agencies.