This study evaluates the constitutionality of section 78(1B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), which places the burden of proving criminal capacity on the party who raises the issue, against section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CRSA). In a legal system such as ours, that has a high regard for equality, any form of unequal treatment must be scrutinised, assessed and, if found to be unjust, rooted out. Even more so where the unequal treatment affects a marginalised minority group such as the mentally disabled. This study weighs section 78(1B) against section 9(1) of the CRSA. It also weighs the section against section 9(3) of the CRSA. Attempts are made to justify possible infringements according to section 36 of the CRSA. An appropriate remedy is then ascertained. This study also provides the historical development of section 78(1B) of the CPA – both in the common law and statute. This study furthermore provides original guidelines and principles in assessing expert evidence where criminal capacity is placed in dispute due to a mental illness or defect of the accused. The main findings are that section 78(1B) infringes on both section 9(1) and section 9(3), that it cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of the CRSA and that the appropriate remedy is the striking out of the whole section from the CPA. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Public Law / unrestricted

Unconstitutional changes, especially coups d’états, have undoubtedly eroded peace and security in many parts of the African continent. These occurrences have also stunted the development of democracy in some African states. The African Union (AU), supported by sub-regional bodies, addresses this problem by imposing sanctions on the regimes that acquire power through coups with the aim of restoring political order. However, this sanctions policy has produced mixed results. In some cases, these sanctions managed to succeed in achieving their objectives (Guinea) while in other instances sanctions failed to achieve their objectives (Madagascar). It is therefore imperative to inquire into the circumstances and assess the conditions under which the AU sanctions policies failed and succeeded in restoring political order to states that experience coups d’états. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

80年代，我國在解嚴之時，民主化運動與言論自由的保障相得益彰，幾乎同一時期，司法院大法官作成釋字第187號解釋，對於特別權力關係敲響第一記警鐘，大法官逐步正視特別權力關係理論對於權利保障與憲政制度的影響，在司法實踐上似乎邁向突破特別權力關係理論長久以來的桎梏。然探其實際，在大法官與學者相繼對於特別權力關係理論加以解構後，公務員仍未能如同民主化後的一般人民一樣享有「充分且必要」的言論自由。 在面對公務員言論爭議的案件中，我國現行法制透過概括的職務義務對於公務員言論自由施加限制。在具體個案的審查中，實務上顯然並不認為公務員享有與一般人民相同的言論自由，就公務員言論應有的界限與限制的標準，也未建立可茲遵循的審查原則。造成此一現象的原因或許在於特別權力關係尚未真正地被揚棄，學者與實務對於公務員「有權利即有救濟」的闡述，過於囿限於「服公職權」，並且在檢討、揚棄特別權力關係的過程中，仍停留在形式法治國的概念，忽略了基本權利實質限制的檢討。 本文借鏡美國法制的發展，嘗試為我國公務員言論自由的審查提出基本原則。在衡量公務員言論自由保障時，應考量「公務員言論的類型」與「公務員的職務內容」，並以「言論表達的時間與地點」與「言論的公開程度」作為輔助判斷因素，衡酌公務員言論對於政府制度目的的影響。在此一審查模型下，並非所有的公務員言論皆受到一致的限制。 法哲學家Dworkin教授曾經說過，在言論自由的困難案件中，法律人必然需要釐清「憲法為何保障言論自由」這個根本性的問題，才能決定言論自由的困難案件應該如何解決。期待本文的觀察建議可以使得實務在審查公務員言論自由的案件時，意識到公務員言論可能具有的公益面向—使政府資訊自由地流向公眾，促進政府課責與民主審議—從而能夠適當的權衡相關利益，賦予公務員言論應有的保障。 / In the 1980s, as the Martial law was lifted, the level of freedom of speech enjoyed by the people was increased alongside with Taiwan’s democratization movement. In the same period, the Constitutional Court rendered the landmark Interpretation No.187 against the theory of special power relation (besonderes Gewaltverhaltnis, the Theory). The Court was concerned with the negative effect of the Theory on constitutionally protected rights and liberties. However, even though the Court had since made several similar interpretations and seemed to gradually move toward abandoning the Theory entirely, Taiwan’s public employees have not yet been able to enjoy the same level of freedom of speech as the general public has. Under the current legal system, civil servants’ freedom of speech was restricted by broad and generalized professional duties specified in the Public Functionary Service Act. In addition, courts do not take the view that public employees and the general public enjoy the same level of freedom of expression, and do not establish a clear principle to determine what public employees can or cannot speak. Perhaps it is because the Theory has lingered on. Or it is because in the process of abandoning the Theory, courts have paid too much attention on the right to holding public offices and ignored other rights, such as the right to free speech. Learning from the public employee speech jurisprudence in the United States, this thesis tries to articulate some basic principles when reviewing cases concerning civil servants’ freedom of speech. This thesis believes that not all public employee speech should be restricted and suppressed. In deciding whether to protect civil servants’ freedom of expression, courts should consider two main factors: “the type of the speech involved” and “the responsibilities of the civil servant’s position.” In addition, factors such as “the time and place of the speech” and “degree of openness of the speech” should also be taken into account when deciding whether public employee speech has negative impact on the government in fulfilling its responsibilities. Professor Ronald Dworkin, an American legal philosopher, once remarked that in hard cases, “lawyers and judges must try to find a political justification of the First Amendment that fits most past constitutional practice and also provides a compelling reason why we should grant freedom of speech.” The thesis hopes that the observation and suggestion made in this research can help courts be aware of the public interests in protecting public employees’ freedom of speech—ensuring free flow of information from the government to the public and improving government accountability and democratic deliberation. Then can the courts better balance the relevant interests and ultimately afford proper protection to public employee speech.