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In the post-cold war era, debate has been renewed regarding the United States' foreign policy towards Cuba. One aspect of this debate concerns the link between U.S. policy and prospects for future democratisation in Cuba. The thesis examines three theories ("squeeze", "communication" and "normalization"), which suggest that either increasing or decreasing economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba will encourage prospects for democratisation. The paper assesses the validity of these theories by using a theoretical framework to explain regime legitimacy, and considers which policy offers the greatest potential for regime change. Next, the paper looks at the current Cuban political and economic environment to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime. To conclude, the author suggests that the current U.S. policy of opposing trade and diplomatic links with Cuba will have a counter-productive effect in encouraging democratisation.

American foreign assistance to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam was a controversial issue during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, straining the executive-legislative relationship and provoking discord within Congress. For Dwight D. Eisenhower, the programme was the best means of containing communism, short of ordering American forces to the region. Both major parties were divided on the issue. Conservatives and liberals in each party perceived foreign aid differently. / Old Guard Republicans and southern Democrats were skeptical about the expensive assistance programme. They contended that the "give-away" legislation would undermine Saigon's resolve to attain economic and political autonomy. Generally suspicious of America's allies, conservatives were especially critical toward Diem since they considered him an unproven ally who could take advantage of United States' generosity. Liberal Republicans and Democrats, who harboured an internationalist perspective, acknowledged foreign aid as a legitimate means of countering communism. Perceiving Diem as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh's leadership and Bao Dai's incompetence, liberals supported the Premier's pro-democratic aspirations. / The French reversal at Dien Bien Phu, the "fiasco" of the Geneva Conference, and the subsequent foreign assistance investigations by the legislative branch brought about a tenuous truce between conservatives and liberals. Although fundamental differences remained, both groups were convinced that a reappraisal of the aid programme was needed before the President committed America too heavily in Vietnam. The increasing commitments by Eisenhower's successor and his lack of co-operation with Capitol Hill solidified the conservative-liberal entente. Diem's assassination in November 1963 sobered Congress and strengthened its disapproval of America's assistance policy. Such congressional activism peaked by the late 1960's and early 1970's. The experience acquired during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years allowed Congress, not the President, to oppose United States military intervention in Vietnam during the Nixon Presidency. It also provided the initiative to rationalize the foreign aid legislation, favoring economic and technical development rather than military commitments.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

United States-Venezuelan Relations during the Dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez explores both United States government and private business dealings with the Venezuelan dictator.The thesis centers first on the political philosophy and government of Perez Jimenez detailing to a limited extent government expenditures as well as some analysis of the regime's financial priorities. The third chapter deals with the repressive practices of the Perez Jimenez government with specific references to labor, press, and the political opposition. The next section discusses United States government and private business relations with Venezuela, such as military assistance, Export-Import Bank loans, and private investments. The following chapter deals with trade and tariffs with special emphasis on oil import quotas. Throughout the thesis, the nature of the regime and United States relationship with the dictator are examined.

This thesis has explored the early United States policy towards Indochina (later Vietnam), traced that policy through the World War II years, and evaluated how clearly that policy was established. Emphasis was placed on an evaluation of the trusteeship proposal of President Roosevelt, for it is held that that policy position demonstrated a rare insight into the course of history long before the rest of the world would come to accept the inevitability of nationalistic movements in the colonial world. With Roosevelt's death, the loss of this insight among high level policy-makers played a significant part in putting the United States on the road to Vietnam.

During the most active years of his life, Theodore Roosevelt lived in an age which was characterized by imperialism. From the time of his youth until the time of his retirement, the Great Powers of Europe were busily engaged extending their political domination over large areas of the world with a view of exploiting these areas economically and otherwise. The United States had been practicing a similar form of imperialism within the limits of North America as its frontier moved westwards. At the turn of the century the country turned from expansion on the American continent to expansion overseas. Roosevelt participated in this latter wave of American imperialism, and the terms of his presidency were wedged in between this and a minor wave of American imperialism in the Caribbean area which took place in the decades following his period. For this reason many people have come to regard Roosevelt as an imperialist and his presidency as an era of imperialism also. The purpose of this thesis is to prove that, although not untainted by the spirit of Manifest Destiny himself, as President of the United States, Roosevelt pursued a nationalist course in his relations with the other nations of the world. Roosevelt's aims in foreign affairs were basically simple. An ultra-nationalist and super-patriot, he believed that his country had a mission in life. This mission was to serve as the beacon of light of progressive civilization in a world of states struggling to better themselves and so reach the goal so happily attained by the United States. The methods he employed in foreign affairs were dominated by this belief. Thus he felt it not improper to use, at times, unethical means to achieve his idealistic ends. The main instrument he employed in this field was his 'big stick' which served him in as many ways as the occasion warranted. And since the 'stick' was used in defence of the 'honor', security and prestige of the United States, Roosevelt assumed that it was of little moment if heads were knocked within the area the 'big stick' was wielded. As a nationalist, and from a short-range and rather narrow point of view, Roosevelt's foreign policy was successful. But viewed from the standpoint of two generations later, his success was mediocre. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines and critiques the American political discourse on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The event itself is past, yet words used to describe and explain the missile crisis capture and give meaning to the experience. The meaning of the crisis begins in a basic sense, then, with the discourse. The increasing availability of material evidence has reinvigorated the discourse on the missive crisis. Where relevant, recent evidence will be employed to critique previous and recent interpretations of the this seminal event. Consensus and debate are both to be found in the discourse on the Cuban crisis. First, there is a large body of shared understanding, or conventional wisdom, on the crisis. Secondly, there is disagreement as to the meaning of the crisis in recent manifestations of the discourse. The essay will use a propaganda model lo examine the politically necessary mythology embodied in the conventional wisdom. This thesis will use a tendency analysis approach to organize the debate on the missile crisis, along the lines of ideological schools of thought, and within the context of a larger American nuclear debate. The propaganda and the tendency analyse models complement the general approach of discourse. These models have been developed specifically for the study of politics, yet the methodology of each is statement analysis; as such these models are rooted in language, ana so conform with the general discourse approach. Security is the common referent of both the conventional wisdom and the current debate. In particular, the President, as the custodian of nuclear weapons, is the principle actor responsible for national security. The powerful image of the President dominates the conventional wisdom, and retains significance in the contemporary ideological debate on the lessons of the missile crisis. The nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the President endows him with great, but double-edged power. The paper concludes with some general observations on the special significance of Presidential leadership as represented in the discourse on the missile crisis, and as necessitated in confronting crises in general. First, in crisis, there is little time for the President to make difficult decisions. Secondly, there may be greater devolution of authority to the military forces deployed to convey the credibility of American deterrence. As such, the subordination of force to policy must remain sound. The image of the President is, of necessity, an image which combines prudence and strength. Manufactured images are not enough however. Policy must be tested in terms of its alleged purpose. Likewise, doctrine must be evaluated in terms the purpose of the policy it is designed to support. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Doctrine of 1932. Some statistics are also given of the scope of U.S. economic interest in China up to Pearl Harbour. Chapter II delves into FDR's overall attitude toward China, the material help provided her to 1942, the logistics involved in its delivery, and the early American attempts to identify China with the three great powers. Chapter III follows American diplomatic moves to have China accepted by Britain and the U.S.S.R. into the U.N. Organization during its formative years at the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences and the gradual relegation of China to a secondary role in the war in the Pacific. Chapter IV investigates the complexities of the Stilwell Mission, some Chinese reactions to it, the modest help provided China, and her relative neglect by the three great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Yalta concessions to foster the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war in the Pacific are also examined in the context of a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. Chapter V assesses the relative value of four years of U.S. diplomacy toward China which concentrated on raising the Nationalists to great power status with a seat in the U.N. Security Council whilst ignoring the growing potential for power of the Chinese Communists. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate