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This thesis examines an important but understudied phenomenon in international politics: the role of amity in foreign policy. The core research question is "how have American friendships for specified others been made possible?" Drawing on the logic of securitization, this thesis employs Aristotle's notion of character friends as Other Selves and Judith Butler's concept of performativity to elaborate an international process of friendship or amitization. In doing so, the thesis employs critical discourse analysis of presidential rhetoric and popular culture to elucidate the process through which discourses of similarity become naturalized frames of reference within the conduct of foreign policy. It argues that friendship emerges when a state comes to see itself in an other and that this similarity (re)produces a certain form of state identity that enables and forecloses certain policy options vis-à-vis friends. Friendship manifests in a habitual, or naturalized, disposition to treat friends better than others. As such, it can account for how certain policies and postures, such as uncritical and often unconditional support for subjects positioned as "friends," have come to be pursued as common sense. Amitization is illustrated by assessing three case studies: the Anglo-American "special relationship;" the US-Israel "unbreakable bond;" and America's membership of "the Atlantic Community." Specifically, the thesis similarly demonstrates the ways in which amity accounts for how supererogatory commitments such as vast financial assistance, diplomatic support, information sharing, security guarantees and concern for the welfare of these specified others have come to be seen as unquestionably legitimate policies in the broader trajectory of American foreign policy. Amity matters and the practices of amitization are inseparable from intelligible foreign policy.

This thesis is a study of national security decision making in the Ford Administration. The subject for study is the Kissinger- Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear age and the means by which to preserve detente. An examination of the substantive policy differences will be preceded by an examination of the conceptual disagreements between the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of international politics. Studies on decision making in intemational politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception of the role that the United States should have in the international system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the preservation of peace. After having defined the theoretical differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues in international politics, an analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's conception of the international system. Policy differences between the two will be shown to have evolved out of disagreements over policy goals, and not policy implementation. Any study of individual decision making in defense and foreign affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of issues. Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy goals when new leadership emerges with which they are uncomfortable. It will be shown, through an analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that foreign nations expressed concern for the outcome of this policy split. In particular, it will be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union. In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach a compromise on issues of policy because of funamental differences between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition of the national security in the nuclear age and the negotiating strategy that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations. These differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that each Secretary had on the nature of the international system. The study of their individual perceptions will help to give one an understanding as to why the policy disagreements made compromise impossible.

Throughout history states have pursued both cooperative and power-oriented strategies. Moralists and realists have long questioned the appropriateness of using force to gain state objectives. Recent analysts have stressed that states have a moral duty to manage international uncertainty in the best interests of their citizens. While this might involve utilizing both power-seeking and order-seeking strategies, it has been suggested that pursuing order-seeking strategies could help alleviate international uncertainty. An historical survey, as well as recent case studies in Grenada and Nicaragua, indicate that the United States often has relied upon military strategies in the Caribbean Basin. The United States has employed a variety of techniques including "shows-of-force," threats, coercive diplomacy, intervention, and covert activities. These policies appear to have been based upon the assumption that military policies can be carefully calculated to alter the behavior of another state. Due to classified information, sensitive information is often restricted regarding this topic. However, available information indicates that American foreign policy regarding the use of force in the Caribbean Basin has not been useful. While such policies may appear to have been successful in the short run, the same policies often have brought negative repercussions in the long run. Not only has the United States been regarded unfavorably, but it has been portrayed as a nation which only observes international law when it is convenient to do so. Further, international uncertainty has often been exacerbated by U.S. actions. Also, it is not clear that such military strategies always have been carefully designed~ and even if they were, such policies would not be completely predictable. The United States needs to design new foreign policy strategies, relying less upon military force.

This thesis has attempted to describe the controversy between Robert Murphy and Hooker Doolittle over American policy toward the North Africans and French during World War II. The research was based primarily on material from State Department documents found in the National Archives supplemented by material from the French archives as well as memoirs, personal interviews, and histories of the period. In order for the reader to understand this particular dispute, the problem was developed in the context of the larger political scene as it evolved in North Africa. The controversy between de Gaulle and Giraud was described since it tended to dominate relations between the United States and France at that time. As a result of the research, it was obvious that Murphy's position prevailed, but not without raising important questions about the long term implications of this position.

This study examines the consequences of interdependence between Saudi Arabia and the United States from 1960 to 1978 as it relates to the concepts of cooperation and conflict. Research on interdependence focuses primarily on relations among Western countries and on whether interdependence is increasing or decreasing between them. It has rarely addressed relations between countries with different levels of economic development or the consequence of interdependence for international relations in terms of conflict and cooperation. Specifically, this study examines the following question: Does the level of interdependence between Saudi Arabia and the United States have any affect on the level of bilateral conflict and cooperation between the two countries? The hypotheses are tested using regression analysis. The primary conclusion is that increases in bilateral interdependence between Saudi Arabia and the United States from 1960 to 1978 produced increased cooperation as well as conflict.

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