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Most studies of the use of conventional military force by the United States in the twentieth century tend to characterize the decision making process in terms of a unitary state and a unitary presidential decision maker. One alternative to this approach is the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm proposed by Graham Allison. To test the explanatory power of this decision making model in the post-Vietnam era, this thesis applies the specific propositions of Graham Allison's "Governmental Politics Model" concerning the use of military force, to selected case studies. In an attempt to determine the explanatory power of Allison's Governmental Politics model in the wake of Vietnam, this thesis draws on case studies ranging from the Dominican Republic intervention to the recent invasion of Panama. This thesis seeks to measure the theory to present reality. / Master of Arts

Within the international relations literature, there is a large body of work dedicated to cooperation and conflict. More specifically, there are numerous theories of regime formation that attempt to explain how and why cooperation among several nation-states is possible. This paper addresses three of the dominant perspectives: conventional structural realism, modified structural realism, and the Grotian perspective (also often referred to as the Global Commons perspective). The goal of this paper is to analyze the rise of regimes to manage international environmental issues in light of these theories. Specifically, I analyze the case of the United States/Canadian water management regime for the Great Lakes first established by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. I apply both a conventional structural realist framework and a modified structural realist framework (depicted in game theoretic terms) to the case study. Because neither of these frameworks is able to adequately explain the rise of the United States/Canadian regime, I employ a framework based on the Grotian perspective. Concentrating on Oran Young's hypotheses of institutional bargaining, I analyze the case study and point out similarities and discrepancies between the theory and the actual event. Finally, I discuss the role of epistemic communities in regime formation and maintenance. Based on the results of the application of each analytical framework, I conclude that the Grotian perspective (expressed in terms of the institutional bargaining approach) is best able to identify the causes of the formation of the water management regime between the United States and Canada. Because this is one of the most successful examples of an international environmental regime in terms of longevity, compliance, and progress, the factors involved in its creation should make a contribution to our understanding of the problems and possibilities associated with the construction of international environmental management regimes. I draw heavily from the work of notable regime theorists, such as Susan Strange, Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, and Ernst Haas, as well as theorists who have specifically addressed international environmental issues, such as Oran Young, Peter Haas, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews / Master of Arts

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Presidents of the United States and other American policymakers have throughout history cited democracy promotion as one of the chief goals of American foreign policy, and the current administration of George W. Bush has been no exception. However, and notwithstanding the habitual endorsement of this objective by US administrations, the subject of democracy promotion has received relatively little academic attention. This study aims to correct this gap in the literature by considering two questions relating to United States democracy promotion. First, have the efforts of the US to spread democracy to other countries met with success? Second, is promoting democracy truly a priority of American policymakers, or is it rather window dressing cynically aimed at winning public and congressional support for foreign policy? I begin by defining the terms democracy and democracy promotion. I then use three recent case studies to answer the two questions outlined above, the first of which focuses on President Reagan’s policy towards Nicaragua. In the second case study I consider President Clinton’s policy towards Haiti, while the third deals with President George W. Bush’s policy towards Colombia. The evidence I present points to the conclusion that the United States has not been successful in its efforts to promote democracy in other countries, and that spreading democracy abroad is at best a secondary goal of American foreign policy. The evidence presented in the thesis also demonstrates the utility of foreign policy analysis-based approaches to the study of international relations.

This study demonstrates that, in the post Cold War era, US leadership becomes more crucial than ever. Through the adoption of a classical approach; a thorough case study of diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Albania coupled with America's response to the crisis in Bosnia, highlights the weakness of US policy in the former and its outright failure in the case of the latter. Historical analysis demonstrates that recent violent nationalism in the Balkans did not suddenly erupt into violence. Instead, it remains dormant until such time that power vacuums, the result of power politics, are created. Indeed, the work seeks to show the history of Western, especially US, policy failure and short-sightedness in the region and how past trends have invoked present failures and crises which have yet to be remedied. The examination of US relations with Albania, shows that much more is required in America's efforts to ensure that democracy succeeds in Albania, and that a deeper analysis demonstrates the need for greater mutual understanding between the US and Albania. The Bosnian crisis is an example of American and Western failure which should not be repeated elsewhere in the region. By reviewing the tenets of American foreign policy, the study seeks to shed light upon the theories which have dominated current debate. The aim of such a review is to examine the trend, or trends, which have surfaced from the foreign policy debate and, specifically, whether or not these indicate the direction American foreign policy towards the region should be taking in the post- Cold War era.

The years 1951 to 1953 are among the most important and controversial in Iranian history. The period is significant not only for the domestic dynamics of popular nationalism under Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, but also for the role that United States policy played in an interaction with the conflict between a lingering British economic presence and the Iranian move to nationalize its oil industry. An examination of United States national security policy of that time reveals that policy toward Iran was consistent with the overall post-war policy of the United States, dominated as it was by the central theme of preventing the spread of communism. The task for the men who were charged with the application of U.S. policy in Iran during those years was to accommodate two factors which complicated the search for an order which would ensure post-war national security for the United States: Iranian nationalism as epitomized by Mossadegh; and the economic and diplomatic interests of Great Britain. The United States sought to resolve the conflict so that instability in Iran would not invite communist influence or takeover. United States policymakers were influenced by several factors which combined to eventually decide the outcome. The centrality of the perceived world communist expansion threat, McCarthyism in the United States, the role of several key figures with experience in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, and the change from a Democratic to a Republican administration at the time Mossadegh was experiencing a deterioration of his own domestic political situation; all worked toward the still-controversial outcome of U.S. policy: the overthrow of Mossadegh. The primacy of containment of communism in United States policy did not preclude variations in its application, nor did this emphasis ignore the forces of Iranian nationalism and self-determination. Nonetheless, given the men involved in the policy decisions, the information available to them and the context of the post-World War II international order, the outcome was predictable and entirely consistent at the time with creating an international order conducive to the national security interests of the United States.