The question arises in the analysis of foreign policy decision making regarding how consensus or approval by the public is attained for policies. Some authors have suggested that consensus is obtained through the manipulation of opinion by decision makers. One case often cited as an example of manipulation is the 1947 announcement of the Truman Doctrine. In determining the validity of these arguments a review was conducted of the language of the doctrine and the interpretations of newspaper columnists. In addition, a review of personal documents of the decision makers was conducted to determine their impressions. The data compiled from these sources indicate that the authors who claim manipulation might have exaggerated the case.

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Central Asia and the Caucasus are of immense geopolitical importance for the US and Russia, but neither power has successfully established regional hegemony. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the states of the Caspian region began to develop their oil and gas reserves, and as a result their importance on the international stage is increasing rapidly. Considering the impact of events such as 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iran, alongside issues including national security, energy policies and American ambitions to limit Russian influence, Christopher Bluth explains why the US has failed to establish authority in this globally significant region. Examining US policy from Clinton to Obama and drawing on interviews with leading figures in the US administration, this study presents the first systematic analysis of US policy towards the Caspian states.

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This thesis examines modern politics in Thailand, its policy, and its search for national security, by showing the impact of the United States on Thai politics. The thesis maintains that politics in Thailand are results that come from attempts of the Thai government to adapt to American involvement in Thailand. The thesis describes the Thai government scene from 1945 to 1972. It analyzes the elements of American involvement and factors in Thai society that are pressured by this involvement. The attempts of the Thai government and its politicians to bring their policy more into line with the changing situations are shown in their reactions to problems of Southeast Asia--the focus of which is on the problems of Vietnam, the problems of China, and the withdrawal of the U.S. to a profile of low visibility.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the Bush administration articulated an anti-terrorism grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Middle East that constituted the heart of the “Bush Doctrine.” This strategy derived primarily from the framework of activist democracy promotion developed by neoconservatives, and reached its apex in 2003 when it served as the rationale for regime change in Iraq as the fulcrum for the democratic transformation of the Arab world. Yet by 2008, the Bush administration's democratisation policies and many elements of the broader neoconservative framework of democracy promotion have been significantly scaled back as a result of the challenges they have faced in the Arab world - to the extent that both are now entering a state of decline. In seeking to assess the development, assumptions and outcomes to date of the United States' post-September 11 anti-terrorism strategy in the Middle East, this thesis offers a critical account of the rise and decline of the “neoconservative moment” in American foreign policy as exemplified by the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies. This thesis examines the origins, evolution and claims of the neoconservative paradigm of armed democracy promotion; it relates these to the justifications for interventionist democratisation in the Middle East present in the terms of the Bush Doctrine; and it assesses some of the key critiques made of these assumptions over the past five years. Unlike a number of studies of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism, this thesis takes seriously the Bush Doctrine's claims and neoconservative beliefs as a genuine intellectual framework for intervention, consistently examining their assertions on their own terms. Further, this thesis utilises an interdisciplinary approach of study, adopting a number of the methods and analytical tools of history and political science in making its arguments and reaching its conclusions.

This thesis has applied three modern American foreign policy decision-making models---borrowed from John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreien Policy Is Made---to the foreign policy of the United States toward France in the period 1793-1800.The intent of the study was to determine the validity of the models, to offer explanations for any contradictions between the models and the test case, and to provide some insights into early American foreign policy decision-making.

The topic of my doctoral dissertation is Washington's Indochina policy from 1973-6. My thesis seeks to shed new light on the period and aims to clarify the central points that have been raised in the surrounding academic controversy. In the study it is argued that neither the so-called "decent interval" nor the "permanent war" theory adequately captures Nixon and Kissinger's post-Paris Agreement strategy. Moreover, my study attempts to highlight both the accuracy and shortcomings of Nixon and Kissinger' s own accounts. In so doing, it aims to offer a new interpretation of Nixon, Kissinger, and later Ford's Indochina policy that centers on the concept of an "insurance policy." In my disse1tation it is argued that the protagonists followed a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam, stressing good relations with the Soviets' and Chinese, and creating an image of touglmess to counterbalance possible defeat in Indochina. In addition to telling the story of the "war after the war" in Vietnam, my dissertation places Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford's Indochina policy in the broader Cold War context of the 1970s. Contrary to previous analyses, it is argued in the study that the three men's concern with great power relations and American credibility does not seem to have led to a simplistic understanding of the situation in Indochina. Moreover, the link between domestic and foreign policy constitutes a central element of my analysis. While it is concluded that Nixon and Kissinger rightly considered the Watergate scandal as the detennining factor for the actual passage of the long-sought congressional funding cuts for Indochina, it is also argued that Watergate was a self-inflicted mistake rather than a tragedy. More generally speaking, it is maintained that domestic political considerations were important on Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford's side, but did not oveITide the protagonists' foreign policy concerns. Finally, my doctoral dissertation provides a reevaluation of Ford that stresses the president's agent role in implementing a hawkish Indochina policy. In sum, my analysis of Washington's Indochina policy highlights Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford's concern with flexibility and their attempt to respond to the challenges of the turbulent 1970s with a coherent, adaptable realpolitik.