India's nonalignment policy attracted the attention of many newly independent countries for it provided an alternative to the existing American and Russian views of the world. This dissertation is an examination of both India's nonalignment policy and the official American reaction to it during the Truman-Eisenhower years. Indian nonalignment should be defined as a policy of noncommitment towards rival power blocs adopted with a view of retaining freedom of action in international affairs and thereby influencing the issue of war and peace to India's advantage. India maintained that the Cold War was essentially a European problem. Adherence to military allliances , it believed, would increase domestic tensions and add to chances of involvement in international war, thus destroying hopes of socio-economic reconstruction of India. The official American reaction was not consistent. It varied from president to president, from issue to issue, and from time to time. India's stand on various issues of international import and interest to the United States such as recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty of 1951, and the Hungarian revolt of 1956, increased American concern about and dislike of nonalignment. Many Americans in high places regraded India's nonalignment policy as pro-Communist and as one that sought to undermine Western collective security measures. Consequently, during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies the United States took a series of diplomatic, military, and economic measures to counter India's neutralism. America refused to treat India as a major power and attempted to contain its influence on the international plane by excluding it from international conferences and from assuming international responsibilities. The Russian efforts to woo India and other nonaligned countries with trade and aid softened America's open resistance to India's nonalignment. As a result, although tactical, a new trend in America's dealings with India was visible during the closing years of Eisenhower's presidency. Therefore, America sought to keep nonaligned India at least nonaligned by extending economic aid.

This thesis is concerned with determining the effect of the establishment of a Jewish state on Anglo-American relations and the policies of their governments. This work covers the period from the awarding of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain, through World War II, and concentrates on the post-war events up to the foundation of the state of Israel. It uses major governmental documents, as well as those of the United Nations, the archival materials at the Harry S. Truman Library, and the memoirs of the major participants in the Palestine drama. This study concludes that, while the Palestine problem presented ample opportunities for disunity, the Anglo-American relationship suffered no permanently damaging effects.

This study is concerned with the relationship between the accumulation of Poland's massive hard-currency debt, from 1970 to 1983, and changes in American economic and political policy toward Poland. Prior to and during the 1970s, a tacit American policy of promoting economic and political ties with Poland can be discerned. But the domestic problems Poland exacerbated by mismanaging its debt to the West and the consequent declaration of martial law in 1981 led to the current discriminatory American policies of economic sanctions against Poland. As a result of this policy shift long-standing American political goals in Poland have been compromised.

Although President Theodore Roosevelt intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1905 to prevent European creditor nations from securing a foothold at the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal, the idea persists among certain historians that Roosevelt's motives for intervention were primarily economic, not political. A close examination of Dominican economic history from the inauguration in 1882 of the tyrannical President Ulises Heureaux, combined with a study of American diplomacy toward the Dominican Republic to the initiation of the customs receivership in 1907, demonstrates that American policy attempted to thwart outside intervention, not promote economic subversion. Best primary sources are the State Department's Diplomatic Instructions, 1801-1906; the Despatches, 1883-1906; and Jacob H. Hollander's "Report" and "Exhibits." Excellent secondary sources are Dana G. MIunro's Caribbean studies.

During the second world war relations between the United States and Ireland deteriorated to the point that many Irishmen feared that an American invasion of Ireland was imminent. At the same time many people in the United States came to believe that the Irish government of Eamon de Valera was pro-Nazi, This study examines the causes for the deterioration of relations between the two countries and the actual attitudes of David Gray, the United States minister to Ireland, and other American officials toward Irish neutrality. Since there are few secondary works on the subject, the research was undertaken almost entirely among primary sources, personal and diplomatic papers, various American newspapers, and memoirs. Of particular importance were David Gray's personal papers, especially his frequent letters to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.. Copies of some letters, not available among Gray's personal papers at the University of Wyoming, were furnished by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The study has also made extensive use of the diplomatic papers published by the Department of $tate in the various volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States. Finally, the author corresponded with more than a dozen of those still living who were personally connected with the wartime relations between the United States and Ireland.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-07-03T13:32:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Lucio Mello Tobias.pdf: 4443680 bytes, checksum: f59e75dbeb6caa4627fde0d7495f3f78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-03T13:32:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Lucio Mello Tobias.pdf: 4443680 bytes, checksum: f59e75dbeb6caa4627fde0d7495f3f78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / A part of the most considered conjectures about the relations between Brazil and the United States insists that Brazil, at some key moments in its history, was subservient to Washington's interests, automatically aligning itself with the interests of the Americans . With the beginning of World War II in 1939, the configuration of power relations between countries began to change, affecting in a political or economic way almost the entire planet. In the case of Brazil, starting in 1942 the country began to participate in a game of interests with the United States that, among other things, wished to have access to the air bases of the Northeast. The Vargas government (1930-1945) and following the Dutra government (1946-1951), saw in this conjuncture an opportunity of negotiation, took advantage of the situation and negotiated with the Americans, trying to gain some advantages for the country. In this game, World War II and the Cold War served as a field for agencies such as the OSS, OCIAA and CIA, in the service of the United States and guaranteed the country some advantages. On the other hand, we did not have that many players, but we never stopped playing. We have even taken up space in newly created international forums such as the UN, OAS and ECLAC, among others. Not always winning, not always losing, but learning to play. Analyzing the Brazilian performance in these organizations, we intend to demonstrate that even in the face of various difficulties and in a less favored situation, the Brazilian government tried, with the resources it had at the time, to be protagonists of its own history / Uma parte das conjecturas mais consideradas sobre as relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos insiste em afirmar que o Brasil, em alguns momentoschave de sua história foi subserviente aos interesses de Washington, alinhando-se de forma automática aos interesses dos norte-americanos. Com do início da Segunda Guerra Mundial em 1939, a configuração das relações de poder entre os países começa a mudar, afetando de uma forma política ou econômica quase todo o planeta. No caso do Brasil, partir de 1942 o país começa a participar de um jogo de interesses com os Estados Unidos que, entre outras coisas, desejava ter acesso às bases aéreas do Nordeste. O governo Vargas (1930-1945) e na sequência o governo Dutra (1946-1951), viram nesta conjuntura uma oportunidade de negociação, aproveitaram a situação e negociaram com os americanos, tentando conquistar algumas vantagens para o país. Nesse jogo, a Segunda Guerra Mundial e a Guerra Fria serviram de campo para a atuação de agências como a OSS, a OCIAA e a CIA, a serviço dos Estados Unidos e garantiram para o país algumas vantagens. Por outro lado, nós não tivemos tantos jogadores assim, mas nunca paramos de jogar. Jogamos, inclusive, ocupando espaço nos fóruns internacionais recém criados, como a ONU, a OEA e a CEPAL, dentre outros. Nem sempre ganhando, nem sempre perdendo, mas aprendendo a jogar. Analisando a atuação do Brasil nestas organizações pretendemos demonstrar que mesmo diante de varias dificuldades e numa situação menos favorecida o governo brasileiro tentou, com os recursos que dispunha na época, ser protagonista da sua própria história

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Thesis (Ph. D. (International Politics)) -- University of Limpopo, 2016 / The United States of America’s (US) foreign policy towards Africa has been the subject for debate. This is partly because the country’s relationship with African countries is not consistent. By and large, such relations are shaped by a number of factors which include political orientation and material resources. Within this context, the present study uses case studies from two different parts of Africa to tease out US foreign policy towards Africa. This explorative study uses Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania (hereafter referred to as Tanzania) as test cases to compare and critique the post-Cold War foreign policy of the US towards Africa. It does this by first analysing and constructing the theoretical material on the three pillars of the US Africa policy (oil, democracy and security) and subsequently, contemporaneously locating the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania. Largely, the study carries a historical sensibility as it traces the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania from as far as the colonial era. History is crucial in this regard because the past provides a sound basis for understanding the present and future. To add, in International Politics theory holds sway and history is used as a laboratory. In this thesis, the researcher proposes Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical paradigm crucial in understanding US foreign policy towards Africa. As it shall be seen, such a paradigm (theoretical lens) remains critical in highlighting the peculiarity of the US relationship with Ghana and Tanzania. It is envisaged that a deeper understanding of the US foreign policy towards Ghana and Tanzania is achievable when its analysis and interpretation is located within a broader continental context of Africa. To realise the purpose of this study, the researcher relies methodologically on interdisciplinary critical discourse and conversations in their widest forms. With reference to the test cases for this study, the agenda for democratic consolidation features prominently on both of them while oil is only applicable to Ghana in this regard. In contrast, Tanzania distinguishes itself both as a victim of terrorism and equally so as a strategic partner on the US anti-terrorism efforts in East Africa. Yet, oil in West Africa’s Ghana is important for the US both as an economic resource and a strategic energy source during wartime periods. Overall the ‘differential’ foreign policy towards individual African states is also a significant observation which dispels the myth of a universal US foreign policy framework. Keywords: Africa, Afrocentricity, democracy, East Africa, foreign policy, Ghana, oil, security, Tanzania, United States of America, West Africa.

To achieve independence, the Dominican Republic had to first endure three centuries of heavy-handed Spanish rule and period of Haitian domination that lasted for twenty-two years. Fear of Haitian reconquest, however, convinced the leading Dominican politicians that the new nation could not long endure without foreign protection. Encouraged by Dominican offers of a naval base, the United States toyed with the idea of expansion in the Caribbean as early as 1850, but civil war cut short these notions and allowed Spain to reassert control over her former colony. Although Spanish occupation ended in failure the United States became more determined that the island Republic should never again be dominated by a European power. Such a determination on the part of the United States to prevent European incursion led to an abortive annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869 and to the establishment of a customs receivership in 1905, when unpaid foreign debts aroused the ire of European creditors. It was hoped that the establishment of a customs receivership would usher in a period of peace and prosperity for the Dominicans but by 1912 it became evident that such hopes were not to be realized. President Wilson adhered to the argument that foreign intervention in the Caribbean was not to be tolerated but broadened United States involvement in the domestic policies of the Dominican Republic by insisting on the establishment of a constitutional democracy, which he felt would establish domestic tranquility. When it became apparent that the internal conditions of the island Republic were not improving, Wilson reluctantly ordered in the United States Marines in the hopes that they would be able to educate the Dominicans to the ways of democracy. By broadening the scope of United States involvement in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic, Wilson had produce an occupation that denied the Dominicans the inherent right of a nation to govern itself, a liberty which had been maintained against overwhelming odds during the preceding seventy-two years.

Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms control behavior. Partly because the number of negotiating parties is only two, there is a propensity to focus on the bilateral relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political situations. Only superficial attention has usually been given to international systems variables that may well influence the domestic political situation and arms control policy. This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political environment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that includes the West European members of NATO as a single actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union) is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior.