No description available.

This thesis examines the relationship between foreign policy and military doctrine, specifically the problems that arise when military doctrine is politicized and the military is used as an instrument of diplomatic or economic power rather than military power. It contains original research on the conduct of military civic action (MCA) by the United States Air Force in Thailand from 1964 until 1976, based largely on archival material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency. MCA has been an element of counterinsurgency doctrine since President Kennedy directed it in 1961, a role often labeled "nation-building." Like Kennedy's foreign policy, MCA had its intellectual origins in the social scientific concept of modernization theory. MCA represents the politicization of military doctrine, a method of employing forces based on social scientific theory rather than military experience. As a result of this and the realities on the ground in Thailand, the objectives of MCA did not fit the context of the Thai situation, training did not provide necessary cultural awareness, and execution was haphazard. Ultimately, the USAF failed to achieve the policy goals of MCA in Thailand. Today the U.S. continues to employ military manpower in the diplomatic, economic, and information realms while only training service members in their core specialty. Policymakers and military leaders need to determine whether to sacrifice proficiency in core specialties to enhance cultural and diplomatic skills or to rely more on those agencies traditionally responsible for those instruments of national power. / History

The goal of my project is a detailed analysis of the technological culture of the United States Air Force from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) perspective. In particular, using the metaphor of the Air Force as religion helps in understanding a culture built on matters of life-and-death. This religious narrative—with the organizational roles of actors such as priests, prophets, and laity, and the institutional connotations of theological terms such as sacredness—is a unique approach to the Air Force. An analysis of how the Air Force interacts with technology—the very thing that gives it meaning—from the social construction of technology approach will provide a broader understanding of this relationship. Mitcham's dichotomy of the engineering philosophy of technology (EPT) and the humanities philosophy of technology (HPT) perspectives provides a methodology for analyzing Air Force decisions and priorities. I examine the overarching discourse and metaphor—consisting of techniques, technologies, experiences, language, and religion—in a range of historical case studies describing the sociological and philosophical issues of the Air Force. As the Air Force is the offspring of the U.S. Army, these examples begin with the Civil War era and the invention of the Gatling gun before moving to the interwar period's Air Corps Tactical School and its seminal organizational thinking about the aircraft. Moving to the more modern times after the birth of the Air Force, I describe and compare the Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center and the Air Mobility Warfare Center, two organizations interacting with technology from different organizational archetypes. The final example is the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, an information technology application at the focal point of cultural change affecting not just the Air Force but the entire Department of Defense. Finally, I will conclude with a chapter on policy considerations and recommendations for the Air Force based on the Air Force religion, a balance of both people and technology, and with an eye toward the future of U.S. military operations. The primary goal is to answer three questions: is the U.S. Air Force truly a religion? If so, how should that affect its approach to technology and technological change? With an eye toward consciously building the future, how has the Air Force religion shaped the organization in the past? [The attached document is cleared by the Department of Defense for public release (OSR Case 09-S-0496).] / Ph. D.

The purpose of this study is to examine the discourse surrounding sexual assault and policy change in the U.S. military. As rhetoricians continue to embrace public sphere theory, the field has started asking what rhetoric's role is in solving public problems. My research questions were twofold: how do rhetorical processes construct social realities around sexual assault and how have these processes impacted policy change? These questions seek to further examine the rhetorical nature of publics and public spheres, specifically those surrounding the military and its interaction with the civilian public. In order to answer these questions, the case studies herein make use of rhetorical histories, grounded theory, discourse analysis, and public sphere theory. Also integral to these cases is the study of anger as a rhetorical force. The role of anger in this discourse is important, as it informs the narrative that grows out of each case study and it shapes public response to formerly private problems. Rhetoric's intervention in these cases shows the power of policy, language, and the material impact of both. The major guiding principle of my methodology is that institutions are shaped and brought to life through rhetorical processes and that these processes construct social reality inside and out of the institution in question. This dissertation examines public facing documents – memos, press releases, speeches, interviews, and leaked documents – and arranges them chronologically to offer a broader view of the discourse around sexual assault in context. The two case studies examine how the culture reinforced by uniform and fitness policies enact gender-based violence and follow the public responses to these incidents. / Doctor of Philosophy / The rise in high-profile sexual assault cases in the United States has drawn public attention to the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence in some of our most important and visible institutions, including our athletic teams, our universities, and our military. Anger plays a predominant role in the public reaction to each new allegation and it shapes the conversations happening around incidents of gender-based violence as public awareness grows. What impact does public anger have on the discourse surrounding these incidents? This study explores the impact of public anger after two major sexual assault scandals in the U.S. military broke headlines: Tailhook in 1991 and the United States Air Force Academy in 2003. A decade apart, these scandals rocked the nation and its trust in the military; they also triggered rapid policy change and growth regarding women's place in the military and how future incidents would be handled.

This ex post facto inquiry investigated the existence of an association between advanced formal education and the largely psychomotor task of flying military aircraft. The analysis of data indicated that such an association does exist. Data were analyzed by computer comparison of two separate data bases. The first data base included selected U.S. Air Force officers' educational histories. The second set of data included aircrew standardization/evaluation qualification grade scores. Individual subjects were identified, and for each subject a record was formed that included the subject's standardization flight proficiency grade and advanced educational background. Group subsets of selected variables were then recorded in 2 X 2 contingency tables and statistical calculations using chi square tests of independence were applied.

The study examined the effects of a study skills training intervention course on U.S. Air Force Aeromedical Apprentices with five main purposes. The first was to examine the relationship between study skills training and the number of times students required academic interventions outside of normal class time. The second purpose was to examine the relationship between study skills training and end of course averages. The third was to determine the relationship between study skills training and the amount of additional instruction, measured in time, students required. The fourth purpose examined the relationship between study skills training and graduation rates. The final purpose was to recommend areas for further research.

This study is based on Kirkpatrick's (1996) four level evaluation model. The study assessed the correlation between and among three levels of data that resulted from evaluation processes used in the U.S. Air Force technical training. The three levels of evaluation included trainee reaction (Level 1), test scores (Level 2), and job performance (Level 3). Level 1 data was obtained from the results of a 20 item survey that employed a 5-point Likert scale rating. Written test scores were used for Level 2 data. The Level 3 data was collected from supervisors of new graduates using a 5-point Likert scale survey. The study was conducted on an existing database of Air Force technical training graduates. The subjects were trainees that graduated since the process of collecting and storing Levels 1 and 2 data in computerized database began. All subjects for this study graduated between March 1997 and January 1999. A total of 188 graduates from five Air Force specialties were included. Thirty-four cases were from a single course in the aircrew protection specialty area; 12 were from a single course in the munitions and weapons specialty area; and 142 were from three separate courses in the manned aerospace maintenance specialty area. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were computed to determine the correlation coefficients between Levels 1 and 2; Level 1 and 3; Level 2 and 3 for each subject course. Multiple linear regression was used to determine the relationship between the composite of Levels 1 and 2 and Level 3. There were significant correlation coefficients between Levels 1 and 2 and Levels 2 and 3 for only one of the five courses. The linear regression analysis revealed no significant correlation using the composite of Levels 1 and 2 as a predictor of Level 3.

Not available / text

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, military aviation technology grew expensive and politically divisive, and this is not without precedent. In the 1960s and 1970s, the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Falcon represented a controversial shift both in the cost of development and in tactical doctrine for the United States Air Force (USAF), yet the motivating factors that influenced their design are not fully understood. Most of the literature either has focused on a teleological exploration of technical evolution or has held to a “genius inventor” paradigm, lionizing individual engineers and planners. Other works have focused on these aircraft as factors that changed the Air Force's tactical approach to warfighting or have simply evaluated their combat performance. Although these approaches are valuable, they do not account for the effect that institutional culture and historical memory had on the F-15 and F-16 programs. This dissertation argues that the culture of the fighter pilot community was based on a constructed memory of World War I fighter combat, idealizing a heroic, romanticized image of “Knights of the Air.” This fighter pilot community attempted to influence the F-15 and F-16 programs to conform to their vision of an idealized past. Furthermore, a smaller group of these pilots, calling themselves the “Fighter Mafia” (and later the “Reformers”) radicalized these ideas, rejecting the Eagle and Falcon as not representative of their ideal vision. Through public and political activism, this group affected the discourse of military technology from the mid-1970s to the present. Drawing on David Nye’s work on the connections between technology and cultural historical narratives and identity, this work will demonstrate that culture and institutional historical memory can be important factors in driving the development of military technology.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / During the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy relied heavily on its ability to project military power. More often than not, the central component of force projection rested on the United States military’s effectiveness in employing air power both by establishing air superiority and through accurate delivery of ordnance. As the primary service tasked with conducting aerial warfare, the United States Air Force (USAF) was expected to maintain this capability either to achieve deterrence or, when necessary, to military action. In January 1973, the USAF seemed incapable of performing the latter task due to the North Vietnamese Integrated Air Defense System’s (NV-IAD’s) effectiveness in Operation Rolling Thunder and its successor, Operation Linebacker. Eighteen years later, Air Force aircraft spearheaded the Coalition’s air attack on the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (I-IADS) in January 1991. Considered by many to be the most effective air defense system outside the Soviet Union’s, the I-IADS was expected to exact heavy casualties from the allied forces. Instead, in less than twenty days, the USAF’s dominance was so complete that politicians, analysts and military historians quickly proclaimed a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The majority of the current historiography credits advances in precision-guided munitions (PGMs), airframes, and computer technology as the impetus for the RMA. Others have claimed that the USAF’s training methodology and construction of advanced training sites such as the Red Flag complex at Nellis Air Force Base were the primary drivers for the Air Force’s success. While acknowledging the role all of these factors played, this dissertation also demonstrates the key role played by the development of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from January 1973 through August 1991. In the aftermath of the American war in Vietnam, the Air Force considered defense suppression a tactical task that was secondary to the primary mission of putting ordnance on target. At the end of Desert Storm, proponents of the Air Force’s SEAD doctrine had convincing evidence that an enemy IADS was not just an ancillary weapons array, but functioned a critical national system just like manufacturing, government, or the people’s will. The process by which this viewpoint changed had effects on the development of the United States Air Force’s Cold War conventional capability in general, and the development of training methods, electronic warfare platforms, and modern airframes specifically.