The increasing complexity and high stakes of foreign policy decisions, especially of major powers such as the United States, have generated specialized studies of decision making. One approach, called "multiple advocacy," maps a strategy of role tasks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making process. This process allows the President to make an informed policy choice as a result of having heard a variety of options debated freely and openly among his advisors in his presence. A crucial actor in this process is the National Security Advisor. As process manager or "custodian," he must ensure that the key provisions of the strategy are met while abstaining from personal involvement in the substance of policy advice and execution. This thesis examines the internal coherence and usefulness of the strategy. The first two years of the Carter administration provide a close approximation of the strategy. Four important policy issues during this period form the empirical basis of this test: the "Deep Cuts" proposals in SALT II, the war in the Horn of Africa, Sino-American Normalization, and the fall of the Shah of Iran. While the basic principles of the strategy are found useful and sound, several of its provisions are challenged. First, in spite of its claim, the strategy does not produce multiple options when the advisors have no wide divergence of opinion. Second, contrary to the strategy's prescriptions, the custodian can improve the process in such situations by joining the policy debate. Third, custodial engagement in activities such as diplomacy and public speaking need not be prohibited too strictly. Last, the demise of the strategy can be more narrowly defined as the result of custodial disregard for a free flow of information and open participation among the advisors. Though further studies are needed to widen the empirical base, several tentative suggestions are offered to improve the strategy. The president must insist on a reasonable range of opinions when appointing advisors. While the National Security Advisor may join the policy debate to widen the range of options, his policy advice should not become the rule. At all times the President must insist that all policy debates among his advisors be brought to his attention, and that all policy options receive a fair hearing. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Using the Aristotelian concept of artistic proof, this thesis analyzes nine televised speeches presented by President Reagan from February 1981 through April 1983. Reagan skillfully utilizes only two modes of rhetorical proof--ethos and pathos. However, his lack of logical proof has not lessened his effectiveness. This study reveals several reasons for Reagan's rhetorical effectiveness and success. For example, Reagan's strong ethical image and personality comfort his audience and encourage their trust. His weaknesses in logical argument are overlooked by his audience because of his high personal appeal. Furthermore, Reagan's use of pathos appeals makes Americans feel good about themselves and their country, helping him to maintain his popularity. Finally, Reagan's skillful use of the television medium has increased his effectiveness.

Studies on Presidential-Executive relations fails to empirically analyze whether or not modern presidential scandal can impact presidential-congressional relations. Meinke and Anderson (2001) find that presidential scandal impacts House of Representatives voting behavior on key votes cited by Congressional Quarterly. A slight revision and replication of Meinke and Anderson's research finds presidential scandal impacts Senate aggregate key votes reported by Congressional Quarterly. In addition, political party plays a more important role than scandal in determining the logged odds of Senate key votes and presidential agreement. / Master of Arts

The administration of President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1992 saw several firsts in both American foreign policy towards the Middle East, and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At the beginning of the Bush Presidency, the intifada was raging in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and by the time it was over negotiations were already in progress for the most comprehensive agreement brokered in the history of the conflict to that point, the Oslo Accords. This paper will serve two purposes. First, it will delineate the relationships between the players in the Middle East and President Bush during the first year of his presidency. It will also explore his foreign policy towards the Middle East, and argue that it was the efforts of George H. W. Bush, and his diplomatic team that enabled the signing of the historic agreement at Oslo.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar.pdf: 2603035 bytes, checksum: 3b082ac06436aa640a2d72a08a30521d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / This dissertation analyzes the domestic constraints that arose during the formulation and voting of US trade policy throughout Bill Clinton s administration (1993-2001) and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles. An analytical narrative is undertaken with emphasis on: 1) the approval of NAFTA (1993); 2) the constraints to the renewal of fast-track authority (1997); 3) trade relations with China (1993-1996) and with Japan (1993-1995), 4) the normalization of trade relations with China and the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle (1999-2000). The analytic framework contains elements of different approaches such as decision units approach and bureaucratic politics model, based on the assumption that decision is made through coalitions. We argue that the way trade policy was formulated was essential for the results achieved and that the constraints were the result of divisions in the Congress, society and Executive and the difficulties related to the coordination of these actors. We conclude that the analysis provided allows us to understand more clearly the domestic constraints to the US trade policy and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles by considering the relationship among the main actors within the decision-making process / A dissertação analisa as dificuldades domésticas apresentadas à formulação e à aprovação de política externa comercial nos EUA durante o governo de Bill Clinton (1993-2001) e a forma pela qual o Executivo se ajustou a esses obstáculos. Faz-se uma narrativa analítica, tendo com ênfase 1) a aprovação do NAFTA (1993), 2) os entraves ao processo de renovação do fast-track (1997), 3) as relações comerciais com a China (1993-1996) e com o Japão (1993-1995), 4) a normalização das relações comerciais com a China e reunião ministerial da OMC em Seattle (1999-2000). O quadro analítico contém elementos de distintas abordagens, como a das unidades de decisão e da política burocrática, partindo da premissa de que o processo decisório em política externa comercial se dá por meio de coalizões. Argumenta-se que a forma como se elaborou a política comercial durante o governo Clinton foi essencial para que se chegasse aos resultados obtidos, sendo que os entraves no processo foram resultado das divisões no Congresso, na sociedade e no Executivo e das dificuldades de coordenação entre esses atores. Conclui-se que a análise oferecida, ao considerar os principais atores e seu relacionamento no processo decisório, permite entender com mais clareza os entraves domésticos à política externa comercial, bem como o modo pelo qual o Executivo se ajustou a tais entraves