This dissertation is a case study of a public policy decision, the decision to shift the military manpower policy of the United States from conscription to a policy of complete volunteerism--the all-volunteer force. The case study approach is largely historical and is concentrated on the turbulent period between 1965, when the United States' combat role in South Vietnam escalated sharply, and 1973, the year of American withdrawal from the war and the last Selective Service System draft call. A brief history of the military manpower policy of the United States is outlined in order to set the case study period within the proper context and to permit a fuller understanding and appreciation of the policy decision. In order that the case study may have potential application to the study of other public policy decisions, a theoretical model for changes in public policy-making is developed based on the research of public policy-making theorists. This model, which is largely adapted from the theoretical work of ~he Agenda-Building Theorists, is compared to the events and inter-actions of key players in the case study. Although conclusions about a wider applicability of the model is not possible, it can be concluded that the theoretical model does fit the events and circumstances contained in the case study. In addition to attempting to derive a working theoretical model of change in public policy-making, a secondary purpose of the research is to address the nonnative aspects of the shift in policy from conscription to volunteerism. Based on the pattern of American military manpower policy, it appears that Anglo-Saxon liberalism, rooted in the freedom of the individual, is an extremely strong strain in American thinking, and that the relatively long period of conscription in the United States after World War II was an anomaly in the history of American military manpower policies. / Ph. D.

Most studies of the use of conventional military force by the United States in the twentieth century tend to characterize the decision making process in terms of a unitary state and a unitary presidential decision maker. One alternative to this approach is the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm proposed by Graham Allison. To test the explanatory power of this decision making model in the post-Vietnam era, this thesis applies the specific propositions of Graham Allison's "Governmental Politics Model" concerning the use of military force, to selected case studies. In an attempt to determine the explanatory power of Allison's Governmental Politics model in the wake of Vietnam, this thesis draws on case studies ranging from the Dominican Republic intervention to the recent invasion of Panama. This thesis seeks to measure the theory to present reality. / Master of Arts

One of the key features of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy was an abrupt shift from the traditional U.S. approach to proliferation threats that prioritized deterrence and promotion of nondiscriminatory nonproliferation norms, to an approach called counterproliferation that emphasized military preemption and direct challenges to adversarial state identity. This thesis asks the question, what caused counterproliferation to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policies of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? The thesis argues that to understand this policy change requires not merely an appreciation of changes in the post-Cold War international security environment, but also an examination of how culturally shaped threat conceptions among American policymakers interacted with capabilities development and policy institutionalization within the U.S. military. As no current theory adequately addresses those dynamics, complimentary strategic culture and organizational theory models are presented as the framework for analysis. This thesis will contend that policy shift from NP to CP resulted from the merging of strategic cultural efforts aimed at legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with a military organizational drive to avoid uncertainty through the development of counterproliferation capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational responses to shifting proliferation threats altered the menu of choice for policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices. This thesis relies on a detailed case study of the evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of public discourse, declassified policy planning and Department of Defense documents, and participant interviews.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many authors, critics, and policy makers question the presence of a unified grand strategy with which the United States has striven toward in recent years. This is a topic worthy of pursuit since such a strategy is responsible for identifying how this nation intends to accomplish its goals. This thesis defines what, if any, grand strategy the United States is currently pursuing. It observes several prominent theories of grand strategy, from both the realist and liberal perspectives. This analysis is set in context of historical grand strategy decisions since World War II and uses the framework of Taiwan as the case study. The thesis then compares the three theories, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, and the Liberal Milieu and their recommendations to real-world activities of the United States with a focus primarily on military deployments and national objectives. The study reveals that of the three in question, the Liberal Milieu grand strategy is the only one that is supported by ongoing deployments in the East Asia region as well as by the national rhetoric which define our policy objectives.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In the early 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged citizens to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to the Soviet atomic threat by joining the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). Established by the United States Air Force (USAF), the GOC involved civilian volunteers surveying the skies for Soviet aircraft via watchtowers, alerting the Air Force if they suspected threatening aircraft. This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives.