Background: It is today common for companies to provide some sort of incentive for CEO's and senior management positions to motivate, retain and benefit employees within a company. This is in order to drive the goals of the CEO and management in the direction that is desired by the owner. Currently, the Swedish centre-right government has forbidden the use of such variable pay within state-owned companies. There are two different attitudes to variable pay, one that is in favour and one that rejects it. However most people agree on the fact that a well-functioning incentive scheme can be of great strategic importance for a company. Approach: has variable pay to CEO's had any effect on the company's profitability. Aim: the aim of the study is to compare companies who use variable pay to CEO's with companies that do not in relation to their profitability in terms of profit margins, yearly performance, returns on total capital and returns on equity. Method: the study uses a quantitative approach. The statistical methods that are used to answer the research question are linear and logistic regression analyses of 51 publicly owned companies in Sweden. The statistical analyses utilises an existing database (Affärsdata) which has information based on the companies’ annual report. Due to the fact that the database lacked information concerning incentive schemes, this information was retrieved manually from the company websites (annual financial reports). The research approach is deductive as we have used a range of theories which we thereafter test through our empirical analysis. Results: The results for the linear regressions show that variable pay to CEO has little or no connection to the degree of the company’s profitability. The logistic regressions show a positive significant relationship between variable pay and the company’s odds of being profitable or not. Conclusion: The study shows that variable pay to the CEO is unlikely to have a big impact on the degree of profit or loss for a company. It does however show that variable pay to the CEO is of importance in terms of whether the company makes a profit or not. / Bakgrund: Det är idag vanligt att företag använder sig av någon typ av incitament till VD och ledande befattningshavare. Syftet är att motivera, behålla och gynna anställda inom ett företag.  Detta för att kunna styra VD och ledningens mål i den riktning ägaren önskar. I dagsläget har den borgerliga regeringen i Sverige beslutat om att bruket av rörlig ersättning inom statligt ägda företag är förbjudet. Uppfattningar kring företags tillämpande av rörlig ersättning skiljer sig från de som helt förkastar användandet till de som fullt ut förespråkar dem. Däremot är de flesta överens om att ett fungerande incitamentsprogram kan vara av stor strategisk betydelse för ett företag. Problemformulering: Har rörlig ersättning till VD någon effekt på företagets lönsamhet? Syfte: Syftet med studien är att jämföra företag som använder sig av rörlig ersättning till VD med företag som inte gör det med avseende på deras lönsamhet i form av vinstmarginal, årets resultat, avkastning på totalt kapital och avkastning på eget kapital. Metod: Studien har en kvantitativ ansats. De statistiska metoder som används för att besvara forskningsfrågan är linjär och logistisk regressionsanalys av 51 publika aktiebolag i Sverige. De statistiska analyserna grundar sig på en existerande databas (Affärsdata) som tillhandahåller information om företagens årsredovisningar. Då databasen saknade information kring incitamentsprogram hämtades denna information in manuellt via de studerade företagens hemsidor (årsredovisningar). Ansatsen är deduktiv då vi valt att utgå från en uppsättning teorier som vi därefter prövar med hjälp av våra empiriska analyser. Resultat: Resultaten för de linjära regressionerna visar att rörlig ersättning till VD har en obetydlig koppling till företagets grad av lönsamhet eller förlust. De logistiska regressionsanalyserna visade emellertid att rörlig ersättning till VD har betydelse för huruvida företaget går i vinst eller förlust. Slutsats: Studien visar att rörlig ersättning till VD troligtvis inte har en så stor betydelse för graden av vinst eller förlust för ett företag, men däremot för huruvida företaget går med vinst eller inte.

<p>In the ever so increasingly competitive business climate of the 21^st century, human resources are vital for corporate success. Employees need proper incentives to perform in goal-oriented manners. Incentive systems, especially Chief Executive Officer [CEO] remunerations, have been a popular topic since the 1990s, and this tendency has increased both during the 2002-2003 corporate scandal era, as well as the financial crisis which sparked in 2007. The recent tendency appears to lean towards companies cutting their executive bonuses as well as criticism and suspiciousness towards large bonus payments. While remuneration policies within the banking industry have been thoroughly debated and researched, another financial industry that is left largely untouched are the insurance companies. The focus of this research is therefore CEO remuneration in European insurance companies.</p><p>This descriptive study, of annual reports of stock-listed insurance companies, uses a purposive cluster sample to explore quantitative trends in CEO remunerations. In addition, a content analysis of five randomly selected companies out of the sample provides a deeper, complementary understanding of the justifications of the trends. The research questions are: <em>What trends on CEO remuneration can be found over the years 2005-2009 in annual reports of European insurance companies, concerning total remuneration, fixed salary and short-term bonus? What justifications do companies make for the remunerations</em><em> over the years 2005-2009</em><em>? </em></p><p>The quantitative part of the research inductively tests the assumption that CEO remuneration has decreased during the past few years 2008 and/ or 2009 due to the impact of the financial crisis. The content analysis part of the research deductively tests if agency theory concerns and issues concerning attraction and retention play a role in determining remuneration policies.<em></em></p><p>From this research, it is concluded that short-term variable pay is largely performance-based. Still, many other aspects serve as input factors when determining compensation levels. Based on the content analysis, it is revealed that interest alignment and attraction- and retention-issues are important determinants of remunerations. Subjective factors such as discretionary judgements also play a crucial role. The quantitative trends found in this study show that total remunerations have decreased markedly in 2008, and more vaguely in 2009. The financial crisis has had an impact on especially the short-term variable part of salaries, but also on base salary levels. Although not all companies that were investigated in the content analysis explicitly mention it in their annual reports, over the years 2005-2009, all of them become more concerned about remuneration policies and business risk factors. Over the investigated years, these companies also become more attentive to creating proactive and sophisticated value creating remuneration policies that are in line with international standards, in order to act legitimate towards stakeholders.</p>

In the ever so increasingly competitive business climate of the 21st century, human resources are vital for corporate success. Employees need proper incentives to perform in goal-oriented manners. Incentive systems, especially Chief Executive Officer [CEO] remunerations, have been a popular topic since the 1990s, and this tendency has increased both during the 2002-2003 corporate scandal era, as well as the financial crisis which sparked in 2007. The recent tendency appears to lean towards companies cutting their executive bonuses as well as criticism and suspiciousness towards large bonus payments. While remuneration policies within the banking industry have been thoroughly debated and researched, another financial industry that is left largely untouched are the insurance companies. The focus of this research is therefore CEO remuneration in European insurance companies. This descriptive study, of annual reports of stock-listed insurance companies, uses a purposive cluster sample to explore quantitative trends in CEO remunerations. In addition, a content analysis of five randomly selected companies out of the sample provides a deeper, complementary understanding of the justifications of the trends. The research questions are: What trends on CEO remuneration can be found over the years 2005-2009 in annual reports of European insurance companies, concerning total remuneration, fixed salary and short-term bonus? What justifications do companies make for the remunerations over the years 2005-2009? The quantitative part of the research inductively tests the assumption that CEO remuneration has decreased during the past few years 2008 and/ or 2009 due to the impact of the financial crisis. The content analysis part of the research deductively tests if agency theory concerns and issues concerning attraction and retention play a role in determining remuneration policies. From this research, it is concluded that short-term variable pay is largely performance-based. Still, many other aspects serve as input factors when determining compensation levels. Based on the content analysis, it is revealed that interest alignment and attraction- and retention-issues are important determinants of remunerations. Subjective factors such as discretionary judgements also play a crucial role. The quantitative trends found in this study show that total remunerations have decreased markedly in 2008, and more vaguely in 2009. The financial crisis has had an impact on especially the short-term variable part of salaries, but also on base salary levels. Although not all companies that were investigated in the content analysis explicitly mention it in their annual reports, over the years 2005-2009, all of them become more concerned about remuneration policies and business risk factors. Over the investigated years, these companies also become more attentive to creating proactive and sophisticated value creating remuneration policies that are in line with international standards, in order to act legitimate towards stakeholders.

本研究欲瞭解在模擬招募情境中，兩個薪資特徵-「變動薪資比例」 與「加薪型態」，分別對組織吸引力之影響，並探討此兩組關係中「風險 知覺」的中介效果與「性格變項（核心自我評價）」的調節效果。本研究 採2x2 受試者間之實驗設計，所操弄的二個獨變項為：1.變動薪資比例 （高、低）；2.加薪型態（高機率低加薪、低機率高加薪），依變項為整 體「組織吸引力」及其三個向度（組織正向情感、雇主評價、求職行動 意圖）。 本研究之受試者為139 位大學應屆畢業生，研究結果顯示：「變動薪 資比例」越高，受試者感受的「風險知覺」越高；但「加薪型態」與受 試者的「風險知覺」無顯著關係。當受試者的「風險知覺」較高時，其 組織正向情感、雇主評價則較低；然而，變動薪資比例、加薪型態與組 織吸引力無顯著關係。雖然核心自我評價並沒有調節「變動薪資比例」 或「加薪型態」與組織吸引力的關係；可是核心自我評價卻調節「風險 知覺」與整體組織吸引力與其二個子向度（組織正向情感、求職行動意 圖）的關係。 研究者分別就結果加以討論，提出可能的解釋，並說明本研究之限 制與貢獻。 / This paper presents an experimental investigation of the influences of type of variable pay ratio and type of pay increases on overall organizational attraction and its three dimensions: affection, intentions toward the company and company prestige. A 2x2 between subjects design was used. Two independent variables were types of variable pay ratio (high/ low) and types of pay increases (high probability, small pay increases/ low probability, large pay increases). The dependent variable was organizational attraction. Risk perception and core self-evaluation were mediating and moderating variable, respectively. The sample comprised 139 college students approaching graduation. The results demonstrated that higher variable pay ratio caused higher risk perception but type of pay increases did not. Higher risk perception caused lower affection, company prestige; however, type of variable pay ratio and type of pay increases did not. Core self-evaluation did not mediate the relationship between type of variable pay ratio and risk perception, but it mediated the relationship between risk perception and overall organizational attraction and its two of three dimensions (affection, intentions toward the company). Based on the results, alternative explanation, limits, and implications were discussed.

No description available.

L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’étudier l’impact différencié de la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels et les bonis collectifs sur l’intention de rester (au sein d’une entreprise donnée) des travailleurs du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications. Afin d’étudier cette question, trois hypothèses de recherche ont été émises à l’aide des théories suivantes : 1- la théorie de l’agence, 2- la théorie des attentes et 3- la théorie de l’échange social de Blau (1964). Selon la première hypothèse, la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. La seconde hypothèse avance que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. Enfin, la dernière hypothèse soutient que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels a un impact plus important sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs. Les données utilisées pour valider nos hypothèses ont été recueillies dans le cadre d'une enquête portant sur « les relations entre la rémunération, la formation et le développement des compétences avec l’attraction et la rétention des employés clés ». Ces données de nature longitudinale, proviennent d'une entreprise canadienne du secteur des TIC. La population étudiée regroupe les nouveaux employés embauchés entre le 1er avril 2009 et le 30 septembre 2010. Nos résultats confirment l’Hypothèse 1 voulant que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels contribue à accroître l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. À l’inverse, ces résultats infirment l’Hypothèse 2. La satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs n’a donc pas d’impact significatif sur l’intention de rester. Malgré un problème de colinéarité, nos résultats suggèrent de confirmer l’Hypothèse 3 voulant que la satisfaction envers les bonis individuels ait un impact plus important sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs du secteur des TIC que la satisfaction envers les bonis collectifs. Les résultats indiquent également que le niveau de scolarité et l’engagement organisationnel ont un impact positif sur l’intention de rester des travailleurs. Les analyses longitudinales révèlent que les différences entre les caractéristiques des travailleurs expliquent davantage l’intention de rester, que les différences à travers les temps chez un même travailleur. / This thesis aims to study the differential impact of satisfaction with individual bonus plans and collective bonus plans on the intention to stay (in the compagnie) of the information and communications technology (ICT) industry workers. In order to investigate this question, three research hypotheses were issued using the following theories: 1 - the agency theory, 2 - the expectations theory and 3 - Blau’s social exchange theory (1964). The first hypothesis suggests that satisfaction with individual bonus plans enhances intention to stay of the ICT industry workers. The second hypothesis suggests that satisfaction with collective bonus plans enhances the intention to stay of the ICT industry workers. The last hypothesis suggests that satisfaction with individual bonus plans has a greater impact on the intention to stay of the ICT industry workers than satisfaction with collective bonus plans. The data used to validate the hypotheses were collected for a larger research on "the relationship between compensation, training and skills development with attracting and retaining key employees." The longitudinal data come from a Canadian ICT business. The study population consists of workers newly hired between April 1st 2009 and September 30th 2010. The results of our statistical analyzes confirm Hypothesis 1, showing that satisfaction with individual bonus plan enhances intention to stay of the ICT industry workers. Contrariwise, the results contradict Hypothesis 2. Thus, the satisfaction with collective bonus plans has no significant impact on intention to stay. Despite a collinearity problem, the results tend to confirm Hypothesis 3, revealing that satisfaction with individual bonus plans have a greater impact on intention to stay of the ITC industry workers than satisfaction with collective bonus plans. The results also show that the level of education and the organizational commitment have a positve impact on worker’s intention to stay. Longitudinal analysis revealed that the differences between the characteristics of workers are a better explanation of intention to stay than the differences across time of a same worker. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis shows how our results can be used by managers in industrial relations, as well as researchers aiming to find the best ways to retain the ICT industry workers.