Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by W. David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 187-192).

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation explores the growing epidemic of academic dishonesty in the United States in order to propose an Aristotelian-inspired model for developing moral character to curtail this epidemic. The task is laid out in four parts. Chapter one responds to the problem of akrasia, adopting a modified version of Devin Henry's distinction between drunken akrasia and genuine akrasia, holding that the akratic individual experiences an internal struggle similar to that of the self-controlled individual, but the improper desire is stronger than the desire for the proper pleasure. Chapter two responds to the challenges to virtue ethics set forth by social situationists, John Doris (2002) and Gilbert Harman (2000) with a model consistent with Rachana Kamtekar's (2004) depiction of character in Aristotelian virtue ethics that adopts a holistic view of character incorporating motivation and proper intellect as necessary elements in practical reason. Chapter three provides a summary of empirical research into the prevalence of academic dishonesty and the internal and external factors influencing academic dishonesty. This assemblage of data suggests that an effective sustainable solution for curbing academic dishonesty must focus upon the development of internal character rather than the mere modification of external or situational factors. Chapter four applies the findings of the existing data to the development of core principles for a proper moral education intended to offer a foundation for possible solutions towards reducing academic dishonesty in the United States. In light of the current research into academic dishonesty, chapter four outlines core principles essential for developing practical solutions inspired by Aristotle's character-based virtue ethics while recognizing the short-term benefits of situation modification.

Andrew Fuller maintained that Christian orthodoxy--as articulated in Evangelical Calvinism--furnished the foundation, framework, and motivation for moral excellence. On the basis of this axiom, he challenged Enlightenment moral foundations and defended the truth of Christianity against Joseph Priestley and Thomas Paine, arguing that Christianity had a superior tendency to promote virtue in men and women. Chapter 1 introduces Fuller's role in the formation of Evangelicalism. Many argue that Evangelicalism rests on Enlightenment foundations, but I make the case that Fuller's moral thought directly undermined Enlightenment foundations. Chapter 2 contrasts how Fuller based his moral thinking in Christian belief while his Enlightenment opponents rested it in human nature and reason. Chapter 3 introduces Fuller's moral polemic against Socinianism and Deism, and it explains how Fuller's emphasis on the aretegenic value of Christian doctrine represents a continuation of an apologetic method found in many classic theologians like Augustine and Calvin. Like them, Fuller maintained that men and women realized their moral telos by rightly knowing and loving God. Chapter 4 outlines Fuller's theology of virtue, demonstrating how he grounds morality in his Evangelical Calvinist system. Chapter 5 examines Fuller's understanding of how Christian belief motivates virtue in believers' lives. Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses the relevance of Fuller's moral thought for today and its parallels with modern virtue theory.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

Rosalind Hursthouse, Mark LeBar, Martha Nussbaum, and other contemporary philosophers have brought virtue ethics into conversation with political philosophy. These philosophers agree with Aristotle that the function of political authority is to enable persons to live well. But we still lack an account of how the virtues, as characteristics of persons, relate to political authority as a property of institutions. I argue that the authority of political institutions depends on performing the function of enabling persons to live well, while the virtues require, but also limit, the authority of political institutions. According to the account I develop, living well consists in the exercise of practical wisdom within a socially embedded institutional context. Political institutions enable living well by means of institutionally defined rights such as property rights that protect the exercise of practical wisdom, and they promote its development through the institutions of civil society such as the family. But, I argue, political authority is limited by the individual virtue of justice, understood as balancing conformity to the existing social norms and laws of a community with their necessary updating through ideals of virtue. Ultimately, I conclude that political authority properly functions to promote an indirect conception of the common good, according to which persons relate to each other virtuously through their shared institutions.

Previous psychological research on vegetarianism has focused primarily on participants' health and weight concerns, and the process by which people adopt a vegetarian diet. The present studies broaden this research by exploring the differences in the way omnivores and vegetarians perceive animals and people whose diets do or do not include meat. In Study 1, participants reported their willingness to eat a series of animal- and vegetable-sourced foods, as well as their perceptions of the animals’ qualities. In Study 2, participants reported their impressions of a hypothetical student’s character and personality, basing their inferences on a short profile that indicated the student’s dietary choices as either omnivorous or vegetarian. Our findings in Study 1 suggest that the decision to eat or not eat animals is chiefly a function of disgust at the thought of eating them and how often one has seen them for sale in a store, but also affected by such diverse factors as perceptions of their intelligence, capacity for pain and suffering, appearance, and similarity to humans. In Study 2, both omnivores and vegetarians rated the vegetarian student targets as more virtuous and ethical than the omnivorous student targets. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

Thesis advisor: Khaled Anatolios / Within the context of his controversy with Eunomius of Cyzicus, Gregory of Nyssa articulated a distinctly pro-Nicene conception of the perfection of God. Gregory identified divine perfection with the philanthropic goodness that is manifested in the economic activity of God and that is witnessed most vividly in the saving incarnation and death of Jesus Christ. Yet, while this particular understanding of divine perfection served Gregory’s defense of Nicene trinitarian theology, its influence was not limited to that element of his theology alone. To the contrary, Gregory’s pro-Nicene conception of the nature of divine perfection finds a perfect corollary in his discussion of the nature of human perfection. Thus, in his anthropological writings, Gregory interprets humanity as a living and active mirror of the characteristic goodness and love of divine power. Similarly, in his ascetical literature, he suggests that the goal of the Christian life is the attainment of godlikeness through participation in divine perfection, and that the form which this participation takes is an imitation of the virtues of Jesus Christ. And in his writings on the spiritual ascent of the soul, Gregory identifies the summit of the virtuous life as active participation in the philanthropic goodness of God. Christian virtue, therefore, is nothing other than imitation of and participation in the perfection of the one whom Gregory calls “the God of the gospel,” the God of Nicaea, the God made known in the person of Jesus Christ. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

In the dissertation I argue for a reconception of moral education grounded in a Platonic conception of virtue and modeled on the form of spiritual practice. I argue that this education would be carried out through practices of virtue comprised of exercises designed to transform the practitioner’s modes of seeing and being in the world. These exercises would take the form of deliberate encounters with objects of interpretive resistance and would be scaffolded to hone the faculty of attention and adapt the patterns of experience to the patterns of virtue: rhythm, harmony, systematicity, and economy. I suggest that the activities that would constitute such practices are in no way alien to contemporary academic curricula; any manner of interpretive work provides an opportunity for these forms of experience. To conclude the dissertation I address literary interpretation as one example of a curricular activity that could be adapted into a practice of virtue and demonstrate how specific interpretive exercises could be extrapolated from the basic form I have developed.

<p> In this thesis I attempt to clarify the nature and limits of the Socratic elenchus in order to determine whether or not it is capable of justifying moral knowledge as Socrates understood it. To this end, I first compare and contrast the elenchus with previous philosophical methods. I then argue that Socrates conceived of moral knowledge as expert knowledge of virtue by way of definition. Finally, I analyze the elenchus itself, and I argue: (i) that it is, in principle, capable of adequately justifying positive convictions about virtue, but only in those cases where Socrates makes no use of premises which are either logically unsecured with.in the demonstration or which lack justification from external, nonelenctic sources (ad hoc premises) ; and (ii) that since Socrates often proclaims elenctic success despite using ad hoc premises, I conclude that his lack of epistemological and logical interest led him to habitually overestimate the results of his arguments.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)