Thesis (Th. M.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-149).

This dissertation examines the political thought of Cicero in order to shed light on the question of the extent to which politics is or can be made rational. Much of modern political science and policy-making treats citizens as calculating pursuers of interests and preferences, if not as consistently rational. But this view has been powerfully challenged by evidence that human beings are far less adept at the determination and pursuit of our preferences than we believe ourselves to be. As a result, political scientists and policy-makers alike have begun to grapple with the question of how regimes committed to self-government ought to address the limits of our rational capacity, not only in the crafting of particular policies, but also in the rethinking of foundational and constitutional principles and institutions. By considering Cicero’s presentation of virtue and republican politics together with his analysis of the popular philosophical schools that were widely influential in his day, I show that Cicero recognizes and reflects on the pervasive irrationality in human decision-making. Like our modern critics of the irrationality of republicanism, the popular philosophical schools of Cicero’s day both deprecated politics for its inherent unreasonableness and sought to make the world as they experienced it conform to strict rules of reason. Through a reading of Cicero’s evaluation and critique of the schools in De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, and De Officiis, this dissertation aims to shed light not only on his account of the limits of reason in the political arena and the danger of attempting to overcome them, but also on his insistence that the irrational parts of human nature are the source of much that is beneficial in republican politics. Only by understanding this aspect of Cicero’s thought can we understand his reflections on the virtues of republicanism. / text

Can Philosophers make a genuine and substantive contribution to the theory and practice of moral education? Contrast the following two answers. According to one approach, analytic moral philosophy is concerned with constructing moral theories. As such, moral education is a secondary concern of the moral theorist and a moral theory will, at most, only have implications for moral education. Call this the strict theoretical approach. An alternative account holds that moral education is a central topic of moral philosophy. As such, moral theorists who ignore questions of moral education are offering incomplete theories. Call this the educative approach. In this dissertation, I argue that moral philosophers need to take the educative approach more seriously. In part one, I argue that the educative approach is well grounded in the western tradition of moral philosophy (particularly in the eudaimonist tradition of ethics). In part two, I show how recent work in virtue theory can make a genuine and substantive contribution to the interdisciplinary field of moral education.

Previous psychological research on vegetarianism has focused primarily on participants' health and weight concerns, and the process by which people adopt a vegetarian diet. The present studies broaden this research by exploring the differences in the way omnivores and vegetarians perceive animals and people whose diets do or do not include meat. In Study 1, participants reported their willingness to eat a series of animal- and vegetable-sourced foods, as well as their perceptions of the animals’ qualities. In Study 2, participants reported their impressions of a hypothetical student’s character and personality, basing their inferences on a short profile that indicated the student’s dietary choices as either omnivorous or vegetarian. Our findings in Study 1 suggest that the decision to eat or not eat animals is chiefly a function of disgust at the thought of eating them and how often one has seen them for sale in a store, but also affected by such diverse factors as perceptions of their intelligence, capacity for pain and suffering, appearance, and similarity to humans. In Study 2, both omnivores and vegetarians rated the vegetarian student targets as more virtuous and ethical than the omnivorous student targets.

In Treatises 19 (I, 2) and 20 (I, 3), Plotinus unfolds several ‘grades’ of virtue by interpreting the Platonic dialogues. Beginning with the goal of Theaetetus, “likeness to god”, Plotinus frames his discussion with a glance to the virtue exhibited by World Soul, giving a cosmic significance to the Delphic command, “know thyself”. Within this cosmic framework, the limited sphere of human, “political” virtues is subordinated to higher forms of purification. Purificatory virtue is revealed as the missing step between the political virtues and their archetypes. This step is mediatory and dynamic; as a lower form of purification, civic virtue is dignified as the necessary condition for the soul’s divinisation. World Soul is the exemplary possessor of perfect virtue, and as such operates as the mediatrix for human souls. This particular mediation illustrates the foundation of virtue for Plotinus: the non-anthropocentric, providential activity of the most contemplative of all souls.

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There is a long-held assumption that Outdoor Adventure Education (OAE) can develop character. However, little research has explored this belief. While many practitioners, and some scholars, remain committed to character development through OAE, the literature also reveals a growing body of discomfort and suspicion surrounding this assumption. This dissent centres on the vague nature of the term “character,” and the moral philosophical complexities surrounding the concept of character itself. Until “character” is more clearly explicated, any resolution to the current confusion is unlikely. This thesis employs Aristotle’s virtue theory, as espoused in his Nicomachean Ethics, to articulate an understanding of character. Although several scholars have used virtue ethics, commonly referred to as character ethics, to support their claims of character development through OAE, these treatments have been preliminary, warranting this more detailed account. When viewed from this virtue ethical perspective, the question, “Can character be developed through OAE?,” becomes problematic. For Aristotle cautions that different subjects of inquiry yield differing levels of accuracy, and with regard to ethical investigations, such as those into character, one must be content to “indicate the truth roughly and in outline” (I 3§4). Further complicating the matter, Aristotle asserts that virtue, a disposition, and the building block of character is gradually and arduously inculcated over long periods of time (I 7§16). While virtue theory implies that radical character transformation is, in any context, unlikely over brief stints of time, this does not mean that OAE programmes are of little moral worth. To the contrary, a detailed examination into a virtue ethical understanding of character suggests that certain elements of OAE programmes may xii have strong moral relevance. This relevance is found in Aristotle’s three conditions that cultivate the development of virtue, conditions readily found within many OAE courses: moral reflection; moral practice; and sharing in the moral lives of others. Drawing on my own interest and experience within OAE, an expedition seemed an ideal setting to explore the presence and content of Aristotle’s three conditions. In hope of discovering this moral narrative, a qualitative case study was conducted on a two-week wilderness expedition in the Adirondack Mountains of New York. The expedition was a first-year transition experience for students attending a Christian liberal college in the United States. Utilising interviews as a primary method, and observations and texts as secondary methods, the research explored the participants’ expedition experience from a virtue ethical perspective. A thematic analysis revealed that participants reported reflecting on their moral lives in both formal (e.g. group reviews, solo, journals) and informal (e.g. while hiking and performing camp chores) settings. Similarly, whether through the mental and physical endurance required in off-trail navigation, or the care expressed through the acts of service and gracious tolerance necessitated by the social demands of expeditionary life, the participants viewed their wilderness travel as a constant opportunity for moral practice. Lastly, the participants identified the community formed on their expedition to be integral to their increased moral self-perception. Although a virtue ethical perspective precludes claiming anything definitive regarding the participants’ character development, at the least, the expedition can be said to have contributed to their moral journey in ways that are directly relevant to their character.

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Material goods play an important role in ethical life and moral education. Judging which goods are preferable to which − and which are therefore worth pursuing over which − is an ethically crucial process. The currently dominant paradigms of moral education (virtue education, cognitive developmentalism and care theory) do not satisfactorily contribute to this important topic. I argue that the resultant lacuna may be resolved by attending to the insight of the classical Stoics and their modern day neo-Stoic interpreters. Stoicism, I argue, provides a unique set of philosophical resources that fosters critical deliberation and reflection regarding the attribution of value to material goods. I begin this study by detailing the extant lacuna via discussion of virtue education, cognitive developmentalism and care theory as they relate to material good education. Once the lacuna’s existence is established I move on to introduce Stoic philosophy (both classical and contemporary). From this philosophy I construct a moral educational framework. This framework is then applied to two topics related to the material good lacuna: consumer education and environmental education. I conclude that, while Stoicism must be softened and revised for a modern pedagogical audience, its core philosophy has much to offer moral educationalists. / Theoretical, Cultural, and International Studies in Education

This dissertation explores Aristotle's concept of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, through the lens of the flourishing self. Connections will be made with Heidegger's concept of authenticity, as seen through the lens of authentic selfhood. It is argued that there is some type of authenticity or self-appropriation already present in Aristotle's ethical thought. For both thinkers, however, the particularized self is subsumed into a type of universality--the universality of excellence or care. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts / Philosophy / PhD / Dissertation