This research strives to illuminate the concept of "Christian values" and it points out the possible connection between this term and the ethics of values. At the beginning is introduced a reflection on the "Christian values" from both philosophical and theological point of view, then we try to find a connection between the Christian values and the ethics of values. The paper is methodologically structured in several subsequent steps. The first one is the reflection on the concept of "value" in the philosophy of values (20th century). the emphasis is put on the connection between the term "value" and the term "good", because we work on the assumption that there is some non-specific relationship between the good and the values. The following step is a theological elaborate of the term "value" that proceeds from a biblical examination, during which we concentrate non only on the term itself but also on the question if the value-focused thinking in the Scripture has a specific implicit form. Thereafter we examine the term of "value" from the systematic-theology point of view. At first we try to look into the values as an expression of the Divine perfection, then we move on to the moral-theological view, where we present the Christian interpretation of values. With this theological examination we lay the foundations for the determination of "Christian values". In the final part of the paper we present the connection between values and the ethics of values. We examine in detail the definition of the ethics of values itself, consequently we talk about the role of values in the ethics of values as well as the theological development of this doctrine. We can conclude that a satisfactory and widely accepted definition of values does not exist, which is why we also examined the term of "good" in order to find the differences between the two terms. We came to the conclusion that the difference is not convincingly explained by the ethics of values. In the theological reflection of the term "value" we tried to find a biblical foundation for values. The language analysis of the biblical texts showed that the term of values is not very frequent in the Bible and less it is in the contemporary understanding of the texts. However, deeper examination of individual texts of the New Testament showed that value-oriented statements can be found relatively often in the Bible. These statements concern the highest value, as well as the hierarchy of natural and supernatural values, etc. The next step of the theological reflection showed, that in the christian understanding, God is the source of all good/values. He is the originator and the aim of all that is and al that comes from him is good. The ethics of virtues is interesting because it differs from another normative ethics by its theological thinking. It focuses on human action from the point of view of the ultimate goal of human life. It is also associated with natural law. Indeed, each of the cardinal virtues is based on some of the basic benefits of human nature. Cultivating the virtues in life leads one to the goal of life, whether it is a naturally successful life or, in the Christian concept, eternal life, that is, communion with God. In the final step, let's take a look at the very notion of "Christian values." First of all, an inclusive concept is possible, which is based on the fact that God is the originator of all that is good, and therefore all goodness can be understood as good Christian. But then there is no difference between good and Christian good. Perhaps only in the perspective of the person who evaluates this good. Secondly, the concept of exclusive is also possible, with Christian values being what is specifically Christian, that is, what has its foundation in Revelation. In other words, it is the good / value that we would not know if it were not for Christianity.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / This dissertation argues that both wealth and poverty function as moral luck to impede the pursuit of virtue and that economic inequality worsens the problem. I begin with a chapter describing the state of economic inequality today, asking whether economic inequality is a problem distinct from poverty. I conclude that it is, for three reasons: inequality causes many social ills traditionally associated with poverty; it self-perpetuates; and—the argument I advance throughout the dissertation—inequality functions as moral luck to harm virtue. In the next chapter, I argue for a Christian virtue account of moral luck. Moral luck is a term used by feminist philosophers to describe the impact of life circumstances on persons’ ability to pursue virtue. I examine Scripture, Aquinas, and the work of womanist theologians to propose a Christian virtue account of moral luck that acknowledges both the pervasiveness of sin and Christian hope for God’s promised redemption. In the third chapter, I draw on Aquinas and contemporary virtue theorists to provide rich descriptions of the eight virtues I will consider throughout the dissertation. I describe a new virtue taxonomy: cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, and humility; “daughter” virtues of solidarity, fidelity and self-care; and helper virtues of temperance and fortitude. To understand how inequality functions as moral luck, we must first understand how wealth and poverty affect our pursuit of virtue. I continue with a chapter describing the impact of wealth, which I define as “having more than we need,” on the virtues in my taxonomy. Blending resources from psychology, sociology and theology, I conclude that wealth impacts the pursuit of virtue in two major ways: by endowing the wealthy person with hyperagency, or greater power, freedom and choice than that enjoyed by others; and by becoming an end in itself. This does not mean that wealth has a unilaterally negative impact on the pursuit of virtue; for example, I argue that wealth can help in pursuing the virtue of self-care. In the next chapter, I assess how poverty, which I define as being unable to meet one’s needs or meeting them only through constant and precarious struggle, functions as moral luck. Consulting social science, memoirists and journalists who write about poverty, and liberation theologians, I show that key issues in poverty’s impact on virtue include scarcity, which impacts cognitive processing and can limit access to certain virtuous practices, and diminished self-regard. This does not mean that poverty has a unilaterally negative impact on the pursuit of virtue; for example, a variety of evidence suggests that poverty encourages the virtue of solidarity. My final chapter shows how inequality exacerbates the impact of wealth and poverty on virtue in terms of hyperagency, wealth as an end in itself, scarcity and self-regard. I offer suggestions for future Christian ethical work on moral luck and responses to the impact of economic inequality on virtue. These include practical economic solutions to reduce inequality and theological solutions including encounter, conversion, satisfaction with contentment, and dependence on God. I suggest that the Christian community can respond to the impact of economic inequality on virtue through political action; a renewed approach to tithing and aid; and creating sites for encounter between the rich and the poor. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: Stephen Brown / Although hagiography and sermons from the Middle Ages are abundant, little research exists that explores the relationship between these two genres. Jacobus de Voragine compiled the most renowned medieval collection of hagiography, Legenda aurea (Golden Legend). He also compiled several volumes of model sermons, including a volume on the saints, sermones de sanctis. This dissertation examines four saints who appear in both of these works: Mary Magdalene, Benedict, Nicholas and Peter Martyr. By writing his hagiography and sermons, Jacobus attempted to guide Christians toward lives of virtue and ultimate union with God. In particular, Jacobus relied on tropological and anagogical reading of Scriptures in order to communicate how Christians should behave and what they should anticipate in eternity. In his work on two of these saints, Mary Magdalene and Benedict, Jacobus relied on the framework of spiritual ascent to God described by Pseudo-Dionysius. In particular, Jacobus focused on the first stage of ascent, the purgative. A link between the hagiography and sermons sometimes can be found in the etymological introductions in the Golden Legend. In the sermons on Mary Magdalene and Peter Martyr, Jacobus follows the virtues found in the etymology in the hagiography, while for Nicholas and Benedict, the correspondence is not as faithful. Nevertheless, throughout his sermons on the saints, Jacobus refers to episodes described more fully in the Golden Legend. Jacobus intended preachers to use stories from the Golden Legend to punctuate and illustrate the more theological content presented in the model sermons. If Jacobus's work is indicative of larger trends in medieval preaching, preachers expected to utilize hagiographical resources in order to urge their listeners to the virtuous life and an eschatological union with God. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

O objetivo deste trabalho está relacionado à questão de saber qual a natureza da virtude em Platão; para tanto, procuramos demonstrar que a virtude na ética platônica possui diferentes fases. A primeira, trata da virtude a partir da visão socrática, considerada a fase de juventude de Platão; nesta fase, o conceito de virtude coincide com conhecimento, ou seja, todo princípio ético deve estar fundamentado pela razão, portanto o conhecimento é o princípio fundamental e unificador de todas as virtudes. Na segunda fase, o conhecimento continua sendo o princípio unificador, no entanto, o conceito de virtude se evidencia como uma unidade que se harmoniza pelo pressuposto das diferenças, isto é, Platão faz emergir a ação, o conflito, conseqüentemente isto leva à superação do intelectualismo socrático, no sentido de mostrar que o conhecimento é necessário, mas não suficiente para unificar as virtudes. E por último, temos a questão do ensino da virtude a partir do diálogo Mênon. Embora o citado diálogo negue a possibilidade do ensino da virtude, entretanto deixa em aberto a mesma possibilidade no que diz respeito à natureza da virtude ser ensinável. / The objective of this paper concerns the question of knowing what the nature of virtue in Plato is. In order to achieve it, we aim to demonstrate that the virtue in the platonic ethics has different phases. The first one deals with virtue from the socratic vision, known as the phase of Plato\'s youth; in which the concept of virtue coincides with knowledge, that is, all ethical principles must be based on reason, therefore knowledge is the basic and unifying principle of all virtues. In the second phase, in spite of the fact that knowledge is still regarded as the unifying principle, the concept of virtue is evidenced as a unit that is harmonized through the assumption of differences, that is, Plato makes the action and the conflict emerge, which consequently leads to the overcoming of the socratic intellectualism, in that it shows that `knowledge is necessary, but not enough to unify the virtues. Finally, there is the question of the teaching of virtue from the Menon dialogue. Although the aforementioned dialogue denies the possibility of the teaching of virtue, yhe same possibility concerning the nature of the teaching of virtue remains unresolved.

Do conjunto dos chamados primeiros diálogos de Platão, o Protágoras destaca-se como a obra em que é apresentada mais sistematicamente a doutrina conhecida como intelectualismo ético. Grosso modo, trata-se de compreender os temas éticos, como as virtudes ou excelências morais (justiça, piedade, sabedoria, temperança e coragem), exclusivamente como resultado de um processo cognitivo; em outros termos, trata-se de afirmar que os assuntos éticos para uma correta apreciação exigem a consideração de um tipo de conhecimento, que, sob esse diapasão, mostrar-se-á como o conhecimento do bem. O final do Protágoras apresenta esse ponto com clareza. Ali, as virtudes discutidas ao longo do diálogo são, a rigor, uma só coisa, a saber, conhecimento. A doutrina ética intelectualista conduz a consequências que não deixaram de ser exploradas por Platão nos primeiros diálogos, notadamente no Protágoras. Primeiramente, reduz-se com isso a multiplicidade das manifestações da excelência humana à posse de um conhecimento, problema que deixará sua herança à literatura antiga e que chega aos estudos eruditos contemporâneos como a questão da unidade das virtudes; em segundo lugar, o papel destacado do conhecimento na compreensão da vida ética requer a compreensão da relação deste com outros elementos fundamentais e reconhecidos, igualmente decisivos para a alma humana e para determinação das ações, como os apetites e as paixões. Este último ponto surge devido à constatação abundante nos diálogos da primeira fase de Platão, corroborada exemplarmente pelo Protágoras, de que o conhecimento é condição não apenas necessária, mas também suficiente para a obtenção e o exercício das virtudes, de modo que nenhum elemento extracognitivo (como o são paixões e apetites) é capaz de desviar a rota de ação indicada pelo conhecimento. Sendo o conhecimento do bem que caracteriza a virtude, hegemônico quando presente na alma humana, qual papel, portanto, seria reservado para paixões e apetites na ética dos primeiros diálogos? Uma doutrina que articula esses dois pontos é avançada no Protágoras, sendo este o diálogo que sistematiza e aprofunda as teorias socráticas presentes nos demais diálogos do conjunto. Nesse sentido, proponho um exame da relação entre virtude e conhecimento no Protágoras, dividido em duas partes: a primeira parte lidando mais diretamente com o problema da unidade das virtudes, enquanto a segunda investigará o sentido do intelectualismo ético segundo a relação entre conhecimento e elementos não cognitivos, parte na qual o exame de uma virtude particular receberá destaque: a coragem. / Among Platos first dialogues, the Protagoras stands out as the work in which the so called ethical intellectualism is exposed in the most systematic manner. Roughly, in ethical intellectualism, ethical themes such as virtues or moral excellences (justice, piety, wisdom, temperance and courage) are defined exclusively as the result of a cognitive process; in other terms, for ethical matters to be correctly understood, a certain knowledge must be considered; in this case, knowledge of the good. This point is made clear at the end of the Protagoras: all virtues discussed throughout the dialogue are strictly one thing, namely knowledge. The consequences of the intellectualist ethical doctrine were also explored by Plato in his first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras. First, the multiplicity of different manifestations of human excellence are thus reduced to the possession of a knowledge, a problem that was thoroughly explored in ancient literature and resulted, contemporarily, in the question of the unity of virtue. Secondly, the central role of knowledge in the comprehension of the ethical life requires the comprehension of the relation between knowledge and other admittedly fundamental aspects such as appetites and passions that are decisive to the human soul and crucial to determine ones actions. This latter point arises from the abundant observation in Platos first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras, that knowledge is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition to obtain and exercise virtue in such a way that no extracognitive element (such as passions and appetites) is able to interfere in the path of action indicated by knowledge. If knowledge of the good is what defines virtue and if it is hegemonic when present in the human soul, what role is left to passions and appetites in the ethics of the first dialogues? These two points are articulated in the doctrine that is exposed in the Protagoras, a dialogue that deepens and systematizes Socrates theories discussed in the other dialogues from this period. Therefore, I intend to examine the relation between virtue and knowledge in the Protagoras. This work is divided in two parts: in the first, I deal with the problem of the unity of virtues; in the second part, I investigate the meaning of ethical intellectualism in view of the relation between knowledge and non-cognitive elements, and one particular virtue shall be examined: courage.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The United States penal system, fragmented by contradictory impulses toward retribution and incapacitation, is in need of coherent objectives for its prisons and jails. This dissertation draws upon the resources of virtue ethics to suggest a new model of justice, one which claims that a Christian theological framework can offer insight for public correctional institutions. In developing a model of justice as virtue, I incorporate rehabilitative goals and contributions from restorative justice. Advancing beyond these foundations, I draw upon two key sources. First, from a study of virtue and justice in the work of Thomas Aquinas, I argue that the virtue of legal justice - an orientation toward the common good - is the fundamental lens for understanding punishment. The prison can only cultivate justice to the extent that it empowers moral agency and (re-)orients offenders toward right relationship with the community. Second, an inclusive, restorative account of biblical justice - developed particularly from Isaiah, the Psalms, and the New Testament - establishes justice as a saving intervention. Thus, punishment can be a legitimate means but is not constitutive of justice itself. Despite its necessary limitations, the prison must empower the moral agency of inmates through just action, reformulate the role and practices of correctional staff, and facilitate just relationships between offenders and their communities and families. Furthermore, prisons themselves can be understood as moral agents that bear responsibility for cultivating justice in society. For the United States prison, a model of justice as virtue mandates unremitting efforts to transform offenders and the larger community into just moral agents. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: Christopher J. Kelly / This dissertation is a study of the moral and political significance of the imagination in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's <italic>Emile</italic>. Rousseau attributes to the imagination a pervasive influence over human life, claiming that it "gives birth not only to the virtues and vices, but to the goods and ills of human life" and that its "empire" makes men "good or bad, happy or unhappy on this earth." The dissertation examines the ambivalence of Rousseau's account, and shows how the model "natural education" of Emile depends on the proper handling of the imagination to cultivate virtue and to secure individual happiness. After first establishing what Rousseau means by "natural education" and what its particular goals are, I turn to the threat the imagination poses to the success of that education. Rousseau's attack on the imagination centers on its power to open the human heart to infinite desire. By generating ever-new and ever-expanding desires, the imagination renders men necessary to one another, causing dependence, weakness, and, ultimately, wickedness, and unhappiness. As a principal agent of man's departure from natural self-sufficiency, the imagination is at the center of the process that transforms natural self-love (<italic>amour de soi</italic>) into <italic>amour-propre</italic>, and makes genuine human satisfaction fundamentally elusive. Following these introductory chapters, the remainder of the dissertation argues that, despite this critique, Rousseau in fact relies on the imagination in the successive stages of Emile's moral education to protect his independence and to strengthen those aspects of natural self-love (<italic>amour de soi</italic>) that lend themselves to the cultivation of the social virtues. Tracing the role of the imagination through Emile's education in compassion, justice, natural religion, love, and virtue, I argue that the proper habituation of the imagination proves to be indispensable for securing both happiness and morality, for defending individual autonomy in the context of social life, and for reconciling, to the extent possible, the private and the public good. Moreover, although Rousseau's recourse to the imagination might initially seem to introduce an element of irrationality into Emile's education, Emile's imagination in fact aids his ability to live not only a moral life but also a rational life. In a variety of ways, detailed in the dissertation, Rousseau employs the imagination and its illusions to forestall other more crippling illusions, to reveal the social world and the passions of men for what they truly are, and to make Emile both moderate and wise. Finally, however, while Emile's moral education engages his imagination in the most salutary manner possible, both for himself and for others, it cannot wholly prevent the imagination from giving birth to desires that betray a disruption of natural wholeness. While these desires present a complicated set of issues, in general, they represent the compromise with natural self-sufficiency that is involved in even the most promising moral education. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: James Keenan / Thesis advisor: Shawn Copeland / Despite its stated opposition to racism, the Catholic church in the United States remains both complicit in and shaped by the United States' persistent white supremacy. Largely due to the habituating effect of racial segregation, many of the church's practices have been turned into habits of white supremacy. For this reason, I contend, white supremacy operates in the church as a corporate vice, impeding the church's ability to achieve its identity as the body of Christ. This dissertation uncovers the Catholic parish as well as the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist as habits of white supremacy in order to propose a new approach to the problem of racial inequality and injustice, corporate re-habituation. The church must re-make itself while re-making the spaces it inhabits. As long as the Catholic church continues to reside in racially segregated space, it will continue to carry the vice of white supremacy in its body. In addition to re- drawing parochial borders in defiance of regnant patterns of racial segregation, the church must also work to dismantle both the hypersegregated black ghetto and the hyperprivileged white enclave. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The dissertation will contribute not only to an appreciation and critical evaluation of fortitude in the Philippine context, but has a wider significance for the practice of virtue ethics. The thesis is that (a) virtue must be analyzed contextually, in specific social contexts, as well as (b) in dependence upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the virtues, that (c) social virtue as well as individual virtue exists, and that (d) this social, contextual, Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to virtue provides a basis for a social-ethical critical evaluation and prescription for particular societies. If virtue ethics is to generate sound social normative claims, its argument needs to be based not merely upon the classical tradition, but also on a socially, historically and culturally aware analysis of the way virtues are fleshed out in context. This dissertation will argue that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition still has much to teach us about courage or fortitude, and in dialogue with contemporary social science still provides legitimate moral insights into fortitude today. Second, it will argue that virtue takes on a particular color or texture in specific social contexts, and will argue this in relation to the Filipino context: Philippine fortitude is Thomistic, with unique attributes of resilience and joy. Third, it will argue that it is necessary to engage in a social-ethical critique of social virtue, arguing that there are deficiencies in Philippine fortitude in that it lacks a crucial link with justice. This critical evaluation will lead to the elaboration of an ethical and social imperative for the Filipino people to develop good anger to fuel a less passive, more assertive fortitude that is ordered to justice. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

A pesquisa apresentada consiste em cinco momentos distintos: Capítulo I - introdução situando a abra e o autor; Capítulo II - ensaios que contextualizam as obras traduzidas, apresentando alguns aspectos relevantes no olhar de Plutarco para a posição da mulher nos âmbitos público e privado; Capítulo III - traduções de três tratados de Plutarco: As virtudes das mulheres, Preceitos para o casamento e Carta de consolação à sua mulher; Capítulo IV - sob o título de considerações finais, destaca como a idéia de virtude feminina perpassa os textos traduzidos e como o conceito de virtude em alguns autores gregos dialoga com a idéia de virtude feminina presente na obra de Plutarco. O Capítulo V, por sua vez, apresenta um glossário dos nomes traduzidos. / The research done has five different moments: Chapter I - an introduction presenting the author and his work; Chapter II - essays that remit the translated works to the context at that period, showing some relevant thoughts of Plutarch about women position in public and private spaces, during the Ancient times; Chapter III - translation of three Plutarch\'s works: Bravery of Women , Advice to bride and groome and Consolation to his wife; Chapter IV - the final considerations emphasize how the idea of feminine virtue is inserted in the translated works and also the interlocution between the concept of virtue in some Greek authors and Plutarch\'s ideas. Chapter V presents a glossary of the translated names.