A presente pesquisa visa compreender o pensamento ético-político de Alexis de Tocqueville, no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento da liberdade do cidadão no Estado democrático para, então, discutir a estreita relação estabelecida entre Estado democrático, liberdade e justiça. O interesse nesta discussão advém de uma dificuldade que a análise tocquevilliana da democracia traz à luz: por um lado o Estado democrático fundamenta-se necessariamente numa relação de harmonia entre a liberdade e a igualdade, por outro lado, tal harmonia é bastante problemática, pois exige dos homens virtudes cívicas opostas às propensões que dispõem naturalmente neste Estado. A falta destas virtudes isola os cidadãos e a conseqüência é o surgimento de um Estado despótico que, aniquilando suavemente a capacidade dos homens pensarem e agirem por si mesmos junto com seus semelhantes, os degrada. Para equacionar esta dificuldade Tocqueville, sem qualquer desprezo às características dos tempos democráticos, mas ciente da necessidade de conter as tendências desagregadoras destes tempos, admite a necessidade de educar o indivíduo para torná-lo um cidadão virtuoso. Aceitando que a virtude possa advir do interesse, faz-se necessário formar, pela ação dos próprios cidadãos concernidos, costumes e crenças que os projetem para além de si mesmos, que os façam reconhecer, no respeito à igual liberdade de todos demais, um critério de justiça adequado ao Estado democrático e à dignidade humana. Mas, se justo é a igual liberdade impõe-se que aceitemos o Estado democrático como radicalmente inacabado, sujeito à revezes e incertezas, posto que implica a permanente abertura ao diferente, à tolerância e ao pluralismo. / This thesis aims at understanding the ethical and political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville as far as the development of the citizen\'s freedom in the democratic state is concerned. This provides a basis for a discussion about the close relationship between democratic state, freedom, and justice. The interest in such a discussion comes from an issue raised by the tocquevillian analysis of democracy: if, on the one hand, the democratic state is necessarily based on a harmonious relationship between freedom and equality, on the other, such harmonious relationship is rather problematic because it demands from the citizens civic virtues which are opposed to their natural dispositions. The lack of such civic virtues isolates the citizens from each other, and can lead to the emergence of a despotic state, which degrades men because it subtly annihilates their ability to think and act by themselves. Without showing any disregard for the characteristics of democratic times, Tocqueville is aware of the necessity to limit the disruptive tendencies of those days and admits the need to educate men to make them become virtuous citizens. Accepting that virtue results from interest, then it becomes necessary that the concerned citizens develop a set of customs and beliefs which project them beyond themselves and make them recognize a criterium for justice which is appropriate to the democratic state and to human dignity. However fair equal freedom, one might accept that the democratic state is an unfinished business, subject to setbacks and uncertainties, and its future depends a great deal on mens ability to deal with difference, with tolerance and pluralism

A menção do título às ilhas deve-se ao fato de que toda a tese se estrutura a partir da análise do discurso Nas ilhas bem-aventuradas, da segunda parte de Assim falou Zaratustra. Examino, em primeiro lugar, a relevância desse cenário, tanto para a obra, quanto para os problemas centrais a serem abordados na tese. Esse espaço mítico, tomado de Hesíodo (e, derivativamente, de Homero), tem a função de selecionar a audiência de Zaratustra e, portanto, restringir drasticamente a destinação de seus ensinamentos (ou seja, da filosofia nietzschiana como um todo). A partir desse enquadramento, examino o significado muito específico que o além-do-homem adquire para a audiência seleta: ele é um ideal, não a ser alcançado, mas a ser perpetuamente perseguido. Ao compreendê-lo, o criador abandona a verdade como um critério da ação criativa e dos valores e é instado a eleger outros em seu lugar. No discurso Nas ilhas bem-aventuradas, um desses critérios emerge da apresentação das condições efetivas que devem ser cumpridas pelo criador: em termos muitos gerais, o criador deve ser capaz de estabelecer uma relação privilegiada com o \"intransitório\", isto é, o devir. Trata-se, assim, de um modo específico de relacionarse com a vida um modo que a trata precisamente como a encarnação do devir e, além disso, da vontade de poder. Por fim, busco, avaliar as consequências daquele ideal quando projetado sobre o futuro da humanidade, algo permanentemente no horizonte de Nietzsche. A criação de uma nova imagem para o homem pressupõe a emergência de alguns raros indivíduos capazes de criar, para si mesmos, as virtudes alinhadas àqueles critérios superiores de valoração; nesse contexto, nobreza soma-se a devir e vida, não apenas como critério de valoração, mas também como meta incluída no ideal de superação da humanidade. / The allusion to the isles is due to the fact that the whole thesis is structured upon the analysis of Zarathustras discourse Upon the blessed isles. This points to the constitutive distance of isles, which symbolizes Nietzsche pathos der Distanz. Building on that, Ill discuss the meaning that the overman acquires in this context, i.e. an ideal to be perpetually aimed at. It implies the abandonment of truth as a criterion for creative action. The new criteria, besides the overman itself, are becoming, life. When it comes to the meaning of Nietzsches concern with the future of mankind, Ill discuss the concept of virtue and the self-stylization of nobility.

A presente pesquisa visa compreender o pensamento ético-político de Alexis de Tocqueville, no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento da liberdade do cidadão no Estado democrático para, então, discutir a estreita relação estabelecida entre Estado democrático, liberdade e justiça. O interesse nesta discussão advém de uma dificuldade que a análise tocquevilliana da democracia traz à luz: por um lado o Estado democrático fundamenta-se necessariamente numa relação de harmonia entre a liberdade e a igualdade, por outro lado, tal harmonia é bastante problemática, pois exige dos homens virtudes cívicas opostas às propensões que dispõem naturalmente neste Estado. A falta destas virtudes isola os cidadãos e a conseqüência é o surgimento de um Estado despótico que, aniquilando suavemente a capacidade dos homens pensarem e agirem por si mesmos junto com seus semelhantes, os degrada. Para equacionar esta dificuldade Tocqueville, sem qualquer desprezo às características dos tempos democráticos, mas ciente da necessidade de conter as tendências desagregadoras destes tempos, admite a necessidade de educar o indivíduo para torná-lo um cidadão virtuoso. Aceitando que a virtude possa advir do interesse, faz-se necessário formar, pela ação dos próprios cidadãos concernidos, costumes e crenças que os projetem para além de si mesmos, que os façam reconhecer, no respeito à igual liberdade de todos demais, um critério de justiça adequado ao Estado democrático e à dignidade humana. Mas, se justo é a igual liberdade impõe-se que aceitemos o Estado democrático como radicalmente inacabado, sujeito à revezes e incertezas, posto que implica a permanente abertura ao diferente, à tolerância e ao pluralismo. / This thesis aims at understanding the ethical and political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville as far as the development of the citizen\'s freedom in the democratic state is concerned. This provides a basis for a discussion about the close relationship between democratic state, freedom, and justice. The interest in such a discussion comes from an issue raised by the tocquevillian analysis of democracy: if, on the one hand, the democratic state is necessarily based on a harmonious relationship between freedom and equality, on the other, such harmonious relationship is rather problematic because it demands from the citizens civic virtues which are opposed to their natural dispositions. The lack of such civic virtues isolates the citizens from each other, and can lead to the emergence of a despotic state, which degrades men because it subtly annihilates their ability to think and act by themselves. Without showing any disregard for the characteristics of democratic times, Tocqueville is aware of the necessity to limit the disruptive tendencies of those days and admits the need to educate men to make them become virtuous citizens. Accepting that virtue results from interest, then it becomes necessary that the concerned citizens develop a set of customs and beliefs which project them beyond themselves and make them recognize a criterium for justice which is appropriate to the democratic state and to human dignity. However fair equal freedom, one might accept that the democratic state is an unfinished business, subject to setbacks and uncertainties, and its future depends a great deal on mens ability to deal with difference, with tolerance and pluralism

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-11T12:02:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Vera Lucia Lopes.pdf: 889172 bytes, checksum: b567f082fcfbd2afbc279ae1034ac1d2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-11T12:02:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vera Lucia Lopes.pdf: 889172 bytes, checksum: b567f082fcfbd2afbc279ae1034ac1d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The Aristotelian ethics is articulated from the research on which is the supreme good of man and the purpose for which all things tend. Artistotle says that happiness (eudaimonia) is this good that we all seek in life and, therefore, is the end to which all things desired by man tend. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the successful accomplishment of the human being viewed as a rational political animal. Thus, the man is happy when performing the purpose for which he exists, i.e., when performing the work (érgon) of its own. This study, which focuses on the part of the Nicomachean Ethics that became known as “The treaty of virtue” (Books I-IV), aims at understanding the design and place that occupies eudaimonia in the ethics of Aristotle. Therefore, we investigate some concepts of Aristotelian ethics closely linked with his conception of eudaimonia. In conclusion to the paper, we present a recent debate that has become paradigmatic in studies of Aristotelian ethics. This is the debate between the positions of two great contemporary Aristotelians, Hardie and Ackrill on the conception of eudaimonia as a supreme good, to be understood as an inclusive one (Hardie) or a dominant one of all the others (Ackrill) / A ética aristotélica se articula a partir da investigação de qual é o bem supremo do homem e o fim a que tendem todas as coisas. Aristóteles afirma que a felicidade (eudaimonia) é esse bem que todos buscam na vida e, por isso, é o fim ao qual devem tender todas as coisas desejadas pelo ser humano. Para Aristóteles, a eudaimonia é a realização bem-sucedida do ser humano entendido como animal político racional. Desta forma, o homem é feliz quando realiza o fim para qual existe, isto é, quando realiza a obra (érgon) que lhe é própria. A presente dissertação, que se concentra na parte da Ética Nicomaqueia conhecida como “O tratado da virtude” (livros I-IV), tem por objeto compreender a concepção e o lugar que a eudaimonia ocupa na ética de Aristóteles. Para tanto, investiga-se alguns conceitos da ética aristotélica estreitamente ligados com a sua concepção de eudaimonia. Em conclusão, apresenta-se um debate recente que se tornou paradigmático aos estudos da ética aristotélica. Trata-se do debate entre as posições de dois grandes aristotélicos contemporâneos, Hardie e Ackrill, acerca da concepção da eudaimonia como bem supremo, a ser entendida como um bem inclusivo de todos os outros (Hardie) e um bem dominante de todos os outros (Ackrill)

Neste trabalho examinamos a concepção de sociedade civil no pensamento social e político de Benjamin Franklin, cujas idéias exerceram grande influência na formação da mentalidade do homem do Novo Mundo. Essa mentalidade inaugura um novo modo de conceber a vida em sociedade, exaltando tudo o que se opõe aos valores da velha ordem. Contra o princípio da honra, os títulos de nobreza e a posição social dos indivíduos, ela exalta a virtude republicana, celebra o trabalho e reclama o respeito à dignidade humana, intrínseca a todos os homens independente da sua condição de nascimento. Não por acaso, virtude e trabalho aparecem como categorias centrais no pensamento de Benjamin Franklin. Longe de degradante, ele entendia o trabalho como energia vital do homem e expressão de sua liberdade. Além de ser um meio para obtenção da riqueza, o trabalho servia também para promover a virtude na medida em que libertava o homem da condição de pobreza, servilismo e dependência da boa vontade dos outros. A tese aí era de que o homem não pode ser considerado verdadeiramente livre se não for, ao mesmo tempo, politicamente livre e economicamente independente. Nesse sentido, sua concepção de sociedade se apresenta articulada com princípios que remontam a uma antiga tradição. É principalmente no ideal da civitas libera, ou Estado livre, que ela se inspira. Esse ideal havia predominado na Roma republicana de Tito Lívio, foi revivido e adaptado no renascimento italiano, sobretudo por Machiavel, e retomado no século XVII pelos defensores da causa republicana inglesa. No século XVIII, essa influência chegou até as colônias inglesas na América e teve em Franklin um dos seus principais representantes. / In this work we inspect the conception of civil society in the social and political ideas of Benjamin Franklin, which exerted large influence on the mentality constitution of the New World´s man. This mentality had initiated a new way to conceive the life in society exalting all that opposed the values of the old order. Against the principle of honor, the nobility titles, and the individual social position it exalts the republican virtue, celebrates the work, and claims respect for human dignity inherent to all men, not depending on their birth condition. Not by chance, virtue and work appears like central categories in the ideas of Benjamin Franklin. Far from conceiving it as shameful, he comprehended the work as the man´s vital energy and expression of his freedom. More than a way to obtain wealth, the work also attended to promote the virtue once it released man from the poverty and servility condition as much as from the dependence of the others good will. This theses utters that man couldn´t be considered free if he wasn´t at the same time politically free and economic independent. In this way, his conception of society seems articulated with doctrines that ascend an ancient tradition. It is mainly inspired by the ideal of civitas libera or the Free State. This ideal had predominated in the Republican Rome of Tito Livio, and then was relived and adapted by the Italian Renascence, mainly by Machiavelli, and was recovered by the defenders of the English republican cause, in the seventeenth century. This influence came to the English colonies in America in the eighteenth century, and it had in Franklin one of its main representatives.

The central aim of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual framework for people wishing to consider how their desires are shaped by forces often unnoticed by them and how they can regain some degree of control over those desires. To this end, it offers a model for desire that acknowledges the importance of social forces in shaping a person's desire, and consequently moral character. It examines the specific social context of American capitalism, and American consumption, in order to understand how it is that many Americans seem to desire and act in ways that appear contrary to their well-being. This dissertation is a work of descriptive Christian virtue ethics, meaning that it considers the desire for and consumption of material goods in light of a person's commitment to a greater system of beliefs and values. Taking the approach of virtue ethics, it considers how a person's desires are shaped by what she takes to be constitutive of her well-being, or her telos. It argues that many Americans participate in practices that dispose them to acquire habits of desiring, consuming, and enjoying material goods in ways that tend over time to distort participants' abilities to judge and reason well about the ends that are really worth pursuing, both on the part of individuals and on the part of societies. When a person participates in a practice she acquires habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that enable her to engage in such practices effortlessly. A practice is often oriented by certain rules and standards of excellence that orient the practitioners to certain ways of thinking, feeling, and acting over others. Taking advertising as a key example, participants often acquire habits that lead them to accept a conception of well-being that is based on the ideas that growth is always to be pursued and more of a good thing is always better. Such an orientation, in turn, can direct a person's desires so that she becomes disposed to satisfy her immediate desires without seriously considering whether those desires will contribute to her well-being and, more broadly, whether the vision of the good life she has in mind is truly worth pursuing. This dissertation offers a way of engaging in critical reflection that can enable a person to bring to awareness many of these unseen social forces, and consider the ways in which participation in her many practices does or does not contribute to her well-being. It suggests that, for Christians in particular, a vision of the good life might focus on the cultivation of virtue--especially the virtues of temperance and justice. Considering a person's practices in light of virtue can be helpful for articulating clearly and strategizing effectively about how to engage in consumer activity in ways that contribute to her well-being.

I offer an interpretation of John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr that highlights the role of virtue in the visions of democracy that both writers articulated. Based on this interpretation, I argue that Dewey and Niebuhr both implied that virtue is necessary for democracy to thrive, despite the fact that they spent much of their careers in intellectual conflict with each other. Specifically, I claim that they were both committed to the value of humility and mutuality for democratic society. Humility and mutuality are virtues with profound importance for democracy that logically flow from Dewey's framework of American pragmatism and Niebuhr's Augustinian Christian theology. I argue that their ironic and unnoticed commitment to humility and mutuality as democratic virtues helps us to understand their shared critique of capitalism. For Niebuhr and Dewey, the democratic self stands in contrast with the capitalist self: the moral agent required and rewarded by capitalism is one who is severely deficient in humility and mutuality. I contend that the conception of democratic virtue that Dewey and Niebuhr shared, which informed their common critique of capitalism, led them to revise socially-inherited notions of property ownership, enact political solidarity with the working class, and support the struggles of labor unions. This virtue-ethical interpretation demonstrates that two writers with deeply conflicting worldviews can both hold that democracy and capitalism are irreconcilable at the level of the moral agent.

Climate change is the first anthropogenic alteration of a global Earth system. It is globally catastrophic in terms of food production, sea level rise, fresh water availability, temperature elevation, ocean acidification, species disturbance and destruction to name just a few crisis concerns. In addition, while those changes are occurring now, they are amplifying over decadal periods and will last for centuries and possibly millennia. While there are a number of pollutants involved, carbon dioxide (CO2) which results from the combustion of any fossil fuel is the primary pollutant. It has not been considered a pollutant until recently because of its natural dissociation into oxygen and carbon compounds like wood. However, because of its molecular durability and ability to acidify water, it has become the primary pollutant as a result of the exponential increase in fossil fuel use for the production of energy by Earth’s population that has doubled over the last six decades. That increase has exceeded Earth’s ability to handle humanity’s waste CO2. Obviously, the involved changes detrimentally affect all life on Earth. Because of the evolving nature of the changes, climate change is presently denied primarily in the United States because of the costs of eliminating our carbon addiction. Because no similar global natural or anthropogenic situation has previously occurred during the lifetime of Homo sapiens, our extant ethical theories are incapable of confronting the crisis. Consequently, new ethical paradigms are necessary. This dissertation attempts to provide thoughts about the use of Aristotelian ethical theory, the aidōs feeling, Aquinian psychology and a possible new virtue of proper primility in an effort to further nurture the growth of the new climate change ethics.

Why be moral? One possible, and compelling answer is that to act morally is in an agent's self-interest. Such an answer can be either elevationist (broadly speaking the Aristotelian/Platonic approach) where self-interest is elevated to coincide with living the good life, or reductionist where morality is defined as acting in an agent's self-interest. Elevationist moral theories appear flawed. If you are in possession of information that, if divulged, will bring about the deaths of others then it may be virtuous to stay silent. However, if staying silent results in you being slowly tortured to death in an effort to extract the information then it seems bizarre to suggest that in doing so you are flourishing, happy, or acting out of self-interest. Reductionist moral theories, acting for the 'good of self' rather than the 'good of others', are widely considered to be the antithesis of morality. Moral philosophers tend to attack such positions claiming that the doctrine of egoism is unworkable. It is commonly claimed that any theory which recommends 'an agent do x if x is in the agent's best interest' is inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory and fails to meet the basic requirements of a moral theory (notably the requirement of universalisability). I begin this thesis with an examination of ethical egoism in its most widely known consequentialist form; i.e. an agent ought to act so as to bring about the best consequences for that agent. I examine the major criticisms of this theory and demonstrate that the axioms of egoism can be developed so as to overcome these criticisms. I argue that consequentialist based ethical egoism is coherent, consistent and noncontradictory. However, I go on to argue that while egoism can be formulated in a manner that overcomes all the aforementioned analytic criticisms it is a flawed moral theory in that within certain contexts the action deemed morally correct by egoism is, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. That a theory contains a flaw is not reason enough to discard the entire theory and I go on to contend that the problem with egoism is the consequentialist approach, not the fact that it is based on self-interest. In Part 2 of the thesis I abandon the consequentialist approach and examine the possibility of a flourishing-based form of ethical egoism. I further develop the axioms of egoism established in Part 1 through an examination of the concept of flourishing (as commonly associated with virtue ethics). Ultimately I tread a path between the consequentialist and elevationist positions. While I do not elevate self-interest to acting virtuously I do contend that an egoist must adopt certain virtues if that egoist is to have the best possibility to flourish. However, I further contend that an egoist ought to act so as to promote that which the egoist values and that this agent-relative hierarchy of values, which necessarily contains certain virtues, determines the manner in which an egoist ought to act.

This thesis aims to examine Johnson¡¦s writings and argue his happiness is a state of eternity in the afterlife which results mainly from God¡¦s mercy and human beings¡¦ obedience, repentance and virtue (or good works). To prove my thesis, I need to study the foundation and essence of Johnson¡¦s salvation alongside his moral and religious thoughts. I thus argue, in Chapter One, that Johnson¡¦s early life has great influence upon him and his well-known spiritual anxiety serves as the main cause of his fear of death and as an important index in the study of Johnson¡¦s conditional salvation. Before probing into Johnson¡¦s salvation, I attempt in Chapter Two to expound religion in eighteenth-century England, especially Johnson¡¦s role as a religious man and a moralist. Both identities play crucial roles in analyzing Johnson¡¦s happiness. Johnson¡¦s morality is surely profoundly conditioned by the climate of social, religious and moral experience shared by his contemporaries in eighteenth-century England and can hardly be dissolved despite great care. His religious and moral thoughts are so large questions to approach, not to mention to answer them. Therefore, the treatment is necessarily selective. I will focus on the connection between Johnson¡¦s morality and his own Christian belief shown in his sermons and other genres of writings. Though Johnson is noticeably ambivalent towards his moral instruction at times, he never jumps the track of the core of his moral thinking: his happiness is of after-life. In Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I will do a close reading on Johnson¡¦s frequent discussion of happiness in his periodical essays and Oriental tale Rasselas and on that of salvation, virtue and eternity respectively with intent to argue that Johnson¡¦s happiness is largely supported by his belief in Christian¡¦s ideas of salvation and eternity. Samuel Johnson in Rasselas voices the essence of happiness through Nekayah after a series of adventures and pursuit of happiness: ¡§To me, the choice of life is become less important; I hope hereafter to think only on the choice of eternity¡¨ (Rasselas 418). This passage clearly marks that happiness of this life is unreliable and the quest will be not only aimless but endless. To assure everlasting happiness, one ought to aspire to the afterlife by strenuous efforts in this life for eternity. Furthermore, I will show evidence from Johnson¡¦s life and words to strengthen my presumption that eternity forwards the realization of happiness. The eternal state of afterlife pacifies Johnson¡¦s spiritual anxiety in this life and enhances the charm of the world coming after. This is quite at odds with Johnson¡¦s fear of death; however, it pinpoints how a devout Christian struggles for not merely salvation but rewards from God after death. As such, I conclude my thesis in Chapter Five by showing how the intertexture of Johnson¡¦s life, religion, morality and literature helps him accept his imperfection, physically wretched and mentally disturbed, and then strive for perfection, that is, an elevated state of life in another world.