This essay is questioning if the state as an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, according to the principle of equal treatment, has the same rights as the other unsecured creditors. The principle of equal treatment means that creditors with unsecured claims are supposed to have mutually equal rights to dividends in a bankruptcy. In the Swedish bankruptcy law from 1987 there are recycling rules which means that some legal actions taken by the bankrupt debtor before the bankruptcy can be recycled to the bankruptcy estate. These rules do not apply on taxes. This essay analyzes whether the state should have this advantage or not. Another issue that’s discussed in this essay is whether or not the opinion of the Court of Appeal that a right of recourse on a claim for a paid Governmental wage guarantee exists before a bankruptcy should be established by the Supreme Court. This essay also analyzes if the rule which statutes that a company representative can become personally liable for the company tax debts should be abolished or not, since this rule means that the taxes on a larger scale than other claims are paid before the bankruptcy.

En période de crise économique, la question de la garantie de paiement du salaire se pose avec acuité en cas d’insolvabilité de l’employeur. En France, cette protection est assurée par un fonds de garantie géré par l’association pour la gestion du régime de garantie des créances des salariés Depuis sa création en 1974, l’AGS a subi d’importantes mutations : initialement conçue pour pallier les insuffisances d’une protection bâtie sur un système de privilèges, elle est désormais un « amortisseur social » pour les salariés de l’entreprise en difficulté. Paradoxalement, cette évolution est également source d’interrogations sur le devenir du fonds en raison de la différence considérable relevée entre le montant des avances consenties aux salariés et celui des remboursements. Le législateur et le juge ont contribué à la dégradation de sa situation en accréditant l’idée que l’AGS constitue un « employeur de substitution », et en suscitant, chez les salariés, le sentiment qu’elle n’est qu’un simple guichet de paiement des salaires. Assurer la pérennité du système de garantie des créances salariales, technique sui generis participant de l’intérêt général, est nécessaire mais risque, au fil des ans, de se révéler de plus en plus difficile si des mesures énergiques ne sont pas rapidement prises. / In times of economic crises, guaranteeing the payment of wages in the event of insolvency on the part of an employer is a cructical issue. In France, this protection is provided by a national insolvency fund, the Association pour la Gestion du régime des garanties des créances des Salariés. Since its creation in 1974, the AGS has undergone significant changes. While it was originally designed to compensate the deficiencies of a protection built on a system of privileges, it has now become a “social buffer” against a payment default on wages for the employees of a company in difficulty. Paradoxically, this evolution has ushered in further questioning with regards to the future of the fund, due to the considerable disparity between the amounts of the advances granted to the employees and those amounts reimbursed to the fund. The legislator and the courts have both contributed to the degradation of its situation by giving credence to the idea that the AGS is a “substitute employer”, which yielded the impression, for the employees, that it was a mere cash-teller for the payment of salaries. Although it is necessary to ensure the durability of this protective system, as a sui generis contribution to the common good, it might prove more and more difficult, if drastic measures are not taken promptly to fix the system.