As the case with most countries across Latin America, unprecedented migration to urban areas has strained city infrastructure systems. More particularly, the region faces a pressing crisis of water security, where rapid urbanization has outpaced water sector development. This thesis addresses the water infrastructure reform in El Alto and La Paz, Bolivia, focusing on strategies to better promote water access for the peri-urban poor. The research investigates the level of progressivity of water service expansion and pricing regimes: in other words, does the present model of water distribution positively improve the lives of the poorest groups? By investigating these social dimensions of water management, this study brings perspectives on the broader dialogue on Bolivia’s economic development, along with issues of participatory governance. Resumen: Como es el caso en muchos países latinoamericanos, la migración a áreas urbanas a niveles sin precedentes ha superado la capacidad de infraestructura. Concretamente, la región se enfrenta a una urgente crisis en la seguridad de agua potable dado que la rápida urbanización ha sobrepasado el desarrollo de este sector. Esta tesis aborda la reforma de la infraestructura de agua potable en El Alto y La Paz, Bolivia, enfocando en las estrategias para mejorar el acceso a agua por parte de los residentes periurbanos pobres. La investigación averigua el nivel de progresividad de los regímenes de precios y expansión de servicios de agua potable. En otras palabras, ¿contribuye el actual modelo de distribución de agua al mejoramiento de la vida de los grupos más desfavorecidos? Al investigar estas dimensiones sociales en el manejo de agua potable, este estudio ofrece perspectivas en cuanto al diálogo amplio del desarrollo económico de Bolivia, así como asuntos de gobernanza participativa.

Der intersektorale Wasserkonflikt zwischen urbaner und agrarischer Wassernutzung in Hyderabad und die Konkurrenz zwischen den Bedürfnissen der Stadt und den Ansprüchen der Landwirtschaft werden verschärft durch willkürliche Verteilungspraktiken, die den offiziellen Zuteilungsrichtlinien oft widersprechen. Übersetzt in die Sprache von Ostrom, gilt die vorliegende Untersuchung der Kernfrage, warum bestimmte praktizierte Regeln (rules-in-use) fortbestehen, obwohl formale Regeln (rules-in-form) im Bereich der Nutzungsrechte an Wasser vorhanden sind. Die Arbeit versucht dementsprechend zu erklären, wie bestehende Institutionen und Governancestrukturen die Interaktionen beteiligter Akteure und deren Verhalten beeinflussen und wie daraus eine durch Willkür gekennzeichnete Umverteilung erwächst. Knights Verteilungstheorie institutionellen Wandels und sein Ansatz über Machtressourcen vermögen zu erklären, wie menschliche Interaktionen in Zusammenhang mit solchen Konflikten über begrenzte Ressourcen zustande kommen. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit zeigen ebenfalls, welche Wirkungen die Charakteristika verschiedener Gruppen von Wassernutzern und deren spezifische Abhängigkeit von Wasserressourcen auf ihre Fähigkeit zur politischen Einflussnahme ausüben. Solche Ausprägungen von Ressourcenabhängigkeiten bedingen Machtasymmetrien und erhöhen das Ausmaß willkürlicher Umverteilungen von Wasser. Die Untersuchung identifiziert eine Literaturlücke im Bereich der Politik der Wassergovernance, indem sie den Wählereinfluss als Machtressource im Land-Stadt-Konflikt um Wasserressourcen empirisch belegt. Die Arbeit zielt insgesamt darauf, das Erklärungspotential von Eigentumsrechtstheorien zu nutzen und anhand von Wasserkonflikten in Hyderabad ein Beispiel zur Anwendbarkeit aktueller Theorien institutionellen Wandels zu geben. / Hyderabad’s inter-sectoral water conflict and competition between the city’s urban needs and the agricultural sector have been fueled by persistent arbitrary water reallocations against the prescribed allocation guidelines. To translate the key question into Ostrom’s language; this study seeks to unravel the persistence of rules-in-use, despite the rules-in-form already in place within the realms of property rights. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework identifies exogenous variables and its influences on the role of institutions which shapes human interaction and decision making processes. It attempts to explain how the existing water-allocation mechanism has propagated the way rules and actors currently interact to influence such arbitrary water re-allocation. Knight’s distributional theory of institutional change and his concept of power resources provide good explanations of human interaction in the context of such conflicts over limited resources. The study results also reveal how the characteristics of water-user groups and its dependence on water resource have the ability to exert political influence over water allocation. Such attributes of resource dependence characterizes power asymmetry, thereby increasing the scale of arbitrary water reallocations. Henceforth, this study addresses the gap in ‘politics of water governance’ in existing literature by empirically deriving ‘political electorate’ as a power resource in rural-urban water contestation. Overall, this study seeks to employ the theoretical explanations of property rights and attempts to provide a case on the applicability of contemporary theories of institutional change by taking the case study of Hyderabad’s water contestation.

Tribal water rights and instream flows for species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) have been a source of tensions in the western United States, particularly when tribes have undetermined water rights to support tribal fisheries listed under the ESA. Understanding the mechanics of past tribal settlements and their strengths and weaknesses in resolving disputes over instream flows for tribal trust fisheries listed under the ESA will allow parties involved in negotiations to evaluate whether similar provisions should be incorporated into future settlements. A review of the 27 congressionally approved tribal water settlements for instream flow and ESA provisions revealed that instream rights were either established as junior rights or reallocated from existing rights. The ESA was a factor in many of the settlements; however, only one actively incorporated ESA tools as part of the benefits of the settlement. After this preliminary evaluation, a comparative analysis framework with 28 criteria for evaluating environmental conflict resolution was applied to the Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement and Pyramid Lake Paiute Water Rights Settlement to identify strengths and weaknesses of using tribal water settlements as a means to resolve disputes involving instream flow claims. From my analysis, I conclude that tribal water settlements offer unique opportunities to shift the status quo and address historic inequities while minimizing harm to existing water users; however, settlement agreements may not result in an outcome that reduces conflict without a concerted effort to establish a fair process and minimize the impacts of the agreement on other parties. Furthermore, despite the many benefits of settlement agreements, since they have not delivered time-immemorial rights for fisheries, other options will likely be a continued consideration for tribes seeking to restore fisheries. However, while litigation presents a risky though lucrative outcome, rights under state law are in line with what has been granted in settlements. Given the time, effort and cost associated with settlements, I suggest that since tribal water right settlements generally use state tools to establish instream flows, states and tribes may reduce future conflict by proactively working together to establish instream flows through existing state water reallocation mechanisms. / Graduation date: 2012