The problem of this research was to compare the ideas of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber concerning the relationship between society and religion. The primary sources for the study were The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life by Durkheim and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and The Sociology of Religion by Weber. An effort was made to establish similarities and differences in the views of the two theorists concerning (1) religious influences on social life and, conversely, (2) social influences on religion.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales / El presente ensayo realizará en un análisis de los aspectos relevantes de la obra de Immanuel Kant para aproximarse al positivismo durante el siglo XX, entendiendo que el intento kantiano de depurar el trabajo científico al intentar establecer los límites del conocimiento humano y modelos formales para una ética universal significó una metodología rigurosa en forma temprana en términos históricos, comprendiendo así la extensión de la obra del filósofo en el trabajo de autores fundamentales para el desarrollo intelectual de la etapa señalada en el marco de las ciencias sociales y en particular del derecho, para posteriormente aproximarse, desde la perspectiva kantiana comentada, tanto a la propuesta de Max Weber, quien elaboró una metodología para la investigación de los fenómenos propios de las ciencias sociales, para el desarrollo efectivamente científico de estas y comprendiendo estos avances como fundamentales para tal disciplina en el contexto al cual pertenece, como también a la Teoría Pura del Derecho de Hans Kelsen, la cual comparte la finalidad pretendida por Weber pero respecto de la comprensión de aquello que es propiamente jurídico en forma depurada de otras disciplinas y teniendo un éxito bastante amplio en el debate jurídico. Finalmente, desde la teoría del reconocimiento extraída a partir de los escritos de Jena realizados por G. W. F. Hegel, se criticará la posición adoptada por Kant, extendiendo dicho ejercicio al trabajo de los autores influidos por el filósofo antes señalados, analizando la posibilidad de existencia de un método diverso al sostenido por Weber y Kelsen, tanto en las ciencias sociales como en el derecho, desde una comprensión integral de la realidad empírica y además desde la eticidad como totalidad respecto de la relación entre los fenómenos estudiados por estas ciencias y los seres humanos, particularmente como alternativa a los esfuerzos más influidos por la filosofía pura.

La vocation est un concept omniprésent dans la pensée de Max Weber. De son ouvrage phare sur l'Éthique protestante à ses deux célèbres conférences sur le savant et le politique, Weber analyse cette conduite de vie méthodique comme un modèle de personnalité éthique en s'inspirant de l'exemple archétypal du protestant ascétique. Comme diagnostic de la modernité et comme idéal normatif, l'étude de la vocation permet d'interpréter le travail comparatif wébérien tout en dégageant les fondements d'une éthique individuelle et politique. Ethos typique de la doctrine protestante, la vocation recouvre une transformation de la considération éthique du monde dont les effets se sont rationalisés dans l'exercice de la profession quotidienne. À la suite des transformations apportées par l'histoire, le désenchantement du monde et son intellectualisation, la conduite de vie méthodique propre à la vocation doit être recomposée selon ses nouvelles conditions historiques de possibilité. Éthique d'un métier spécialisé et ascétique, porteur d'un engagement normatif et responsable dans le monde, Weber édifie un modèle de personnalité à même de répondre aux défis politiques et intellectuels de son temps. Face à la lutte et à la sélection inéluctable des qualités et des types d'hommes, la défense pugnace de la vocation contient en elle la volonté de préserver le potentiel de transformation immanent d'une telle conduite menacé par les processus endémiques de différenciation et de dépersonnalisation des ordres de vie tels que la bureaucratisation. Modeler les conditions historiques nécessaires à l'engagement vocationnel pour le constituer comme un modèle dominant d'ethos, voilà ce qui guide la préoccupation anthropologique de Weber. À cette fin, le charisme et la virtuosité sont indispensables pour apprécier les ressorts et la portée de la définition de ce type d'homme d'élite adéquat pour prendre en main son histoire. Constamment préoccupé par la qualité des hommes du futur, Weber offre à travers la vocation une incitation aux hommes d'aujourd'hui à ne pas renoncer à agir décisivement pour déployer leur conception du monde différenciée. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Max Weber, vocation, éthique, conduite de vie, type d'homme.

Dissertação de mestrado--Departamento de sociologia--Universidade estadual de Campinas. / Bibliogr. p. 295-318.

Thesis--University of London, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 289-313.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Sociology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 313-322). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ56262.

In the works of Weber, Freud, and Foucault we find a distinct depiction of the relation between the self and modern civilization. This thesis describes that relation as "entrapment": the self has become mired in the life orders of modernity and is unable to reign over them. The primary hazard of these orders is their imposition of subjectivities that are highly circumscribed, subjectivities more responsive to external functions and imperatives than to the expression of individuality. Underlying this outlook is a new consciousness of time; in lieu of evolutionary and progressive theories of history, a tragic view emerges. History is seen as devoid of any deterministic necessity, yet its collective products have become too weighty and entrenched to allow for radical, over-arching political transformations. The thesis examines how, beginning with these shared presuppositions, Weber, Freud, and Foucault develop very different understandings of entrapment, understandings that pose fundamental challenges to one another.

This study is centered on the social question as addressed and defined by Ernst Troeltsch (1865--1923) and by Max Weber (1864--1920); it pertains mainly to the rise of religious modernity and its conditions of possibility; based on a comparative analysis of the socio1ogy of religion of Troeltsch and Weber, it deals with the question how religious modernity has to be thought from a sociological perspective. / Along with modern historical science and scientific rationality in general, the social question challenged religion in the nineteenth century; this study brings out the originality of Troeltsch's vision of a modernity compatible with belief in the future of religion. / Motivated by the debate on the social question, Troeltsch's concern was the social foundations of the Christian doctrine in its relation to secular domains of activity, and this calls for a new outlook on the issue of the relation between religion and culture. / Eventually, the comparative approach of the sociological thought of Weber and Troeltsch pursued in the present work, while providing new insight into Weber's views on religion, brings about a better understanding of Troeltsch as a theologian and a philosopher of religion.

This study examines two interconnected and as yet wholly neglected aspects of Max Weber's 'Sociology of Law,' namely, its substantive underpinnings and focal concern with the status of the judge. At the heart of the 'Sociology of Law' is a comparative analysis of the Continental and the English administrations of justice, which can best be understood when read against his substantive sociology and which requires an assiduous reading of the 'Sociology of Law.' Thus the first part of this examination elucidates Weber's overarching concern with the effects of bureaucratization on the development of personality. The second part provides a detailed explication of the 'Sociology of Law' which privileges his treatment of the Common Law and distinguishes the juristic and sociological strands of his analysis, re-examines his notion of formal and substantive rationality, pays close attention to his assessment of the Free Law Movement, and accords due place to his discussion of the anti-formalistic tendencies in modern law. Taken together, these expose the contradictions and assumptions which frame his tendentious analysis and bring to light the vital role he ascribes to the judge.

Weber's contribution to the study of social action has been a major influence upon the development of modern sociology but aspects of his approach have been obscured by the process of translation, commentary and evaluation - and in this respect the work of Parsons and to a lesser extent Schutz has been significant. Hence this study aims (a) to clarify the nature of Webens Theory of Action and (b) to determine its contemporary value in comparison with the extension of his ideas by Parsons and Schutz. We examine the interpretation, advanced particularly by Parsons, that Weber's approach to the study of action changed as he became increasingly concerned with the nature of sociological inquiry, and, thereby, moved beyond the problems of historical method. On the basis of a detailed examination of Weber's theoretical and methodological arguments we reject the idea of a break in his thinking about historical and sociological research and this has important implications for some accepted views-on Weber's conception of objectivity, ideal type concepts and understanding. Parsons set out to extend Weber from the perspective of a natural science of society, but his claim to identify a convergence between Durkheim, Pareto and Weber into the Voluntaristic Theory of Action is rejected and the criticisms, which his development of some aspects of Weberts approach have experienced, are sufficient to cast doubts upon the-validity of his General Theory. Schutz formulated a phenomenological critique of Weber's categories of interpretive sociology and sought to establish a philosophically more secure basis for the study of action but, we suggest, his assumptions about the everyday world, allied to his evaluation of Weber's approach, led him to propose an impracticable methodology. Finally, we argue that the contemporary relevance of Weber's Theory of Action can be seen from the way many of the problems involved in the study of action, some of which were identified by the development of the phenomenological perspective, can be solved by recourse to his approach.