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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1971. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 388-392).

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze current housing and supplemental income programs on a national level to measure success and failures of different programs like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Earned Income Tax Credit, and Housing Vouchers. Furthermore, this thesis attempt to discuss questions of ethics and precedent in determining to what degree the United States should engage in social safety net policies. This paper analyzes contemporary American social safety net policies on the basis of their cost to American taxpayers as well as how well it benefits those in poverty.

This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter three. Chapter five distinguishes between rights-based and equality-based justifications for redistribution and argues that Ronald Dworkin's idea of a right to equal respect and concern is best understood as an equality-based justification. The enabling model of rights and deprivation is introduced in chapter six. This model says that liberty rights require that others ensure that the right-holder enjoys the means to do what he or she has the right to do as well as not interfere with him or her doing what he or she has the right to do. It is found to break down because it is unable to accommodate the right to do wrong. The other four chapters are concerned with defending an alternative model of rights and deprivation. The groundwork for this alternative model - the development model of rights and deprivation - is laid in chapters two and four. Chapter two presents a person-affecting theory of rights. The two principal conclusions of the development model of rights and deprivation are defended in chapter seven. It is argued, first, that from both of the abstract moral rights to liberty introduced in chapter four flow certain derivative rights against others to have one's needs met and, second, that the state is required to promote and protect particular forms of culture as well as to meet certain sorts of personal needs including special needs, collective needs, and the unmet personal needs that arise when the prevailing methods of meeting those needs breaks down. The final chapter discusses two general issues relating to the development model of rights and deprivation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Stockholm, 1990. / Formal dissertation announcement (1 leaf) inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 175-187).

En droit de l’aide sociale, le terme « renonciation » est très peu utilisé par la doctrine, sans doute parce que, de longue date, il a été considéré que le bénéficiaire ne pouvait renoncer ni tacitement ni expressément à son droit à l’aide sociale. Néanmoins, il réapparaît depuis peu dans les travaux de la doctrine portant sur le non-recours aux droits sociaux. Quoique ces notions désignent indubitablement des situations d’abandon de droits, cet usage du terme « renonciation » ne saurait suffire à convaincre de l’existence de la renonciation en droit de l’aide sociale dans la mesure où, malgré les nombreuses controverses doctrinales autour de la définition de la notion de renonciation, elle a toujours été enfermée par la doctrine majoritaire dans un cadre conceptuel particulièrement étroit. Se révèle alors l’intérêt d’étudier la renonciation en droit de l’aide sociale, étude d’autant plus importante que cette réflexion conduit à envisager sous un angle nouveau non seulement la notion même de renonciation, mais encore la problématique de l’effectivité des droits sociaux. L’objet de cette thèse consiste donc à se questionner sur l’existence et sur les caractéristiques de la renonciation en droit de l’aide sociale et, en filigrane, sur la nature et la spécificité de ces droits ainsi que sur la place du bénéficiaire au sein du droit de l’aide sociale. / In welfare law, the term « waiver » is seldom used by doctrine, no doubt because over the years it has been thought that the beneficiaries could not waiver either tacitly or expressly their rights to welfare. Nevertheless, recently the term has resurfaced in doctrinal research on non-recourse to welfare rights. Although these notions undoubtedly refer to situations whereby beneficiaries renounce their rights, such use of the term “waiver” is definitely not sufficient to prove the existence of waiver in welfare law. Indeed, despite numerous doctrinal controversies pertaining to the definition of the notion of waiver, prevailing doctrine has always circumscribed this definition within a very narrow conceptual framework. Accordingly, the study of welfare law becomes significant, all the more so as it leads to considering from a new perspective not only the very notion of waiver, but also the issue of the effectiveness of welfare rights. The aim of this thesis thus consists in questioning the existence and characteristics of waiver in welfare law and inherently, the nature and specificity of these rights together with the place of the beneficiary within welfare law.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed Jan. 9, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 300-330).

Black women formed the first welfare rights organization in Atlanta composed of recipients and continued anti-poverty organizing for decades. Their strategy adapted to the political climate, including the ebb and flow of social movements. This thesis explores how and why that strategy changed as well as how the experiences of the women involved altered ideas of activism and movements.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 311-320).