This thesis offers an account of William of Ockham's understanding of teleology in order to question the standard modernist history of the concept. Ockham does not rely on the Aristotelian analogy between art and nature to establish that all natural things seek an end. Nor does he simply relativize the analogy by considering all creatures as having their ends fixed by God. Instead, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between voluntary and natural agency, which results in two very different uses of final causality. On the one hand, the way in which final causes operate in voluntary agents cannot compromise their freedom. On the other hand, the way they operate in natural agents cannot explain their necessity. Ockham negotiates the radical difference between the causality of voluntary and natural agents by positing a new analogy altogether, comparing it to the difference between will and intellect.

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Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-04 / This study aims to investigate how is the critique of nominalist system ockhamiano front of realistic theories developed in the Middle Ages. For this research takes place we choose to trace an investigative path that begins with the elucidation of what the 'Quarrel of the Universal' in the Middle Ages and the establishment of typologies that bring together the theories of the period. Later we work with the contextualization of the logical system developed by William of Ockham setting the bases of your system and pointing out some of the realistic writers who are criticized by the author. So that the logic of the author system became clear we seek to elucidate the logic of the terms of their time, which means the author's nominalism and what are the logical tools that he used to implement his critique of realism, namely: the supposition, the connotation and the signification. Finally we seek to discuss and demonstrate what the nominalist response of the author face the realistic theoretical models, placing the universal only with mental existence, exerting a semantic function, and devoid of ontology and a reality that is outside the human mind, shifting the axis the discussion of the problem to the field of logic to the detriment of the ontological field. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar de que forma ocorre a crítica do sistema nominalista ockhamiano frente às teorias realistas desenvolvidas no medievo. Para que a presente pesquisa se realize optamos por traçar um caminho investigativo que se inicia com a elucidação do que seja a ‘Querela dos Universais’ no medievo e o estabelecimento das tipologias que congregam as teorias do período. Posteriormente trabalhamos com a contextualização do sistema lógico desenvolvido por Guilherme de Ockham fixando as bases de seu sistema e apontando alguns dos autores realistas que são criticados pelo autor. Para que o sistema lógico do autor se tornasse claro buscamos elucidar a Lógica dos Termos de seu tempo, o que significa o nominalismo do autor e quais são as ferramentas lógicas por ele usadas para implementar sua crítica ao realismo, a saber: a suposição, a conotação e a significação. Por fim buscamos discorrer e demonstrar qual é a resposta nominalista do autor frente aos modelos teóricos realistas, colocando os universais somente com existência mental, exercendo uma função semântica, e desprovidos de ontologia e de uma realidade que esteja fora da mente humana, deslocando o eixo da discussão do problema para o campo da lógica em detrimento do campo ontológico.

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This thesis is a detailed examination of the logico-semantic system propounded by the English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c.1287 – c.1347). It provides a reinterpretation of Ockham's account of mental content and mental-language semantics, as well as of his theory of consequential goodness. It does so from the standpoint of an inferentialist theory of meaning, in rejection of previous attempts made from the standpoint of internalist and externalist theories of mental content. Chapter 1 ('The Scientic Status of Logic') provides an account of Ockham's understanding of logic as a rational, practical, ostensive science. Chapter 2 ('The Received Interpretation') presents and casts doubt upon the arguments put forward by the defenders of both externalist and internalist construals of Ockham's semantic theory. Chapter 3 ('An Inferentialist Construal') presents the central tenets of a inferentialist theory of meaning. In order to show how Ockham's system can be understood within such a semantic paradigm, we will have to set out at least three things. First, Chapter 4 ('Ockham's Propositionalism') argues that the mature Ockham actually embraced a propositionalist theory of meaning. Second, Chapter 5 ('Obligationes and the Normativity of Asserting') seeks to prove that such a theory of meaning can only be properly understood against the normative background provided by his theory of obligationes. Finally, Chapter 6 ('Consequences') argues that Ockham's theory of consequential goodness is materialist, not formalist. That is to say, that the goodness of a certain kind of consequence ultimately depends upon the meaning of its propositional parts, rather than upon its structure. It is then shown that all remaining kinds of consequences (syllogisms included) are to understood with respect to these material inferences. The main sources of this research are Ockham's Ordinatio, his Summa logicae, and his Quodlibeta septem. As regards the inferentialist theory of meaning, Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) and Wilfrid Sellars 'Inference and Meaning' (1953) were essential to this research.

This dissertation examines William of Ockham's theory of property rights in the Opus nonaginta dierum (1332) in the context of the other major Michaelist texts of the period. A corollary of the project is to examine to what extent Ockham, a theologian with no formal training in law, was able to exploit the resources of Roman and canon law to justify his theory of property rights. The first chapter outlines general methodological concerns. The second chapter describes John XXII's theory of property rights as it can be found in his major bulls of the 1320s. The subsequent chapters adopt a thematic approach. Chapters three through five analyse in turn the concepts of ius, dominium, and usus, which are hierarchically related concepts in the Michaelist texts. Chapter three examines ius in traditional legal discourse in order to provide a framework for understanding how the Michaelists employed the term; both the issue of positive and natural rights and the interaction of divine, natural, and positive law are examined. Chapter four examines dominium, here primarily understood as proprietary lordship, as it is justified in divine, natural, and positive law; the Franciscan position on the origin of private property also becomes clear. The fifth chapter deals with the Franciscan argument that usus must be understood not only in a legal sense. Franciscan use, they argue, is a rightless and legally indefensible sort of use because it lacks a connection to ius. The sixth chapter explores how the Michaelists explained that one may justly use something that is consumed through use without ever holding property rights over it, while the seventh explores the Franciscan theory of corporate rights in the face of Innocent IV's and John XXII's arguments about the supposedly fictive personality of corporations. A concluding chapter and three appendices round out the dissertation. The first appendix illustrates how Michael of Cesena adapted Bonaventure's theory of a 'fourfold community of temporal things'. The second compares the structural interrelationship of the Michaelist texts. The final appendix tabulates Ockham's use of canon and Roman law with respect to the writings of the pope and the other Michaelists.

This dissertation examines William of Ockham's theory of property rights in the Opus nonaginta dierum (1332) in the context of the other major Michaelist texts of the period. A corollary of the project is to examine to what extent Ockham, a theologian with no formal training in law, was able to exploit the resources of Roman and canon law to justify his theory of property rights. The first chapter outlines general methodological concerns. The second chapter describes John XXII's theory of property rights as it can be found in his major bulls of the 1320s. The subsequent chapters adopt a thematic approach. Chapters three through five analyse in turn the concepts of ius, dominium, and usus, which are hierarchically related concepts in the Michaelist texts. Chapter three examines ius in traditional legal discourse in order to provide a framework for understanding how the Michaelists employed the term; both the issue of positive and natural rights and the interaction of divine, natural, and positive law are examined. Chapter four examines dominium, here primarily understood as proprietary lordship, as it is justified in divine, natural, and positive law; the Franciscan position on the origin of private property also becomes clear. The fifth chapter deals with the Franciscan argument that usus must be understood not only in a legal sense. Franciscan use, they argue, is a rightless and legally indefensible sort of use because it lacks a connection to ius. The sixth chapter explores how the Michaelists explained that one may justly use something that is consumed through use without ever holding property rights over it, while the seventh explores the Franciscan theory of corporate rights in the face of Innocent IV's and John XXII's arguments about the supposedly fictive personality of corporations. A concluding chapter and three appendices round out the dissertation. The first appendix illustrates how Michael of Cesena adapted Bonaventure's theory of a 'fourfold community of temporal things'. The second compares the structural interrelationship of the Michaelist texts. The final appendix tabulates Ockham's use of canon and Roman law with respect to the writings of the pope and the other Michaelists.

William of Ockham's (1285-1349) influence on medieval philosophy has been generally acknowledged. Little, however, has been written on the possibility that his work had an effect on the arts. His radical reversal of traditional epistemology and ontology raised new questions which had great implications for poetry. This study seeks to establish the extent of his influence on one poet, Geoffrey Chaucer (c. 1345-1400), by examining Chaucer's engagement with Jean de Meun (c. 1232-1305) on the theme of language and morality.

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[pt] Não obstante o reconhecimento de que a lógica desenvolvida por Guilherme de Ockham é consideravelmente interessante tanto do ponto de vista histórico quanto filosófico, pouca atenção foi dada àquelas doutrinas lógicas que envolvem aspectos temporais. Este fato, por sua vez, constitui um obstáculo à compreensão integral da lógica ockhamista, já que acarreta uma série de controvérsias motivadas basicamente por interpretações parciais que menosprezam o papel desempenhado pelo tempo na lógica medieval. Com efeito, o presente estudo analisa o caráter temporal da lógica de Ockham a fim de contextualizá-lo junto às teorias lógicas do referido autor. Para tanto, reservou-se uma parte da investigação ao esclarecimento das noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista e, em seguida, destinou-se outra parte à determinação da interação entre o tempo e tais noções. Neste contexto, evidenciou-se que a lógica concebida por Ockham é essencialmente temporal, pois o fato dela concentrar-se na análise da estrutura da língua latina, aliado ao reconhecimento de que a doutrina das proposições temporalmente flexionadas e a silogística temporal desenvolvida pelo referido autor apóiam-se numa teoria da suposição capaz de lidar com uma concepção ampla de significação, cujo domínio dos objetos significados encerra o que é ou poderia ser tanto no presente, quanto no passado ou no futuro, indica que até as noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista presumem o caráter temporal da linguagem ordinária. / [en] Although the logic developed by William of Ockham is regarded as having considerable interest, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view, little attention has been paid to the temporal aspects of his doctrines. This creates a barrier to the full understanding of Ockham´s logic because it leads to many controversies that are due to partial interpretations which underestimate the role of time in the logic of the Middle Ages. In the present study, the temporal character of Ockham´s logic is analyzed in order to contextualize it within his general theories. The first part of our investigation is concerned with the basic notions of Ockham´s logic, and the second part studies their interaction with temporal notions. It becomes clear that Ockham´s logic is essentially temporal. This is mainly due to the fact that it concentrates on the analysis of the latin language, and that the doctrine of temporal propositions and of temporal syllogism are based on a conception of supposition that must be able to deal with a broad conception of signification. The domain of objects signified includes what is, or what could be, in the present as well as in the past and in the future. This shows that fundamental notions of Ockham´s logic presuppose the temporal character of ordinary language.