This thesis offers an account of William of Ockham's understanding of teleology in order to question the standard modernist history of the concept. Ockham does not rely on the Aristotelian analogy between art and nature to establish that all natural things seek an end. Nor does he simply relativize the analogy by considering all creatures as having their ends fixed by God. Instead, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between voluntary and natural agency, which results in two very different uses of final causality. On the one hand, the way in which final causes operate in voluntary agents cannot compromise their freedom. On the other hand, the way they operate in natural agents cannot explain their necessity. Ockham negotiates the radical difference between the causality of voluntary and natural agents by positing a new analogy altogether, comparing it to the difference between will and intellect.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-29T12:41:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 973078 bytes, checksum: 302bf7253aed6478fac0a90b1464f5b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-04 / This study aims to investigate how is the critique of nominalist system ockhamiano front of realistic theories developed in the Middle Ages. For this research takes place we choose to trace an investigative path that begins with the elucidation of what the 'Quarrel of the Universal' in the Middle Ages and the establishment of typologies that bring together the theories of the period. Later we work with the contextualization of the logical system developed by William of Ockham setting the bases of your system and pointing out some of the realistic writers who are criticized by the author. So that the logic of the author system became clear we seek to elucidate the logic of the terms of their time, which means the author's nominalism and what are the logical tools that he used to implement his critique of realism, namely: the supposition, the connotation and the signification. Finally we seek to discuss and demonstrate what the nominalist response of the author face the realistic theoretical models, placing the universal only with mental existence, exerting a semantic function, and devoid of ontology and a reality that is outside the human mind, shifting the axis the discussion of the problem to the field of logic to the detriment of the ontological field. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar de que forma ocorre a crítica do sistema nominalista ockhamiano frente às teorias realistas desenvolvidas no medievo. Para que a presente pesquisa se realize optamos por traçar um caminho investigativo que se inicia com a elucidação do que seja a ‘Querela dos Universais’ no medievo e o estabelecimento das tipologias que congregam as teorias do período. Posteriormente trabalhamos com a contextualização do sistema lógico desenvolvido por Guilherme de Ockham fixando as bases de seu sistema e apontando alguns dos autores realistas que são criticados pelo autor. Para que o sistema lógico do autor se tornasse claro buscamos elucidar a Lógica dos Termos de seu tempo, o que significa o nominalismo do autor e quais são as ferramentas lógicas por ele usadas para implementar sua crítica ao realismo, a saber: a suposição, a conotação e a significação. Por fim buscamos discorrer e demonstrar qual é a resposta nominalista do autor frente aos modelos teóricos realistas, colocando os universais somente com existência mental, exercendo uma função semântica, e desprovidos de ontologia e de uma realidade que esteja fora da mente humana, deslocando o eixo da discussão do problema para o campo da lógica em detrimento do campo ontológico.

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This thesis is a detailed examination of the logico-semantic system propounded by the English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c.1287 – c.1347). It provides a reinterpretation of Ockham's account of mental content and mental-language semantics, as well as of his theory of consequential goodness. It does so from the standpoint of an inferentialist theory of meaning, in rejection of previous attempts made from the standpoint of internalist and externalist theories of mental content. Chapter 1 ('The Scientic Status of Logic') provides an account of Ockham's understanding of logic as a rational, practical, ostensive science. Chapter 2 ('The Received Interpretation') presents and casts doubt upon the arguments put forward by the defenders of both externalist and internalist construals of Ockham's semantic theory. Chapter 3 ('An Inferentialist Construal') presents the central tenets of a inferentialist theory of meaning. In order to show how Ockham's system can be understood within such a semantic paradigm, we will have to set out at least three things. First, Chapter 4 ('Ockham's Propositionalism') argues that the mature Ockham actually embraced a propositionalist theory of meaning. Second, Chapter 5 ('Obligationes and the Normativity of Asserting') seeks to prove that such a theory of meaning can only be properly understood against the normative background provided by his theory of obligationes. Finally, Chapter 6 ('Consequences') argues that Ockham's theory of consequential goodness is materialist, not formalist. That is to say, that the goodness of a certain kind of consequence ultimately depends upon the meaning of its propositional parts, rather than upon its structure. It is then shown that all remaining kinds of consequences (syllogisms included) are to understood with respect to these material inferences. The main sources of this research are Ockham's Ordinatio, his Summa logicae, and his Quodlibeta septem. As regards the inferentialist theory of meaning, Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) and Wilfrid Sellars 'Inference and Meaning' (1953) were essential to this research.

William of Ockham's (1285-1349) influence on medieval philosophy has been generally acknowledged. Little, however, has been written on the possibility that his work had an effect on the arts. His radical reversal of traditional epistemology and ontology raised new questions which had great implications for poetry. This study seeks to establish the extent of his influence on one poet, Geoffrey Chaucer (c. 1345-1400), by examining Chaucer's engagement with Jean de Meun (c. 1232-1305) on the theme of language and morality.

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[pt] Não obstante o reconhecimento de que a lógica desenvolvida por Guilherme de Ockham é consideravelmente interessante tanto do ponto de vista histórico quanto filosófico, pouca atenção foi dada àquelas doutrinas lógicas que envolvem aspectos temporais. Este fato, por sua vez, constitui um obstáculo à compreensão integral da lógica ockhamista, já que acarreta uma série de controvérsias motivadas basicamente por interpretações parciais que menosprezam o papel desempenhado pelo tempo na lógica medieval. Com efeito, o presente estudo analisa o caráter temporal da lógica de Ockham a fim de contextualizá-lo junto às teorias lógicas do referido autor. Para tanto, reservou-se uma parte da investigação ao esclarecimento das noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista e, em seguida, destinou-se outra parte à determinação da interação entre o tempo e tais noções. Neste contexto, evidenciou-se que a lógica concebida por Ockham é essencialmente temporal, pois o fato dela concentrar-se na análise da estrutura da língua latina, aliado ao reconhecimento de que a doutrina das proposições temporalmente flexionadas e a silogística temporal desenvolvida pelo referido autor apóiam-se numa teoria da suposição capaz de lidar com uma concepção ampla de significação, cujo domínio dos objetos significados encerra o que é ou poderia ser tanto no presente, quanto no passado ou no futuro, indica que até as noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista presumem o caráter temporal da linguagem ordinária. / [en] Although the logic developed by William of Ockham is regarded as having considerable interest, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view, little attention has been paid to the temporal aspects of his doctrines. This creates a barrier to the full understanding of Ockham´s logic because it leads to many controversies that are due to partial interpretations which underestimate the role of time in the logic of the Middle Ages. In the present study, the temporal character of Ockham´s logic is analyzed in order to contextualize it within his general theories. The first part of our investigation is concerned with the basic notions of Ockham´s logic, and the second part studies their interaction with temporal notions. It becomes clear that Ockham´s logic is essentially temporal. This is mainly due to the fact that it concentrates on the analysis of the latin language, and that the doctrine of temporal propositions and of temporal syllogism are based on a conception of supposition that must be able to deal with a broad conception of signification. The domain of objects signified includes what is, or what could be, in the present as well as in the past and in the future. This shows that fundamental notions of Ockham´s logic presuppose the temporal character of ordinary language.

Guillaume d’Ockham (v. 1285-88 / 1347), surtout connu pour sa philosophie nominaliste, est aussi l’auteur d’une œuvre de philosophie politique importante. Convoqué à Avignon en 1324, il s’y trouve plongé au cœur du débat entre l’Ordre des Frères mineurs et la papauté concernant la pauvreté du Christ et de l’Ordre. Dans ce contexte, Ockham en vient à rompre avec l’Église et fuit à la cour de Louis IV de Bavière, où il se consacre jusqu’à sa mort à la philosophie politique. De 1328 à 1347, il compose une dizaine d’ouvrages, dont le Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico (v. 1339-1341). Ce livre synthétise la réflexion d’Ockham concernant les limites du pouvoir pontifical et les droits et devoirs respectifs du pape et du prince. En se fondant sur une lecture littérale de la Bible, principalement du Nouveau Testament, Ockham démontre l’absence de pouvoir régulier du pape dans le domaine temporel. Le Breviloquium se démarque en vertu de sa méthode ainsi que par son contenu, qui offre le meilleur accès à la pensée mature d’Ockham concernant la question de la séparation et des limites des deux pouvoirs. L’épistémologie ockhamienne, inspirée de celle de François d’Assise, recèle en sus une originalité qui lui est propre. Ainsi, dans le Breviloquium, Ockham met en place une méthode argumentative novatrice pour son époque, qui articule théologie, logique et scientificité. La présente étude fait la démonstration de cette originalité de Guillaume d’Ockham. / William of Ockham (c. 1285-88 / 1347), mostly known for his nominalism, is also the author of an important work on political philosophy. In 1324, he is summoned to appear in Avignon where he is immediately immersed in the middle of the debate between the Order of Friars Minor and the papacy concerning the Christ’s poverty and the Order’s poverty. In this context, Ockham will break with the Church and go to the court of Louis IV the Bavarian, where he will devote the rest of his life to political philosophy. Between 1328 and 1347, he writes about ten books, including the Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico (c. 1339-1341). This book is the synthesis of Ockham’s reflections and thoughts on the limitations of the papal power, and the rights and responsibilities of the pope and the prince. Based on a literal interpretation of the Bible, mostly the New Testament, Ockham demonstrates the absence of papal power in the temporal sphere. The method and content of the Breviloquium make it a noticeable work, offering the best access to Ockham’s mature thought on the limitation and separation of the two powers. Ockham’s epistemology, inspired by Francis of Assisi, have is own originality. Thus, Ockham in the Breviloquium has an innovative reasoning method for that time, articulating theology, logic, and scientific character. This study will demonstrate this original aspect of William of Ockham.

The Influence of William of Ockham teaching to the politics of Louis IV of Bavaria The aim of this work is to find out how far was the King of the Romans and Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria willing or able to use the idea fulfilled in work of the Franciscan monk William of Ockham while patterning his state policy. William of Ockham was living for many years at Louis's court and he reacted to the actual political situation in the Roman Empire by his work. Two elections took place after the death of the Roman Emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg. Louis of Bavaria and Friedrich of Habsburg became two Kings of the Romans and enemies to each other, too. This was followed by many years lasting fight for the throne which paralysed all Empire politics and was only finished when Friedrich was taken captive in the battle of Mühldorf. The new Pope John XXII was elected after two years lasting sede vacante in 1316. When Louis of Bavaria began exercise his right to the Italian part of the Empire after the battle of Mühldorf fully, he got into a disagreement with John XXII. It was ended up not only by a denial of king's right to the Northern Italy but also to Germany and Burgundy and to the start of the trial against the person of Louis IV. The king refused all Pope's demands through three appellations - of Nuremberg,...

Ce mémoire propose une étude critique des chapitres 14 à 17 de la première partie de la Summa logicae de Guillaume d’Ockham (v. 1285-1347), philosophe et théologien du bas Moyen-Âge. Ces quatre chapitres présentent la position d’Ockham dans la querelle des universaux, débat intellectuel marqué qui a opposé plusieurs écoles de pensée du milieu universitaire médiéval. Pour sa part, Ockham défend une position nominaliste selon laquelle 1. tout ce qui existe est de soi singulier; et 2. les universaux, ces concepts uniquement accessibles par l’esprit, n’existent pas. S’opposant au réalisme, Ockham s’y adresse notamment à l’un de ses collègues franciscain, Jean Duns Scot (v. 1266-1308). Ce mémoire a pour objectif d’identifier d’abord les mérites de la position nominaliste face au réalisme quant au statut des universaux et à la philosophie du langage et ensuite les tensions internes au nominalisme ockhamiste lorsque nous tentons de concilier celui-ci à l’ontologie et à la théologie catholique. Il s’agira donc de montrer que l’antiréalisme parvient à défaire le réalisme dans une perspective logique, mais que certains problèmes demeurent lorsque nous l’analysons dans une perspective ontologique ou théologique. Mots-clés : Guillaume d’Ockham, philosophie médiévale, Moyen-Âge, universaux, Jean Duns Scot, scolastique, ontologie, théologie catholique, logique, sémantique / This thesis proposes a critical study of chapters 14 to 17 of the first part of William of Ockham’s Summa logicae, a philosopher and theologian of the late Middle Ages (c. 1285-1347). These four chapters present Ockham's position in the problem of universals, a marked intellectual debate that opposed several philosophical and theological schools of the medieval academic world. For his part, Ockham defends a nominalist position according to which 1. everything that exists is inherently singular; and 2. universals, those concepts only accessible to the mind, do not exist. Opposing realism, Ockham addresses one of his Franciscan colleagues in particular, John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308). This thesis’s first aim is to identify the merits of a nominalist position vis-à-vis realism in regard to the status of universals, and second, to mark the tensions internal to Ockham’s nominalistic approach in its conciliation with ontology and catholic theology. It will thus be shown that antirealism succeeds in defeating realism from a logical perspective, but that some problems remain when we analyse it from an ontological or theological perspective. Keywords: William of Ockham, medieval philosophy, Middle Ages, universals, John Duns Scotus, scholastic, ontology, catholic theology, logic, semantics.