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International organizations (IOs) operate in increasingly dense institutional networks. This means that IOs rarely act in isolation; instead, their decisions are shaped by the activities performed by other IOs in their issue area. However, existing literature focuses primarily on how individual IOs can solve cooperation problems in a vacuum. How and when can IOs broadly, and U.S.-led liberal IOs in particular, effectively pursue their mandates against the backdrop of institutional crowding? In a three-paper dissertation, I probe the evolution of multilateral cooperation networks and how they structure policymaking in liberal IOs. To explore these dynamics, I construct an extensive, hand-coded dataset of cooperation between organizations in the development and emergency lending issue spaces 1945-2018. This coding draws on the contents of thousands of organizational policy papers, program documents, and press releases. I then leverage quantitative methods, text analysis, and network modeling to analyze these data. I supplement the empirical results with semi-structured interviews and experimental research designs. While existing work suggests that IOs must make concessions to member states to prevent them from shopping between institutions or else restrict their mandates to reclaim monopoly authority, I show that IOs can achieve their mandates and combat complexity through cooperation. In the first paper, I show that such cooperation materializes most easily between IOs whose leading stakeholders are geopolitically aligned. This is because multilateral staff are selected and socialized by leading shareholders to hold beliefs similar to their own. In the second and third papers, I show how cooperation enables IOs to enforce more stringent policies and improve operational performance. On the whole, then, I show that U.S.-led IOs like the World Bank and IMF can coerce welfare-enhancing reforms in target states and promote good governance by cooperating with other organizations in their issue spaces, though geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and other leading IO member states may be obstructive.

This dissertation seeks to explain how revisionist states attempt to prevent the intervention of other states – “third-party states” – that are not the victim of their plans. By engaging in a deep analysis of Louis XIV’s efforts to prevent third-party intervention before and during his War of Devolution, I have been able to build a theory that not only describes the strategies a revisionist may employ, but also explains how it decides which among them to use. In order to effectively select which of these strategies to implement against any particular third party, the revisionist will attempt to improve its belief about the third party by engaging in negotiations, where it deploys these strategies as offers which elicit telling responses from the third party. Despite the incentive to misrepresent private information, credible data can be transmitted during negotiations for a number of reasons, which I explain. With this improved belief, the revisionist can better choose which strategies have the highest probability of neutralizing that particular third-party state. To both demonstrate where my theory was inducted from and illustrate how it works in practice, I examine in high detail the negotiations Louis XIV’s France undertook against the United Provinces and Austria. Through granular analysis of the offers traded in these talks, one can better understand how a revisionist approaches the task of neutralization, making clear exactly how the mechanisms in my theory operate. This dissertation makes several important contributions: it helps to fill a conspicuous gap in the international relations literature, which has neglected the study of revisionists as strategic actors, and also offers important counterpoints to bargaining theory.

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This dissertation explores the stereotypes of representations of Muslims in American popular culture, and specifically in television dramas and comedies. These tropes include: 1) the Muslim terrorist/villain; 2) the patriotic “Good” Muslim; 3) the Muslim “friendly cultural stereotype”; and 4) the Muslim victim (both of Western discrimination and of patriarchal “Muslim culture”). This research is also interested in portrayals of Muslims that resist these stereotypes. Taking a performativity approach based on Critical Race Theory and intersectionality, this research is interested in the intersections of race, gender, class, and sexual orientation. Following the aesthetic turn of International Relations theory and falling within the subfield of Popular Culture and World Politics, this research takes popular culture seriously as a site of politics because representational practices are important in informing politics and societal relations at local, national, and global levels. This dissertation conducts a discursive content analysis of every American television program from 2001 to 2015 that features Muslims as main and/or recurring characters, including Homeland, 24, Sleeper Cell, and The Grid. This project is timely and important because constructions of identities, including through performative reifications of stereotypes in popular culture, both influence and are influenced by foreign policy. Narratives about Muslim-ness are important in justifying Western intervention in the Middle East as part of the US-led “War on Terror”. Most recently, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and early presidency illustrate in a visceral way the currency of negative and reductionist perceptions of Muslims, as illustrated in his proposed policies and widely spread societal and political support for a “Muslim ban”. Thus, it is important to think critically about the relationship between popular culture and world politics. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation explores stereotypes of Muslims in American popular culture, and specifically in television dramas and comedies. These include: 1) the Muslim terrorist/villain; 2) the patriotic “Good” Muslim; 3) the Muslim “friendly cultural stereotype”; and 4) the Muslim victim (both of Western discrimination and of patriarchal “Muslim culture”). This research is also interested in portrayals of Muslims that resist these stereotypes. This project is timely and important because stereotypes about Muslims are important in justifying Western intervention in the Middle East as part of the US-led “War on Terror”. Most recently, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and early presidency illustrate the power of negative perceptions of Muslims, as illustrated by his proposed policies and widely spread societal and political support for a “Muslim ban”. Thus, it is important to think critically about the relationship between popular culture and world politics.

What kind of activity is global governance? What do all of the many sectoral forms of global governance – of the planetary environment, of global finance and global health – have in common? Moving beyond sector-specific studies, this book outlines the fundamentals of global governance in eight chapter-length propositions.

While the resurgence of interest in the study of status in international politics has brought forth new insights into how status influences political decision-making and the behavior of states internationally, there are still areas where our understanding of status is hampered by inconsistent theorizing and a lack of empirical testing of the many assumptions these theories rest on. Over the course of three separate papers, I address three issue areas within the study of international status with the goal of clarifying theoretical gray areas and substantiating hypotheses that are key pillars within in this research program. In particular, across the three papers, I show how the current application of social identity theory, though flawed, not only can still push the field’s understanding of status further, but can also fill in gaps in the existing literature that other frameworks have yet to do. In my first paper, I point out fundamental issues with the Larson and Shevchenko (2014, 2019) reinterpretation of SIT for the international political context. Like Ward (2017), I show that their framework conflates the related, but distinct concepts of social mobility and individual mobility in such a way that destroys the boundaries between individualistic and group-oriented strategies and introduces a level of analysis issue not originally present in the original conception. I offer a reconceptualization of the social identity approach to international status that introduces a two-tiered framework that differentiates status strategies available based on whether the social identity of study is nationality or whether it is the state’s membership in informal and formal international groups and organizations. While the former is a social identity that is salient for most members of a nation at any given time, I theorize that the latter is a social identity likely most salient to those who engage in foreign policy or represent the state internationally in a formal capacity. This reconceptualization not only addresses a fundamental issue present in the current framework, but also connects sub-national and individual level causal processes implied by many state level theories of status in international relations to state action and policy. Through this paper, I show the continued importance of SIT to our understanding of the influence of status concerns on political decision-making. In my second paper, using Japanese national survey data from 2013, I provide evidence that status is not just the projection of an individual’s personal belief regarding a nation’s international standing. Individuals not only differentiate between their personal evaluations of their own country’s status and the evaluations they assume of others outside their nation, but these evaluations hold even in the face of incentives to downplay another’s status due to ongoing animosity between their countries. Furthermore, I show that individuals who are dissatisfied with the international status of their country not only are more supportive of status-seeking behavior from their state in the form of hosting the Olympics, but are in favor of increased government spending to potentially acquire more international status and national prestige. Status is not only a differentiable belief, but it also impacts support for status-seeking behavior. In my final paper, I again use Japanese national survey data from 2011 to investigate the relationship between status dissatisfaction, nationalism, and patriotism. Social identity theory suggests that individuals will pursue international status due to a desire to positively distinguish their country from other countries and maintain national pride. Given that national pride can manifest as either nationalism or patriotism, which have diverging effects on intergroup relations, to what extent is the desire for status rooted in nationalism and/or patriotism? Using public opinion data from the October 2011 wave of the Survey on the Image of Foreign Countries and Current Topics (SIFCCT) I conduct a regression analysis and find that between nationalism and patriotism, status concerns that drive status seeking behavior are rooted in the former and not the latter. Holding nationalist beliefs makes an individual more likely to be in a state of status dissatisfaction, whereas no significant relationship was found between patriotism and status dissatisfaction. This relationship holds regardless of whether the indicators for patriotism and nationalism are tested independent of one another or when both are included in the same model. These results have important implications regarding what kind of behavior is to be expected from status dissatisfied actors in international politics and the nature of international status seeking

This study examines the Socialist Republic of Romania as a Stalinist state which employs a personality cult. The leader of a state is the focus of a personality cult, but he does not enjoy the status it gives without consent from elsewhere within the government. In order to determine where this power comes from, three possible sources are discussed. These are: Nicolae Ceausescu, president of Romania; the state bureaucracy; and the people. The Soviet Union, during the time of Stalin, is used as a comparative element. When Nicolae Ceausescu came to power he did so with the consent of the elite. As the Romanian elite are less inclined to support his policies, Ceausescu has had to continually take steps to stay ahead of the opposition. The Romanian people also lent their support to Ceausescu earlier, and have since become discontented with the regime. This study concludes that a leader with a personality cult must have some form of consent to come into power, but his personal characteristics will determine how he leads and whether or not he will be able to remain in power if that consent is withdrawn. / M.A.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Soft power is more relevant now than ever before. In fact, in the current world system it has become an important element in exercising state power and mapping out leadership strategies. This assignment attempts to analyse the use of soft power as a post-Cold War foreign policy strategy on the part of China. Chinese relations with the African continent are assessed to prove the increasing rate at which China has expended trade and diplomatic relations in the past two decades, and to determine the degree to which soft power is contributing to China’s prospects of a harmonious rise to a position of global power. China’s foreign policy is ideologically underpinned by nationalism and confucianism. This stance is based on the need to protect and promote the economic and social stability of the state, as well as to secure a sound diplomatic identity in the international arena. For this reason, China has expanded economic interests abroad, particularly, looking upon Africa as a source of mutual development and investement, economic cooperation and an enhanced network for trade. This has lead to the growth of ‘soft’ ties between the Chinese nation and many African states, through the provision of aid, diplomatic cooperation on policy issues and the sharing of cultural values and institutional norms. In this way, China has been able to promote the perception of a peaceful rise to power and make a valuable contribution to the Chinese goal of constructing a harmonious world. Concluding a thorough analysis of China’s foreign policy behaviour it is determined that China-Africa relations are based, at least in part, on soft power, as a means to gain increased international influence. This is contended by the likeness between the behaviour advocated by soft power theory and that of Chinese interaction with African states. Furthermore, this partnership can be understood as a potential global shift towards multilateralism and the belief in an emerging international order that organised by regionalised powers that cooperate with each other on international platforms. The theory of constructivism, particularly its emaphasis on the roles of ideas, identities and institutions, is a valuable perspective to consider in approaching this discussion of China as a peacefully emerging global power. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: ‘Sagtemag’ is nou meer relevante vandag as ooit tevore. Dit is inderdaad ‘n belangrike element in die uitoefening van staat mag en leierskap strategieë in die huidige wêreld. Hierdie werkstuk poog om die gebruik van sagte mag te ontleed as ‘n buitelandse beleid strategie op die deel van Sjina sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog. Sjinese verhoudings met Arika word geassesseer om te bewys die toenemende tempo waarteen diplomatieke betrekkinge in die afgelope twee dekades bestee het, en die graad aan wat sagte mag dra Sjina se vooruitsigte van ‘n harmonieuse aanleiding tot wêreld mag te bepaal. Sjina se buitelandse beleid is ideologies ondersteun deur nasionalisme en Confucianisme. Hierdie standpunt is gebaseer op die behoefte om die ekonomiese stabiliteit van die staat te beskerm en om ‘n gesonde diplomatieke indentiteit te verseker op ‘n internasionale vlak. Om hierdie rede het Sjina uigebrei om die ekonomiese belange in die buiteland, veral op soek op die Afrika-vasteland as ‘n bron van wedersydse ontwikkeling en belegging, ekonomiese samewerking en ‘n groter handelsmerk netwerk. Dit het gelei tot die groei van die ‘sagte’ bande tussen Sjina en baie Afrika-lande, deur die voorsiening van fonds, diplomatieke samewerking oor beleidskwessies en die deel van kulturele waardes en institusionele norme. Op hierdie manier het Sjina die persepsie van ‘n vreedsame opkoms by wêreld mag te bevorder en ‘n waardevolle bydrae tot die Sjinese doel vir ‘n ‘Harmonious World’ te bou. Die sluiting van ‘n deeglike ontleding van Sjina se buitelandse beleid word bepaal dat Sjina-Afrika verhoudings is op sagtemag gebou om ‘n verhoogde internaionale invloed te kry. Dit is aangevoer deur die gelykenis tussen sagtemag teorie en die gedrag wat bepleit word deur Sjinese interaksie met Afrika-lande. Verder kan hierdie vennootskap verstaan word as ‘n moontlike globale verskuiwing na multilateralisme en die potensiële van ‘n nuwe internationale bestel wat gereël is deur regionalisering magte. Konstruktivisme, veral die teorie se nadruk op die rolle van idees, indentiteite en instellings, is ook ‘n waardevolle perspektief te oorweeg in die nader van heirdie bespreking van Sjina as ‘n vreedsame wyse opkomende wêreld mag.

Scholars assert that the Cold War began at one of several different points. Material recently available at the National Archives yields a view different from those already presented. From these records, and material from the Foreign Relations Series, Parliamentary Debates, and United States Government documents, a new picture emerges. This study focuses on the British occupation of Germany and on the Council of Foreign Ministers' Moscow Conference of 1947. The failure of this conference preceded the adoption of the Marshall Plan and a stronger Western policy toward the Soviet Union. Thus, the Moscow Conference emphasized the disintegrating relations between East and West which resulted in the Cold War.