Over the past thirty years the dominant trend in studies of American World War I literature has been to recognise the plurality of experience represented in American writing connected with the First World War, beyond that registered in the canonical works of white male modernists. Scholars have identified literary representations of the various gendered, political, intellectual, and racial subgroups that were affected by World War I in America. This growing interest in the experiences of diverse socio-political constituencies has, unfortunately, often reductively classified authors as belonging to a particular category of identity. Accordingly, the present work challenges this trend in three distinct ways. I argue, firstly, that individual authors held and represented complex and nuanced responses to the war. I propose, secondly, that writers expressed these views not just in the key works for which they are remembered, but across multiple literary media, including novels, magazine fiction, film scripts, book reviews, history works, prefaces, and autobiographies. Finally, I maintain a focus throughout on the provisionality of authors' responses to the war, arguing that these changed over time as a consequence of authors' intellectual and professional developments.

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D.Litt. et Phil. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

This dissertation studies Second World War ‘sites of memory’ in the islands of Jersey, Orkney and the Isle of Man, to determine if each island celebrates the war’s events as Britain does, or if they have charted their own mnemonic course. It builds on the work of Angus Calder, Malcolm Smith, and Mark Connelly, who have explored how popular conception of the Second World War in Britain has been structured around a certain set of commemorative motifs, most of which centre on Winston Churchill and the events of 1940. The British war narrative is now commonly referred to as the ‘Churchillian paradigm’ or ‘finest-hour myth’, and continues to be the driving force in commemoration and memorialization on the British mainland. The three islands in this study are culturally and historically distinct from Britain, and each has strong notions of its own ‘island identity’. Each also possesses a tangential and divisive domestic experience of war, one which is often minimized in the iconography of the Churchillian paradigm. Jersey was occupied by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945, Orkney was home to several thousand Italian POWs who built important infrastructure in the island, and the Isle of Man was home to 14,000 German, Finnish, Japanese, and Italian internees in what one critic has called ‘a bespattered page’ in the nation’s history. By examining ‘sites of memory’— museums, heritage sites, commemorations, celebrations, philately, and use of public space—this dissertation shows that each island simultaneously accepts and rejects elements of the finest-hour myth in their collective memory. Each island displays its unique (though often quite negative) heritage in order to differentiate itself from Britain, while at the same time allowing them, at certain events, to participate in celebration of Britain’s ‘greatest victory’. In this way, islands’ use ‘Britishness’ pragmatically, by basking in traditionally ‘British’ commemorative tropes, while at the same time deepening their own cultural and historical sovereignty.

The First World War was the United States’ first significant foray into European conflict and their first war as part of a major international coalition. The inadequacy of the US Army for the conflict forced them to rely on extensive support from its allies to successfully prosecute the war. For most members of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), the ally with which they most closely associated with was France who provided substantial amounts of equipment, training, and guidance. Most work on bilateral Franco-American relations during the period focus on high level diplomatic and military relations between the leaders of both nations and casts the state of relations as being antagonistic. This paper examines the more mundane experiences of AEF members with French soldiers and civilians and how those experiences shaped American views of themselves and their allies. By examining the American relationship with the French on and off the battlefield, it provides a view of the alliance outside of the staterooms and war rooms and re-examines previous characterisations of the relationship. The first chapter examines American relations with French civilians in port towns, in billets, and on leave through the opinions and behaviour of members of the AEF. The second and third chapter focus on the relationship with the French military not only through American opinions about the military competence of their ally but also examines the development of an American military identity apart from and in opposition to the French. American experience in the war allowed Americans not only to form stronger relationships than generally acknowledged with the French but also allowed them to develop a stronger sense of their own identity as a people and a country.

Since 1945 a number of historical controversies have arisen over the German leadership in the Second World War. Hitler has been described both as an astute opportunist and as a fanatic relentlessly following a preconceived plan. Thus his decision to turn east in 1941 has been regarded as the result of frustration in the West and also as the ultimate step in a great plan for eastern conquest which he followed throughput his career. Most of the German military leaders have supported the idea that Hitler had no "war plan." They have depicted themselves as subordinates hopelessly attempting to avert the worst effects of Hitler's irresponsible opportunism and amateurish interference in military strategy. Thus they have attributed most of the blame for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East to Hitler’s errors. This study re-examines these controversies in the light of the planning for the invasion of Russia. It shows that Hitler consistently followed a broad plan for the conquest of Lebensraum. Thus in 1940 his decision to attack Russia even if the war was still unfinished in the West was the result of his determination to fulfill his plan while Germany still held the initiative in Europe. Most of Hitler's military leaders shared his anti-Bolshevism and favoured a policy which would revive the situation created by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918. These attitudes made them willing to attack Russia. However, the optimism fostered by their defeat of France and their serious underestimation of Russia's strength caused them to omit careful consideration of the logistic and operational difficulties in the East. While accepting Hitler's more cautious plan they neglected to make the necessary preparations to implement it and instead attempted to adhere to their own simpler plan for a battle of destruction near the frontier followed by a thrust on Moscow. By the time it had become clear that the initial battles had failed to yield a decisive victory it was too late to revive Hitler's plan and the campaign deteriorated into a series of improvised operations. These served only to show that the Wehrmacht lacked the range and striking power to defeat the Soviet Union by military force alone. Hitler might have compensated for this deficiency by developing a coalition grand strategy capable of exerting further pressure on Russia from the Far East or the South. But instead, he failed to win the trust and cooperation of the Japanese by concealing his intention of attacking Russia and by directing them and the Italians towards the war against Britain. Furthermore, the Nazi terror and exploitation in Russia precluded the development of a positive policy which might have caused an internal collapse of Stalin's regime. The basic flaws of Hitler's Lebensraumpolitik as presented in Mein Kampf, his misjudgement of the British and his contempt for the Russians, were major political and grand strategic causes of his ultimate defeat. But on the military strategic level the German generals bear a far greater share of the responsibility for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East than has previously been recognised. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is an examination of how the Second World War has been commemorated in Northern Ireland. It seeks to explore how popular and official understandings of the war were constructed around two key moments. Primarily, it looks at the Victory celebrations to mark the end of the war in the West in May 1945. Secondly, it examines the importance of the publication of the official war history Northern Ireland in the Second World War in November 1956. By looking closely at how the Northern Irish government planned for the victory celebrations and how this ritual unfolded, we can reveal much about Northern Irish society at the end of the war. This thesis shows that the state-led, official commemoration served only to alienate the Catholic community. Exploring how the Northern Irish press recorded this event highlights the underlying tensions existing between both communities at the time. This thesis argues that the Northern Irish government used the victory celebrations to project a positive image of itself to the British government. Equally, in 1940 the Northern Irish government rather pre-emptively commissioned the writing of its own official war history, separate from the United Kingdom Official War History Series. This decision, taken by the Northern Irish government, was intended to ensure that Northern Ireland’s role in the war would never be forgotten. After 1945, the unionist government, preoccupied with securing its constitutional positioning within the United Kingdom, intended to make this official history a permanent memorial to Northern Ireland’s contribution to the war. Written, therefore, to exaggerate Northern Ireland’s part in the war, this official war history can be seen as a reflection of unionist insecurity. It is through these commemorative processes that ideas of national identity and belonging are explored.

The American military experience in the European Theater of Operations during the Second World War is one of the most heavily documented topics in modern historiography. However, within this plethora of scholarship, very little has been written on the contributions of the United States Cavalry to this era. The six mechanized cavalry groups assigned to the Third Army served in a variety of roles, conducting screens, counter-reconnaissance, as well as a number of other associated security missions for their parent corps and the Army. Although unheralded, these groups made substantial and war-altering impacts for the Third Army.

For decades nations have debated how to successfully employ air power. In 1943 the United States and Great Britain launched a massive strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The two sides agreed to a flawed plan due to the fundamental differences on bombing doctrine. As a result, the campaign was fraught with issues that remained largely unresolved in 1943. Without a clearly defined plan, the Allies were unable to determine which commands or targets received priority throughout the offensive. This ultimately led to a confused and unfocused campaign. High losses and inconclusive results derailed the American bombing effort. By November, the two sides agreed that the entire bombing offensive was either behind schedule or had failed entirely.

As a modernist, Virginia Woolf aimed at the modernisation of existing forms of artistic expression. However, she was also a very historically aware author. Thus the main issues and questions that this dissertation aims at investigating are Woolf’s views on, approach to and use of history and the past in three major novels: Mrs Dalloway (1925), To the Lighthouse (1927) and Between the Acts (1941). After a brief exposition of some of Woolf’s general views on history and inherited cultural constructions and how these contrast with traditional nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches to history, the argument progresses to explore history and the past in each of the three novels respectively. The choice of novels aims at reflecting something of the scope and range of her concerns with history and the past. The chapter on Mrs Dalloway is mainly concerned with the manner in which Woolf deals with a profound historical event like the First World War and her dual vision of history as both a source of tragedy and as a form of assurance for the continuation of life. In the chapter dealing with To the Lighthouse as its main focus, Woolf’s response to her personal past and the preceding cultural era will be explored, as well as her attempt to achieve a form of balance between the present and the past through artistic portrayal. In the discussion of the last novel Woolf wrote, Between the Acts, her response to history in the making and her views on how the course of history can be altered will be dealt with. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of this study in the contexts of Woolf as a modernist and an experimental novelist and in the light of the critical views that perceive Woolf as inadequately responsive to history and social issues.</p / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2008. / English / MA / unrestricted