In today's interconnected digital landscape, the protection of sensitive information is of great importance. As a result, the field of cryptography plays a vital role in ensuring individuals' anonymity and data integrity. In this context, this thesis presents a comprehensive analysis of symmetric encryption algorithms, specifically focusing on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Camellia. By investigating the performance aspects of these algorithms, including encryption time, decryption time, and ciphertext size, the goal is to provide valuable insights for selecting suitable cryptographic solutions. The findings indicate that while there is a difference in performance between the algorithms, the disparity is not substantial in practical terms. Both AES and Camellia, as well as their larger key-size alternatives, demonstrated comparable performance, with AES128 showing marginally faster encryption time. The study's implementation also involves encrypting a data set with sensitive information on students. It encrypts the school classes with separate keys and assigns roles to users, enabling access control based on user roles. The implemented solution successfully addressed the problem of role-based access control and encryption of unique identifiers, as verified through the verification and validation method. The implications of this study extend to industries and society, where cryptography plays a vital role in protecting individuals' anonymity and data integrity. The results presented in this paper can serve as a valuable reference for selecting suitable cryptographic algorithms for various systems and applications, particularly for anonymization of usernames or short, unique identifiers. However, it is important to note that the experiment primarily focused on small data sets, and further investigations may yield different results for larger data sets.

The Rijndael encryption algorithm has recently been published as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a Federal Information Processing Standard, and is being accepted by developers and designers as the algorithm of choice where encryption is required. Java is becoming the language of choice for E-Business applications, many of which require cryptography. The performance of any Java application is dependent on the compiler and virtual machine used to compile and interpret. Prior research has provided performance information for the Rijndael algorithm in Java for specific virtual machines. This research includes the development of a Rijndael implementation in Java. Using Java system calls, the performance of the Rijndael implementation is measured across fifteen compilers and fourteen virtual machines. Through analysis of these benchmarks, the Java performance of the Rijndael algorithm across compilers and virtual machines is produced.

Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) have become a realistic threat to implementations of cryptographic algorithms. By utilizing the unintentionally leaked side-channel information during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, it is possible to bypass the theoretical strength of the algorithm and extract its secret key. Recently, far-field electromagnetic (EM) emissions have been used in SCAs to extract keys from mixed- signal chips used in wireless communication protocols (such as Bluetooth). In such type of chips, the EM leakage is mixed with radio carrier and accidentally amplified by the antenna. Attacks exploiting such far-field EM side-channels may succeed over a much longer distance than the attacks based on near-field EM side-channels. Therefore, it is necessary to further investigate far-field EM side channels.In this thesis, we perform far-field EM side-channel attacks using two techniques: correlation and template analysis. We analyse an Arm Cortex-M4 microprocessor implementation of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-128 with a Bluetooth module on different distances up to 50cm. We first evaluate how the inter-chip diversity and the distance can affect the attack efficiency of template analysis. Our current results show that a template constructed using traces from one device captured at distance d can recover the secret key from 4,000 traces from the d device captured at the same distance d. However, if the distance is changed, or if traces are captured from different devices, the attack fails. This shows that it is not sufficient to build a template based on traces captured from a single device at a fixed distance. In addition, we present a pre- processing technique for allocating leakage points, which can significantly improve the attack efficiency of correlation analysis. / Side channel attacks har blivit ett realistiskt hot mot implementering av kryptografiska algoritmer. Genom att använda den oavsiktligt läckta sidokanalinformationen under exekveringen av en kryptografisk algoritm är det möjligt att kringgå algoritmens teoretiska styrka och extrahera dess hemliga nyckel. Nyligen har EM-utsläpp från fältfält använts i SCAsför att extrahera nycklar från blandade signalchips som används i trådlösa kommunikationsprotokoll (t.ex. Bluetooth). I en sådan typ av chips blandas EM-läckan med radiobäraren och förstärks av misstag av antennen. Attacker som utnyttjar sådana långtgående EM-sidokanaler kan lyckas på mycket längre avstånd än attackerna baserade på EM-sidokanaler nära fältet. Därför är det nödvändigt att ytterligare undersöka EM-sidokanalanalyser från fältet. I denna avhandling utför vi EM-sidokanalanalys med fältfält med två tekniker: korrelationsanalys och mallanalys. Vi analyserar en Arm Cortex-M4-mikroprocessorimplementering av AES med en Bluetooth-modul inbäddad på kortet på olika avstånd upp till 50 cm från den mottagande antennen. Vi utvärderar först hur mångfalden mellan chip och avståndet kan påverka attackeffektiviteten för mallanalys. Våra nuvarande resultat visar att en mall konstruerad med spår från en enhet fångad på avstånd d från den mottagande antennen kan återställa den hemliga nyckeln från 4K spår från samma enhet som fångats på samma avstånd d från den mottagande antennen. Om avståndet ändras eller om spår från en annan enhet analyseras misslyckas dock attacken. Detta visar att det inte är tillräckligt att bygga en mall baserad på spår från en enda enhet fångad på ett fast avstånd från den mottagande antennen. Dessutom presenterar vi en förbehandlingsteknik för allokering av läckagepunkter i spåren och visar att den kan förbättra attackeffektiviteten för korrelationsanalysen betydligt.

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Electronic devices such as phones and computers use cryptography to achieve information security. However, while cryptographic algorithms may be strong theoretically, their physical implementations in hardware can leak unintentional side information as a byproduct of performing their computations. A device's security can be compromised from this leakage through side-channel attacks. Research in hardware security reveals how dangerous these attacks can be and provides security countermeasures. This thesis focuses on a category of side-channel attacks called fault attacks, and contributes a new fault attack method that can compromise a cryptographic device more rapidly than the previous methods when using practical fault injection techniques. We observe that as a circuit is further overclocked, new faults are often superimposed upon previous ones. We analyze the incremental changes rather than the total sum in order to extract more secret information. Unlike many previous methods, ours does not require precise fault injection techniques and requires no knowledge of when the internal state is in a specific algorithmic stage. Results are confirmed experimentally on hardware implementations of AES-128, 192, and 256. / Thesis / Master of Applied Science (MASc)

A nearly stoichiometric, (1×1) Cr₂O₃ (101̲2) surface was prepared from a single crystal of α-Cr₂O₃. The five-coordinate cations exposed at the stoichiometric surface dissociatively adsorb molecular oxygen to form a (1×1), terminating chromyl (Cr=O) layer that is stable to >1100 K. TDS and AES were used to investigate the reactivity of the halo-alkanes CFCl₂CH₂Cl, CF₂ClCH₂Cl, CF₃CH₂Cl, and CF₂CH₂F, in addition to the halo-alkenes CFCl=CH₂ and CF₂=CH₂. The halo-alkanes CFCl₂CH₂Cl, CF₂ClCH₂Cl, and CF₃CH₂Cl undergo 1,2-dihalo elimination similar to the Zn-catalyzed dehalogenation of vicinal dihalides to form alkenes. Some acetylene is also formed. The halo-alkenes CFCl=CH₂ and CF₂=CH₂ decompose to yield acetylene. Halogen removed from the molecules remains bound to the surface following TDS experiments and eventually terminates the surface chemistry due to site blocking of the cations. Reactivity is directly related to the chlorine content of the molecules investigated. Only CFCl₂CH₂Cl was reactive on a chromyl-terminated surface. / Ph. D.

While 5G energy harvesting makes 5G smart dust possible, stretching computation across power cycles affects cryptographic algorithms. This effect may lead to new security issues that make the system vulnerable to adversary attacks. Therefore, security measures are needed to protect data at rest and in transit across the network. In this paper, we identify the security requirements of existing 5G networks and the best-of-breed cryptographic algorithms for ultra-low SWaP devices in an energy harvesting context. To do this, we quantify the performance vs. energy tradespace, investigate the device features that impact the tradespace the most, and assess the security impact when the attacker has access to intermediate results. Our open-source energy-harvesting-tolerant versions of the cryptographic algorithms provide algorithm and device recommendations and ultra-low SWaP energy-harvesting-device-optimized versions of the cryptographic algorithms. / Master of Science / Smart dust is a network of tiny and energy-efficient devices that can gather data from the environment using various sensors, such as temperature, pressure, and humidity sensors. These devices are extremely small, often as small as a grain of sand or smaller, and have numerous applications, including environmental monitoring, structural health monitoring, and military surveillance. One of the main challenges of smart dust is its small size and limited energy resources, making it challenging to power and process the collected data. However, advancements in energy harvesting and low-power computing are being developed to overcome these challenges. In the case of 5G, energy harvesting technologies can be used to power small sensors and devices that are part of the 5G network, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Examples of IoT devices are wearable fitness trackers, smart thermostats, security cameras, home automation systems, and industrial sensors. Since 5G energy harvesting impacts the daily lives of people using the relevant devices, our research seeks to find out what kind of measures are necessary to guarantee their security.