Master's thesis. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Master's thesis. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Masteropgave. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Hy S. Rothstein, Kalev K. Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-175). Also available online.

The main purpose with the essay is to look into NATO and annalise how the organisation haschanged it´s security policy work process today 2015, seen from two different world eventsduring the period 1989-2015, the collapse of the Berlin wall and war in Afghanistan. Purposeand issuses also apply based on two theories Anarchymodel and World society model. In orderto highlight two different ways to see NATO:s security policy work process over time untilthe present day. Issues: • How did the fall of Berlin wall in 1989 change NATO:s security policy work process? • How did the war in Afghanistan in 2001 change NATO:s security policy work process? The essay is a qualitative method literature review describing NATO as an organisation andworld events that had impact on NATO over time. The result show that NATO has shifled it´s borders further fast because ”new” membercountries from the former Soviet Union are party members. NATO has moved closer toRussia, and increased in momentum. A possible armed conflict could be in the advantage ofnew markets that werwe previously isolated and intiate a co-operation with entrant´s. The result also shows that terroism and conflicts are carried out between operators and groupswithout fixed borders. It is largely down to the balance of power between NATO and Warsawpact dosesn´t exist anymore. Earlier controlled Superpowers of their allies. It has providedspace for new opponents to understand rights and responsibilities according to their way ofthinking and acting on that basis. These operators are weaker in impact strength and hencethey act according to their own circumstances and conditions, often through terroism. NATOhas transformed a large part of it´s security policy process to better respond to threats such asterroism.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, military personnel participating in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been plagued by traditional barriers to successful labor market attachment such as health and mental health concerns, employer stigma, and difficulty translating military training and experience to the civilian market, but also by a lagging economy. Veteran status since Vietnam has historically been linked to negative employment outcomes over the life course. Currently, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports an unemployment rate of 9.5% for male Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans, and a 12.1% rate for their female counterparts. Veterans aged 20-24 have a 20.1% unemployment rate, nearly five points higher than that of their civilian peers. To compound the problem, an overly passive labor market policy prevents access to education and training that civilian employers value most. As Veterans continue to separate from the armed forces the United States, employers and policymakers can choose to capitalize on their skills, experience, and willingness to serve, or risk alienating another generation of young service members. This paper addresses five key categories that serve as barriers to successful labor market attachment and summarizes both governmental and private-sector programs designed to assist military personnel in their transition to civilian work. Finally, it provides policy options for remedying the post-9/11 Veterans labor market transition problem through improving service coordination and delivery, deliberately developing human capital through military service, and increasing employer responsibility for skill development and labor market attachment. / text

The international community has followed up its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with a complex multi-faceted peacebuilding project. However, informed observers believe the Western-led mission in Afghanistan has failed to address the inherent peacebuilding needs of Afghanistan and has hindered the formation of a locally experienced sustainable peace. In response, emerging peacebuilding theory and rhetoric has pointed to an urgent need for revised peacebuilding paradigms and strategies that hold local (Afghan) ownership of peacebuilding activities as a central concern. This research project utilised a qualitative grounded theory methodology to explore perceptions of Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan. Research data was gathered in early 2011 through face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 63 local and international peacebuilding leaders in two Afghan urban centres. The participants included persons from the United Nations, the Afghan and foreign governments, local and international NGOs, a broad range of civil society groups, international donors, and the international military forces. Analysis of the interview narratives revealed several dilemmas on the journey towards increased Afghan ownership of peacebuilding. First, participants believed that the international community is performing important roles in Afghanistan, but is struggling to ensure Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities. Second, international and Afghan peacebuilding actors have struggled to define who should be owning peacebuilding in at least two respects: (1) civil society or government; and (2) traditional- informal or democratic-formal institutions. Third, grassroots populations and Afghan civil society felt virtually no ownership of upper-level peace processes, and described a distinct lack of locally owned grassroots-level peace process activities. And fourth, inappropriate external forces and processes, the militarisation and politicisation of peacebuilding activities, local aid dependency, and inadequate local control over peacebuilding coordination have hindered the international-domestic inter-relationship in Afghanistan. However, the dilemmas of local ownership do not need to be viewed as unworkable barriers but can be re-conceptualised as holding constructive potential in designing sustainable peacebuilding solutions. To this end, this research study proposed the creation of a locally owned, broadly participatory, and strategic dispute resolution system that might transform international-local relations and forge the necessary space in which the transition to local authority and ownership might occur.

State failure represents one of the most pressing concerns for international security in the 21st century, and Afghanistan represents one of the most concerted efforts ever witnessed to address this phenomenon in a lasting and sustainable way. This thesis takes the position that part of the difficulty in finding a remedy for state failure relates to the contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the state-building enterprise itself. The trade-offs required by certain fundamental aspects of state-building must be better understood if they are to be effectively managed, and these trade-offs cannot be understood without critically analysing the basic assumptions of state-building. To come to grips with these assumptions in concrete terms, this paper examines the European Union’s involvement in Afghanistan as a case study to apply and develop the analytical framework of “dilemma analysis.” The first major goal of this research will be to outline the tensions within state-building, and to assess their usefulness for explaining some of the difficulties facing state-builders in general terms. The second goal will be to analyse the significance of the specific combination of dilemmas relevant to the case of Afghanistan, in order to show how those dilemmas interact with each other to constrain the EU’s options for effective state-building. The third goal is to identify ways in which the EU and the international community in general can benefit from dilemma analysis when conducting state-building interventions in the future.

This thesis assesses institutional-learning by the European Union (EU) in Afghanistan. The assessment is carried out by delineating the developments and changes in relevant EU policies through the years 1993-2010 using process tracing. The analysis is based on an extensive review of EU documents, regulations, statements, publications and interviews together with third party evaluations and a survey of the relevant academic literature. The research question which the thesis addresses is to assess whether a policy change in EU state-building efforts is discernible and whether this change can be attributed to institutional-learning or to other causes. It also provides evidence that the state-building efforts by the EU form part of an institutional process of development by the EU to establish itself as a global actor. The assessment therefore focusses around four components: the EU, institutional-learning, state-building and Afghanistan. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the nexus between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU-led state-building in fragile and/or post-conflict countries outside of the Union's enlargement sphere while taking into account the change in actorness on the part of the EU. This analysis is grounded on two interlocking frameworks. By using data and developments in the Afghanistan country study, elements of the state-building Framework are scrutinised for evidence of the different categories of institutional-learning and adaptation derived from the institutional-learning Framework. By pinpointing the learning processes within the EU as an organisation and in its state-building policies, and by analysing the limitations of its approach to these, the thesis concludes with a recommendation of how to make EU-led post-conflict state-building in forthcoming cases of fragile states more effective.

The international community has followed up its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with a complex multi-faceted peacebuilding project. However, informed observers believe the Western-led mission in Afghanistan has failed to address the inherent peacebuilding needs of Afghanistan and has hindered the formation of a locally experienced sustainable peace. In response, emerging peacebuilding theory and rhetoric has pointed to an urgent need for revised peacebuilding paradigms and strategies that hold local (Afghan) ownership of peacebuilding activities as a central concern. This research project utilised a qualitative grounded theory methodology to explore perceptions of Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan. Research data was gathered in early 2011 through face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 63 local and international peacebuilding leaders in two Afghan urban centres. The participants included persons from the United Nations, the Afghan and foreign governments, local and international NGOs, a broad range of civil society groups, international donors, and the international military forces. Analysis of the interview narratives revealed several dilemmas on the journey towards increased Afghan ownership of peacebuilding. First, participants believed that the international community is performing important roles in Afghanistan, but is struggling to ensure Afghan ownership of peacebuilding activities. Second, international and Afghan peacebuilding actors have struggled to define who should be owning peacebuilding in at least two respects: (1) civil society or government; and (2) traditional- informal or democratic-formal institutions. Third, grassroots populations and Afghan civil society felt virtually no ownership of upper-level peace processes, and described a distinct lack of locally owned grassroots-level peace process activities. And fourth, inappropriate external forces and processes, the militarisation and politicisation of peacebuilding activities, local aid dependency, and inadequate local control over peacebuilding coordination have hindered the international-domestic inter-relationship in Afghanistan. However, the dilemmas of local ownership do not need to be viewed as unworkable barriers but can be re-conceptualised as holding constructive potential in designing sustainable peacebuilding solutions. To this end, this research study proposed the creation of a locally owned, broadly participatory, and strategic dispute resolution system that might transform international-local relations and forge the necessary space in which the transition to local authority and ownership might occur.