© Cranfield University / This thesis focuses on what stability is, and what interventions have supported stability in four communities in Afghanistan and Nepal. It is the author’s view that this is the first in-depth village level assessment of how populations conceive of stability and stabilisation and thus presents a challenge to existing analysis and research about how to foster stability in contexts in extreme tension and often violent conflict. The thesis argues that international, particularly Western, notions of stability and stabilisation processes have failed to grasp the importance of local political legitimacy formation, which is a vital aspect of contemporary statebuilding of a ‘non-Westphalian’ nature. The interventions, across defence, diplomatic and defence lines, have also at times undermined one another and in some cases contributed to instability. This is particularly acute when the interventions have been motivated by the conflicting demands of statebuilding, counter-insurgency (COIN) and development theories. The thesis argues that the nature of the interventions, their conception of stability and exogenously-driven goals limit the ability to promote stability. Research findings indicate that that local processes of stabilisation have, at times, proven to be more enduring but only in circumstances where a combination of local and national political processes have allowed political legitimacy to be formed and maintained. Research findings also suggest that the more successful stability interventions have been critically supported by humanitarian and security activities which have provided for the immediate needs of the population. Longer term stability has only been embedded in contexts which have also been able to exploit economic opportunities.

This thesis focuses on what stability is, and what interventions have supported stability in four communities in Afghanistan and Nepal. It is the author’s view that this is the first in-depth village level assessment of how populations conceive of stability and stabilisation and thus presents a challenge to existing analysis and research about how to foster stability in contexts in extreme tension and often violent conflict. The thesis argues that international, particularly Western, notions of stability and stabilisation processes have failed to grasp the importance of local political legitimacy formation, which is a vital aspect of contemporary statebuilding of a ‘non-Westphalian’ nature. The interventions, across defence, diplomatic and defence lines, have also at times undermined one another and in some cases contributed to instability. This is particularly acute when the interventions have been motivated by the conflicting demands of statebuilding, counter-insurgency (COIN) and development theories. The thesis argues that the nature of the interventions, their conception of stability and exogenously-driven goals limit the ability to promote stability. Research findings indicate that that local processes of stabilisation have, at times, proven to be more enduring but only in circumstances where a combination of local and national political processes have allowed political legitimacy to be formed and maintained. Research findings also suggest that the more successful stability interventions have been critically supported by humanitarian and security activities which have provided for the immediate needs of the population. Longer term stability has only been embedded in contexts which have also been able to exploit economic opportunities.

Depuis son accession à l’indépendance en 1960, la République Centrafricaine (RCA) oscille entre périodes troubles et moments de stabilité relative, notamment sous les régimes militaires de Jean-Bedel Bokassa et d’André Kolingba. L’instabilité politique quasi-chronique de ce pays depuis la fin des années 1980 a entrainé des réponses internationales successives, sous forme de missions de paix débutées en 1997 et visant, in fine, à la reconstruction/construction étatique comme solution à la crise du politique centrafricaine. L’éclatement, en fin 2012, d’un conflit armé mené par la rébellion de la Seleka souligne cependant la faiblesse de cette entreprise internationale, qui fait fi des dynamiques politiques et sociales internes des sociétés concernées. Cette reprise violente des hostilités en RCA remet également au goût du jour la question de la rigidité du concept d’État et de sa pertinence universelle, limites des politiques internationales de « statebuiding ». La multitude d’acteurs, locaux et internationaux, qui opèrent sur le terrain centrafricain témoigne de la complexité de ce conflit et rend difficile la possibilité d’une solution durable. Le rôle premier de la Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) dans le « statebuilding » en RCA entre 2012 et 2016 est l’incarnation d’une lutte d’influence que cet acteur régional - en l’occurrence ses États membres - a remporté. La « victoire » de la CEEAC a été acquise au détriment d’une solution objective et viable à la question centrafricaine, « au profit » d’États tels que le Tchad et la France, et d’individus tels que Idriss Deby et Denis Sassou N’guesso. Ce succès de la « diplomatie de machination » est illustratif des logiques et lutte de pouvoir et de la convergence des régimes politiques dans la sous-région, ainsi que de la relation très paradoxale que la France entretient avec ses anciennes colonies. / Since its independence in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has oscillated between turmoil and moments of relative stability, notably under the military regimes of Jean-Bedel Bokassa and André Kolingba. The country’s quasi chronic political instability since the end of the 1980s, has led to successive international responses in the form of peace missions starting in 1997 and ultimately aimed at statebuilding as a solution to the CAR’s crisis of the political. The outbreak of an armed conflict at the end of 2012 led by the Seleka rebellion, however, underlines the weakness of this international enterprise, which ignores the internal political and social dynamics of ‘recipient’ societies. This violent resumption of hostilities in the CAR also brings to the fore the question of the rigidity of the concept of the state and its universal relevance, as limits of international statebuilding policies. The multitude of local and international actors operating in the CAR is indicative of the complexity of this conflict and renders the possibility of a lasting solution difficult. The primary role of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the statebuilding in CAR between 2012 and 2016 is a manifestation of the struggle for influence that this regional actor - in this case its member states - won. The ‘victory’ of ECCAS was gained at the expense of an objective and viable solution to the Central African question, ‘for the benefit’ of states such as Chad and France, and individuals such as Idriss Deby and Denis Sassou Nguesso. The success of this ‘diplomacy of conspiracy’ is illustrative of power dynamics and power struggle and the convergence of political regimes in the subregion, as well as the very paradoxical relationship that France has with its former colonies.

State failure represents one of the most pressing concerns for international security in the 21st century, and Afghanistan represents one of the most concerted efforts ever witnessed to address this phenomenon in a lasting and sustainable way. This thesis takes the position that part of the difficulty in finding a remedy for state failure relates to the contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the state-building enterprise itself. The trade-offs required by certain fundamental aspects of state-building must be better understood if they are to be effectively managed, and these trade-offs cannot be understood without critically analysing the basic assumptions of state-building. To come to grips with these assumptions in concrete terms, this paper examines the European Union’s involvement in Afghanistan as a case study to apply and develop the analytical framework of “dilemma analysis.” The first major goal of this research will be to outline the tensions within state-building, and to assess their usefulness for explaining some of the difficulties facing state-builders in general terms. The second goal will be to analyse the significance of the specific combination of dilemmas relevant to the case of Afghanistan, in order to show how those dilemmas interact with each other to constrain the EU’s options for effective state-building. The third goal is to identify ways in which the EU and the international community in general can benefit from dilemma analysis when conducting state-building interventions in the future.

Thesis advisor: Gerald Easter / The U.S. military is asked to perform statebuilding operations far more often than it engages in conventional warfare against opposing uniformed state militaries. The U.S. military has engaged in 13 major armed statebuilding operations during and since WWII, along with numerous smaller operations throughout the world, and the most optimistic measures of success are less than 50 percent. Why, despite statebuilding being the most common task it is asked to perform, is U.S. military performance in statebuilding operations still so poor. This puzzle cannot be answered by current research on military effectiveness since this body of research focuses exclusively either on a military’s effectiveness in conventional combat, or on a military’s effectiveness in the conventional combat aspects of non-conventional operations. This gap is detrimental since militaries are frequently asked to perform a wide range of missions far beyond conventional operations. The U.S. military consistently resists statebuilding operational tasks when conducting such operations and consistently dismantles what little statebuilding capacity it does build following the statebuilding operation. This dissertation takes a novel approach by disaggregating between the three statebuilding tasks the U.S. military identifies as tasks it should be able to perform in statebuilding operations, building infrastructure, building and training local security forces, and building and supporting local governance. It finds that the military actually performs well in some statebuilding tasks and poorly in others. This dissertation presents the Primary Mission Theory to explain this divergence in effectiveness, which argues that militaries will preference those tasks that contribute to what they consider to be their primary mission, which is almost always conventional combat. Thus, statebuilding tasks will be preferenced only if they can also contribute to conventional combat capabilities. I trace the historical development statebuilding institutions within the U.S. military and conduct case studies on operations in Afghanistan and Vietnam in support of the presented theory. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an interesting case study of statebuilding in a conflict-country context. Created as an interim administration in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, the PA has been hampered by the statebuilding framework enshrined in the Oslo Accords, its lack of sovereignty, the lack of final status negotiations, and the 'partners for peace' paradigm which is an attempt by donors and international organisations to support who they regard as the 'right' type of elite - that is, those willing to 'make peace' with Israel (as defined by Israel). This article explores the impacts of this paradigm and argues that it has paralysed the formal political process in Palestine and has securitised democracy.

[pt] A presente dissertação tem como principal objetivo analisar o engajamento do Brasil nos debates normativos sobre segurança internacional, em especial os que envolvem a temática da reconstrução estatal e a construção da paz, enquanto um agente contestador através da construção e da prática do Brazilian Way of Peacebuilding. Para realizar tal análise partiu-se do debate sobre normas nas Relações Internacionais para entender como uma norma surge, se consolida e pode ser contestada. Assim, para analisar essa atuação normativa do Brasil buscou-se analisar dois processos de reconstrução estatal e consolidação da paz nos quais a presença brasileira é e foi bastante significativa tanto em termos militares quanto em termos políticos: Guiné-Bissau e Haiti. A partir desses casos foi buscado entender como que o Brazilian Way of Peacebuilding contesta e, no limite, legitima uma visão tradicional de construção da paz. Por fim, são apresentadas as consequências dessas práticas para as normas de segurança internacional. / [en] The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze Brazil s engagement in the normative debates on international security, especially those that involve the theme of Statebuilding and peacebuilding, as a contestation agent through the construction and practice of the Brazilian Way of Peacebuilding. In order to carry out this analysis, we started with the debate on norms in International Relations to understand how a norm emerges, is consolidated and can be contested. Thus, in order to analyze this normative action in Brazil, we sought to analyze two processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding in which the Brazilian presence is and was quite significant both in military and in political terms: Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. From these cases it was sought to understand how the Brazilian Way of Peacebuilding contests and, in the limit, legitimizes a traditional vision of peacebuilding. Finally, the consequences of these practices for international security norms are presented.

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In response to competing group claims and the challenge to achieve pre-set triple national goals - recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity, achieving national unity and political stability, successive Nigerian governments from the colonial era to the present, have at various periods negotiated, constitutionalised and/or decreed state building strategies. This thesis offers detailed discussion and evaluation of some of these competing group claims and strategies using principles derived from the theoretical arguments of Michal Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, and prescriptions based on the empirical arguments of Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz and Donald Rothchild. The thesis argues that some of the strategies adopted in response to the competing group claims were defensible in the very circumstances in which they were introduced, but were either not deep enough to offer an adequate political inclusion, or lacked the appropriate instruments that would have minimised recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities. There were some strategies that either generated tension among groups, or were purely driven by strategic considerations for national unity, but were defensible. There were other strategies that were pragmatic at the very period they were adopted, but not defensible. The core theoretical finding of the thesis is that, the normative and empirical prescriptions validate the country’s various strategies for coping with diversity. However, application of some elements of the prescriptions in the Nigerian multicultural society has the potential to generate tensions leading to ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities. The important empirical finding of the thesis is regarding the role the inherent tensions between the triple national goals and the state building strategies play in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities. The thesis argues that the underlying factors responsible for the prevalence of ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities in the country include among others, the ascension of the military to power and its costly dominance of the political scene for about thirty five years, the immediate post-civil war period which coincided with the era of petroleum boom that created a deepening crisis of corruption, the perpetuation of large scale electoral and financial corruption, and manipulation of ethnic loyalties. Given the above underlying factors, this work observes that state building and Constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society is a difficult task, especially taking into account the ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities associated with the Armed Forces over the years. On the basis of a detailed and interdisciplinary analysis, the thesis recommends constitutional and institutional safeguards for mitigating ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities in the course of future political development of Nigeria.

How do international norms travel, via statebuilding efforts, into post-conflict settings, and how do international and national actors interact in this process? These are the main questions addressed in this thesis. The empirical focus is the spreading and rooting of the norm of women’s political rights in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, two countries in which international actors have played a significant role in statebuilding efforts. Although statebuilding has increasingly become a part of UN peacebuilding missions, we still lack a thorough understanding of how much, and in what ways, the international community can successfully promote change. This is important in view of the fact that the key to success ultimately depends on how the receiving community responds to the presence and efforts of international actors to promote new social norms.  This study analyzes the interaction between international and national actors engaged in the promotion of women’s political rights as part of the effort to advance democracy. Three institutional developments are examined in detail – electoral rules and regulations, the establishment of a national gender equality/women’s machinery and the strengthening of the local government structure. The study uses a modified norm diffusion approach and makes two theoretical contributions to the literature. First, I place the norm diffusion process in a post-conflict context. Second, I add the concept of capability to function in order to conceptualize and study the internalization of the norm. The thesis is based on both an analysis of written material and semi-structured interviews. A total of 65 interviews were conducted during three research trips to each of the countries between 2007 and 2009. In general, the four empirical chapters reveal that the interaction between international and national actors has predominantly been characterized by international actors setting the agenda, with varying degrees of consultation and collaboration with national actors. While norm institutionalization has been rather high in both countries, norm inter­nalization lags behind. This is explained by discriminating ways of life and attitudes, lack of resources and time. Norm internalization is higher in Timor-Leste, in part because national actors have adapted the norm of women’s political rights to fit the local setting, but also due to their openness to international influences. The empirical study underscores that international actors can push for change and norm adherence, but their efforts are not enough. In the end, national actors have to buy into the message that international actors try to convey. The strengths and weaknesses that have been uncovered in the Cambodian and Timorese case studies presented here should be carefully considered as international actors, led by the UN, embark upon future statebuilding missions around the globe.