How can we successfully complete our missions while we are stuck in bunkers? A question representative of a hot topic of discussion regarding the restrictions of force protection measures that are placed on US troops conducting military operations abroad. The discussion, which peaked during the late 1990s early 2000s, was heavily weighted in one direction, namely claiming that force protection has a negative impact on military effectiveness. As the claim generalises force protection, a concept that has numerous definitions and even more interpretations, it therefore seems unlikely that such a generalisation can be made. This study analyses the claim using an idea analysis method, questioning its sustainability and presenting a way of understanding its limitations. In studying the circumstances of the reports that triggered this discussion, the analysis allows us to see the limited relevance of the claim with regard to the broader concept of force protection, while acknowledging its possible relevance regarding the specific aspects that are more commonly associated with the concept.

<p>This dissertation examines whether war has reputational consequences by analyzing the conditions under which third party actors are more or less likely to challenge combatants after the war is over. I develop a theory of reputational effects that emphasizes how information generated during wartime interacts with expectations and the characteristics of third party states to determine when war outcomes influence the decision making of potential challengers. I test this theory against competing explanations using three methodological approaches. First, I analyze the effect that the outcomes of conventional wars have on the initiation of militarized disputes using cross-national time series data from 1816-2004. Second, I use process tracing to assess whether the decision making by Japan and Germany after the Winter War and the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Cuba after Vietnam is consistent with the causal logic of my theory. Finally, I combine qualitative historiography with time series intervention analysis to assess whether the Vietnam War increased or decreased the number of challenges initiated against the United States. I find that the reputational effects of revealed effectiveness are quite broad, but are most pronounced when the fighting environment is similar. Combatants that perform poorly on the battlefield are more likely to be challenged by their potential adversaries, especially when those adversaries expect to fight them in an environment that is similar to the past war. On the other hand, the reputational effects of revealed cost tolerance are much more limited. The statistical analysis found that information about the combatant's willingness to suffer costs only influenced very weak challengers, while the case studies found that it only influenced the behavior of states that were concerned about issues that were similar to those over which the past was fought. When the issues at stake were similar, weak challengers were more emboldened than strong challengers but weak challengers with different issues at stake did not alter their behavior.</p> / Dissertation

Thesis advisor: Gerald Easter / The U.S. military is asked to perform statebuilding operations far more often than it engages in conventional warfare against opposing uniformed state militaries. The U.S. military has engaged in 13 major armed statebuilding operations during and since WWII, along with numerous smaller operations throughout the world, and the most optimistic measures of success are less than 50 percent. Why, despite statebuilding being the most common task it is asked to perform, is U.S. military performance in statebuilding operations still so poor. This puzzle cannot be answered by current research on military effectiveness since this body of research focuses exclusively either on a military’s effectiveness in conventional combat, or on a military’s effectiveness in the conventional combat aspects of non-conventional operations. This gap is detrimental since militaries are frequently asked to perform a wide range of missions far beyond conventional operations. The U.S. military consistently resists statebuilding operational tasks when conducting such operations and consistently dismantles what little statebuilding capacity it does build following the statebuilding operation. This dissertation takes a novel approach by disaggregating between the three statebuilding tasks the U.S. military identifies as tasks it should be able to perform in statebuilding operations, building infrastructure, building and training local security forces, and building and supporting local governance. It finds that the military actually performs well in some statebuilding tasks and poorly in others. This dissertation presents the Primary Mission Theory to explain this divergence in effectiveness, which argues that militaries will preference those tasks that contribute to what they consider to be their primary mission, which is almost always conventional combat. Thus, statebuilding tasks will be preferenced only if they can also contribute to conventional combat capabilities. I trace the historical development statebuilding institutions within the U.S. military and conduct case studies on operations in Afghanistan and Vietnam in support of the presented theory. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

No description available.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing en magsaanwending. Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig. Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het. Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite aangeraak nie. Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer. Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf. ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die lig laat sien het. Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing. Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is. Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf. Ter opsomming dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word. Die tesis maak dus die gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is. Ten slotte is die weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat.

Till följd av Försvarsmaktens tidigare inriktning mot insatsförsvar och den strategiska time-out som präglade början av 2000-talet förfogar luftvärnet idag över luftvärnssystem som är flera decennier gamla. Systemen är inte dimensionerade för att möta dagens högteknologiska motståndare och regeringen har därför beslutat att en ersättare till Robotsystem 97 skall vara på plats senast 2020. Valet står mellan Patriot och Aster SAMP/T, syftet med detta arbete är därför att undersöka och bedöma den militära effektiviteten för respektive luftvärnssystem. Undersökningen baseras på en komparativ analys där luftvärnssystemen jämförs utifrån ett scenario med tillhörande händelseförlopp och kravställningar. Slutligen sammanställs och presenteras resultatet i en multimålmodell för att på ett kvantitativt sätt kunna mäta skillnaderna mellan systemen. Resultatet visar på att Aster SAMP/T har störst potential att vara effektivt i en given kontext men att Patriot också uppfyller de krav som ställs nästintill utan begränsning. Då jämförelsen grundar sig på ett begränsat scenario med specifika förutsättningar är det viktigt att ha i beaktande att resultatet endast har validitet mot det scenario och kravställningar som luftvärnssystemen jämförts utifrån. / As a result of the Swedish Armed Forces previous focus on international operations and strategic timeout in the beginning of the 21st century, the air defense today has surface-to-air missile systems that are several decades old. The systems are not designed to handle today’s high-tech opponent and the government has therefore decided that a replacement for MIM-23 HAWK must be in place by 2020. The choice stands between Patriot and Aster SAMP/T, the purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate and assess the military effectiveness of each surface-to-air missile system. The survey is based on a comparative analysis where the systems are compared to each other in a scenario which includes several events and requirements. Finally, the results are compiled and presented in a multi-goal-model to quantitatively measure the differences between the systems. The result shows that Aster SAMP/T has the greatest potential of being effective in a given context, but that Patriot also meets the requirements almost without any limitations. As the comparison is based on a particularly limited scenario with very specified conditions, it is important to take into account that the result is valid only against the scenario and requirements from which the systems are compared.

De nombreuses études concluent à la supériorité des démocraties dans la guerre. A travers notre analyse des relations unissant aujourd’hui les piliers de la trinité clausewitzienne classique – pouvoir politique, peuple et armée – notre recherche s’attache à mettre en évidence l’importance, à cet égard, de la définition du « sens de l’action ». Complexe à conceptualiser, cet objet naît de l’interaction des trois piliers de la trinité qui contribuent à le construire. Cette dynamique prend son origine dans le sens conféré, par le discours politique,à la décision de recourir à la force. Ce sens politique repose sur les intérêts nationaux tels qu’appréhendés par les décideurs, mais également, du fait de la contrainte démocratique, sur les préférences de l’opinion publique telles que perçues par le politique. Le soutien public apparaît essentiel pour alimenter la volonté politique dans le conflit, mais influence aussi le moral des militaires déployés en opérations. Notre étude s’attache donc, en second lieu, à analyser les composantes du sens conféré par les militaires à la mission qu’ils exécutent, afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure un sens politique insuffisamment clair peut influencer le soutien public et, in fine, une éventuelle perte de sens chez les soldats. Cette analyse multiscalaire cherche en définitive à répondre à la question de savoir pourquoi l’on se bat, en approfondissant deux cas d’étude : la participation de l’Armée de terre française à la FIAS, en Afghanistan, et à la FINUL renforcée, au Liban. Elle peut s’inscrire, plus largement, dans le courant d’analyse cherchant à déterminer les facteurs d’efficacité dans la guerre, en esquissant l’idée que les démocraties peuvent, du fait des contraintes qui leur sont propres, présenter une faiblesse à cet égard. / Many studies have determined that democracies perform better in war. Through our analysis of the relationship that links the pillars of today’s clasewitzian trinity – political leaders, people and soldiers – our study seeks to highlight the importance, to this regard, of defining the « meaning of the action ». In spite of a complex conceptualization, this object can be apprehended by analyzing the interactions of the three pillars, within the frame of a military intervention abroad. This interactional dynamic’s origin lies in the meaning given by the political discourse to the decision to use force. This political meaning leans on national interests (as perceived by policymakers), but also on public preferences (as perceived by policymakers), due to democratic constraint. Public support appears essential to underpin the political will during a conflict, but it also affects soldiers’ morale in the field. Secondly, our study thus seeks to analyse the components of the meaning given by soldiers to their mission,in order to determine to what extent an uncleared or blurred political meaning might affect public support and ultimately provoke a loss of meaning among the military. This multiscale approach aims to answer to the ultimate question of knowing why are we fighting, by deepening two case studies : the French Army contribution to ISAF (in Afghanistan) and UNIFIL II (in Lebanon). It can more broadly come within the framework of previous researchs studying strategic and battlefield effectiveness, by underlying that democracies might have a weakness in this regard.