This thesis analyses the factors that determine the provision of stability in peacekeeping operations and the peacekeeping operations of the African Union (AU). It makes theoretical and empirical contributions, and supports the claim that the AU has been effective in peacekeeping. Theoretically, this study offers a comprehensive list of factors drawn from extant peace literature which influence peace operations meeting the basic objective of protecting lives and keeping areas stable. Beyond the majorly discussed factors of contingent size, funding, international collaboration, local participation, mandate and peacekeeper training, this study also examines issues of domestic political elite, field leadership, force integrity, impartiality, international political will, lead state, local women participation, size and resources of territory and timing. In bringing these factors together, this study expands the peacekeeping debate on what matters for stability in conflict areas. Empirically, using the peace support operations (PSO) of the AU, this study identifies those factors most and least significant for the provision of stability in conflict areas and ranks them based on their impact. Contrary to extant peace literature where mandate, funding, international collaboration, local initiative and size of the contingent are at the heart of creating stability in conflict areas, this study advocates the indispensability of domestic elite cooperation, local initiative and international political will. These were the only factors consistent in all successful AU PSO’s. Conversely, where any of these three factors were lacking, the AU missions failed. This study therefore argues that these three factors are central to the provision of stability in peace operations in the short term. The short term method of evaluation which revolves around the cessation of violence and provision of security is adopted as the standard for peacekeeping’s effectiveness. This is because the AU often leaves peacebuilding which is evaluated over the long term to the United Nations (UN). So, having achieved stability in four of its six peace operations, this study concludes that the AU has been fairly effective as Africa’s chief peacekeeper. Other findings exhumed by this study include the necessity of force integrity to large contingents, and the need for a lead state if missions are to succeed in complex theatres demanding prolonged operations.

Depuis son accession à l’indépendance en 1960, la République Centrafricaine (RCA) oscille entre périodes troubles et moments de stabilité relative, notamment sous les régimes militaires de Jean-Bedel Bokassa et d’André Kolingba. L’instabilité politique quasi-chronique de ce pays depuis la fin des années 1980 a entrainé des réponses internationales successives, sous forme de missions de paix débutées en 1997 et visant, in fine, à la reconstruction/construction étatique comme solution à la crise du politique centrafricaine. L’éclatement, en fin 2012, d’un conflit armé mené par la rébellion de la Seleka souligne cependant la faiblesse de cette entreprise internationale, qui fait fi des dynamiques politiques et sociales internes des sociétés concernées. Cette reprise violente des hostilités en RCA remet également au goût du jour la question de la rigidité du concept d’État et de sa pertinence universelle, limites des politiques internationales de « statebuiding ». La multitude d’acteurs, locaux et internationaux, qui opèrent sur le terrain centrafricain témoigne de la complexité de ce conflit et rend difficile la possibilité d’une solution durable. Le rôle premier de la Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) dans le « statebuilding » en RCA entre 2012 et 2016 est l’incarnation d’une lutte d’influence que cet acteur régional - en l’occurrence ses États membres - a remporté. La « victoire » de la CEEAC a été acquise au détriment d’une solution objective et viable à la question centrafricaine, « au profit » d’États tels que le Tchad et la France, et d’individus tels que Idriss Deby et Denis Sassou N’guesso. Ce succès de la « diplomatie de machination » est illustratif des logiques et lutte de pouvoir et de la convergence des régimes politiques dans la sous-région, ainsi que de la relation très paradoxale que la France entretient avec ses anciennes colonies. / Since its independence in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has oscillated between turmoil and moments of relative stability, notably under the military regimes of Jean-Bedel Bokassa and André Kolingba. The country’s quasi chronic political instability since the end of the 1980s, has led to successive international responses in the form of peace missions starting in 1997 and ultimately aimed at statebuilding as a solution to the CAR’s crisis of the political. The outbreak of an armed conflict at the end of 2012 led by the Seleka rebellion, however, underlines the weakness of this international enterprise, which ignores the internal political and social dynamics of ‘recipient’ societies. This violent resumption of hostilities in the CAR also brings to the fore the question of the rigidity of the concept of the state and its universal relevance, as limits of international statebuilding policies. The multitude of local and international actors operating in the CAR is indicative of the complexity of this conflict and renders the possibility of a lasting solution difficult. The primary role of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the statebuilding in CAR between 2012 and 2016 is a manifestation of the struggle for influence that this regional actor - in this case its member states - won. The ‘victory’ of ECCAS was gained at the expense of an objective and viable solution to the Central African question, ‘for the benefit’ of states such as Chad and France, and individuals such as Idriss Deby and Denis Sassou Nguesso. The success of this ‘diplomacy of conspiracy’ is illustrative of power dynamics and power struggle and the convergence of political regimes in the subregion, as well as the very paradoxical relationship that France has with its former colonies.

Concept des Relations Internationales justifiant l'action extérieure des États, l'intérêt national est une notion toujours omniprésente dans les discours des gouvernants, mais dont la nature et la finalité s'avèrent à la fois subtiles et diversifiées. L'avènement du Multilatéralisme et son objectif de la sécurité internationale, en constitue une parfaite mise à l'épreuve. En effet, malgré l'émergence des structures légitimes, l'État, par un discours et une implication opérationnelle dans ses actions extérieures, s'affirme en tant qu'acteur de la sécurité internationale. Cet investissement, loin du discours sur des objectifs relevant du symbolique, participe dans la réalité, à une stratégie minutieusement orchestrée au nom de l'intérêt national. Sur le continent africain, on assiste ainsi à une émergence de politiques étrangères et d'actions diplomatiques étatiques apparemment vouées à la sécurité internationale mais relevant de l'intérêt national. La présente analyse, par une approche constructiviste, entend ainsi démontrer que la pratique des médiations entreprise par le Burkina Faso dans la sous-région de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, loin des discours sur la sécurité de la zone véhiculés, est une illustration de cette tendance. / As concept of International Relations justifying foreign action of States, the national interest is a notion always present in the governement leaders speeches about foreign affairs. But its meaning and its purpose are subtle and diversified as the introduction of Multilateralism and its objective of international security show. Despite the emergence of legitimate structures, the State gets involved for international security in foreign actions through discourse and implication. This implication, far from a discourse of symbolic objectives, takes part in an accurately orchestrated strategy in the name of national interest. Thus, on the African continent, we attend the emergence of foreign policies and national diplomatic actions dedicated to international security. This analysis demonstrates by the constructivist approach that the practices of mediation by Burkina Faso in West Africa participates in this trend - in contrast to the disseminated discourse of security in this subregion.