The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s led to a multilateral international system no longer divided by contending forces of capitalism and communism. In the context of South Africa, the end of the Cold War occurred at a juncture where the apartheid government was being challenged by pro-democracy forces that have fought against it for decades. The developments in the international system and in the country led to South Africa adopting universal liberal values not only in its constitution, but also in its international relations. Foreign policy documents and statements by the ministry of Foreign Affairs also reflected the country's aspiration of becoming a mediator, a facilitator for democracy and a peacemaker especially in the context of Africa. International expectation mounted as South Africa was perceived as possessing the capacity to act in a manner that advances democratic values and which gives voice to the weak nations of the world. However, the aura of a post-apartheid South Africa that would act not only in its interest, but also in the interest of the world community never fully materialised. South Africa failed to act in a manner consistent with its stated commitment to democratic values when it recognised Peoples Republic of China, an undemocratic and repressive government. It also marched into Lesotho in 1998, resulting in the destabilisation of this tiny Southern African country. These events led to an increasing criticism of the South African government. Some argued that South Africa was still inexperienced given its recent emergence as a world player. Others blamed the inconsistency on a too broad and ambitious foreign policy that set itself for failure. This study seeks to contribute to the conceptual understanding of the debate regarding the ambiguous nature of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. It situates the conceptualisation of South Africa's foreign policy within the predominant debates in international relations between realism, political structuralism and pluralism. Firstly, it holds that the end of the Cold War and ascendancy of globalist conceptions of international relations did not lead to the inadequacy of political structuralism as an organising framework. Secondly, it attempts to clarify the gap between South Africa's foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour by employing the assumptions advanced by political structuralism, Thirdly, a case study of South Africa's foreign policy towards China, Lesotho, the Great Lakes and Swaziland is carried out. Here it is demonstrated that the ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy are a function of the constraints imposed by the political and economic structure of the international system, It draws its conclusion by providing methodological recommendations to South Africa's foreign policy makers and future researchers in the field of foreign policy analysis.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, 2006. / This study examines foreign policy decision-making processes of the South African government relating to African crises in the period 1994 to 2002. It takes as its point of departure the question of who makes foreign policy, how, and to what effect. The theory relating to foreign policy and public policy gives rise to a variety of models to explain policy formation and in particular decision making in government. From the survey, three models developed by Graham Allison – the rational actor, organisational behaviour, and governmental politics models – are selected to analyse and better understand South African foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy decision making relating to crises in Nigeria (1995), Lesotho (1998) and Zimbabwe (2000-2002) are examined. The question in each case is which model best helps to enlighten our understanding of the South African foreign policy response to the perceived crisis. Case study materials were gathered by means of primary and secondary literature as well as open, semi-structured interviews with key individuals involved in relevant policy formation processes. Prior to the analysis of decision making the study constructs a view of the institutional settings of post-apartheid foreign policy making, in particular identifying actors and process, and provides a short contextualisation of the crises in Nigeria, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The study concludes that public policy making ought to be seen as a political problem solving activity in the face of complexity rather than a logical process involving wellinformed calculations by rational actors who seek to maximise economic utility, political power, or organisational effectives. It supports the view that reliance on the dominant rational actor model is inadequate to explain a foreign policy decision or event. Although of limited use it nevertheless acts to clarify issues, such as broad objectives (actions to achieve peace and stability in Africa as well as the promotion of national interests). Little x evidence emerges to suggest that foreign policy decisions can be understood as outputs of large organisations functioning according to regular patterns of behaviour (such as the Presidency or department of foreign affairs). To the contrary, in the years immediately following 1994, senior governmental decision makers were faced with inadequate, inappropriate or malfunctioning organisational settings and procedures, leading to choices being made by a small circle. The governmental politics model assists in identifying, in all three cases, the lack of an ‘action channel’ – that is, a process to allow for the aggregation of competing perceptions and preferences for making decisions and taking action. Whether institutional overhaul (integrated governance, the cluster system, policy frameworks and a National Security Council) improved matters in later years could not be fully determined. The study found that the governmental politics model was difficult to operationalise because certain data relating to decision making processes remain confidential. The study concludes with recommendations regarding the application of Allison’s models in the South African setting.

The aim of this dissertation is a comparative study of South Africa's strategic significance in two distinct periods, namely, from approximately the Second World War to 1989 and from 1990 to 1993. The research methodology followed was to firstly identify the theoretical framework to be utilised as regards the concept of strategic significance and then to highlight the relative variables to be compared. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of a new era following the end of the Cold War, which resulted in changes in the external environment and to the concept of strategic significance. In this study, this concept is based on three criteria, namely, a state's national capability; ego perceptions of strategic significance, based in part on the national capability noted above; and alter perceptions or perceptions of the external environment regarding a particular state's strategic significance. The study presents evidence of South Africa's relatively strong national capability in both periods under discussion, especially when compared to the rest of the African continent. The RSA's strategic significance was particularly strong during the pre-1990 period, primarily as a result of the Cold War conflict and the resultant superpower battle for the extension of influence. South Africa, with a wealth of vital strategic minerals, anti¬communist sentiment, relatively strong economy, and having possession of the Cape Sea Route, was thus awarded a certain degree of international importance. This was indicated by continuing international contacts and trade relations during a period when the RSA' s domestic apartheid policies were under constant international criticism. The end of the Cold War, however, resulted in a diminishing of strategic significance as regards the above¬mentioned aspects; while the value of South Africa's role on the African continent in general and in the Southern African region in particular, began to take precedence over previous concerns of communist expansionism in the Third World. This role was especially relevant in light of continuing marginalisation of Third World countries. As a result, both the developed North and the underdeveloped South began to perceive South Africa as a potential "saviour" and "engine of development" for the African continent. South Africa's role as an international economic partner and supplier of strategic minerals, however, continued. A comparative analysis is presented at the end of the study to assess similarities and differences in South Africa's strategic significance during the two periods, and it is concluded that the RSA was indeed considered to hold a certain degree of strategic importance throughout both periods under discussion, although the emphasis of such value was altered in response to changes in both the internal and external environments. / Dissertation (MA (International Politics))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Scholars and laymen alike have in the past lamented the ambiguous and confusing nature of post-apartheid South African foreign policy, specifically with relation to humanitarian crises on the African continent. Regularly the principles of promoting human rights and democracy on the continent seemingly fall to the wayside in favour of a stubborn adherence to respecting state sovereignty and African solidarity. No two cases exemplify this more than President Thabo Mbeki’s continued reliance on the policy of Quiet Diplomacy in addressing the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe and the alleged genocide in Darfur, Sudan, both of which occurred in the early years of the 21st century. Some International Relations scholars have previously suggested the influence of Mbeki’s anti-Western-imperialist convictions as a constructivist explanation to this foreign policy ambiguity, but all of them attempt to address the ambiguity only within the specific contexts of Sudan and Zimbabwe, none attempting to create an overarching exploration of both cases. This thesis attempts to use constructivist methodologies to a) rationally establish, through a logical and structured approach, anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a common variable that was able to influence the foreign policy decision in both Zimbabwe and Sudan, and b) explain how anti-Western-Imperialism was able to exert such an influence. Firstly, a Rule Based Language Orientated Constructivist (RBLOC) approach is employed to create two language games, one for each case (Sudan and Zimbabwe), utilising primary and secondary sources to recreate verbal and non-verbal speech acts for the actors involved. Through the dialogical analysis of these language games, the common variable of ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ is identified as essential for the rational conclusion of each language game. Secondly, Securitisation Theory, extrapolated to a regional, interstate level, is used to explain how anti-Western-imperialist convictions on the part of President Mbeki were able to influence the policy responses in the respective case studies. Ultimately it is the aim of this thesis to prove that in both cases the presence of President Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition, a shared referent object (anti-Western Imperialism), and the securitisation of Western Imperialism can be confirmed and that the presence of these variables can be used to rationally explain Mbeki’s use of Quiet Diplomacy in those instances. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die skynbaar dubbelsinnige en verwarrende aard van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, veral ten opsigte van humanitêre krisisse op die Afrika-vasteland, is deurgaans deur kundiges en leke betreur. Beginsels soos die bevordering van menseregte en demokrasie op die vasteland is op gereelde grondslag verbeur ten gunste van ’n weerbarstige aanhang van staatsoewereniteit en Afrika-solidariteit. Twee gevalle wat hierdie verskynsel uitstekend illustreer is Pres. Thabo Mbeki se beleid van stille diplomasie ten opsigte van die politieke en ekonomiese krisisse in Zimbabwe en die beweerde volksmoorde in Soedan se Darfur-streek, albei gebeure van die vroeë 21ste Eeu. Menige Konstruktiwiste het gepoog om die dubbelsinnighede van hierdie twee gevalle aan die hand van Mbeki se toentertydse anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oortuigings te verklaar, maar niemand het nog gepoog om ’n omvattende ontleding van albei gevalle te doen nie. In hierdie tesis word gepoog om twee duidelik onderskeibare Konstruktiwistiese metodologieë in te span om a) deur ’n logiese en gestruktureerde benadering te bevestig dat die anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oorwegings ’n gemene veranderlike was wat ’n invloed kon hê op die uitkomste in Zimbabwe sowel as in die Soedan, en b) om te verklaar hoe hierdie anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oorwegings so ’n invloed kon uitoefen. Eerstens, word ’n Reël-Gebaseerde, Taal Georiënteerde Konstruktiwistiese benadering aangewend om twee spraakspeletjies, een vir elk van die gevallestudies, te skep. Primêre en sekondêre bronne word gebruik om die spraakhandeling van die betrokke rolspelers in albei gevalle te herkonstrueer. Deur die dialogiese aard van hierdie spraakspeletjies te ontleed, word die gemene veranderlike van die anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oorwegings uitgewys as onontbeerlik vir die rasionele volvoering van elke spraakspel. Tweedens, beveiligingsteorie,ge-ekstrapoleer tot interstaatsvlak in streeksverband, word toegepas om te verklaar hoe Mbeki se anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oortuigings ’n invloed gehad het op beleidmaking. Die tesis voer aan dat Pres. Mbeki se keuse tot stille diplomasie in albei gevalle rasioneel verklaar kan word aan die hand van Mbeki se psigo-kulterele ingesteldheid, ’n gemene verwysingsvoorwerp (anti-Westerse-imperialisme), en die sekuritisasie van Westerse-imperialisme deur die betrokke rolspelers.

No description available.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1994.

M.A. / Diplomacy is the most widely used instrument of foreign policy. The changing international environment, brought about by the end of the Cold War and the increasingly popular doctrine of humanitarian intervention, has altered the nature of diplomacy. “Quiet diplomacy” has progressively become the bon mot of international relations. However, quiet diplomacy is a loose term that is bandied about in reference to many kinds of “soft” diplomatic approaches. This study is an attempt to provide some clarity on the conceptualisation of quiet diplomacy, through the comparative analysis of its use by two successive South African Presidents - Mandela and Mbeki - in two African crises. The study proposes a set of indicators of quiet diplomacy, namely: personal or direct diplomacy between heads of state or government or senior officials; little (or no) media involvement; the appearance of limited action or even inaction; calm and tactful but persistent negotiation or dialogue in a non-threatening atmosphere; constructive engagement with the target country in an effort to solve the problems as quietly as possible; and finally, diplomacy often carried out in the context of bilateral or multilateral efforts. These indicators are operationalised during the course of the study by applying them to Mandela’s use of these tactics in the Nigerian crisis in 1995 and then Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwean government in 2000-2004. The new South Africa was instantly placed under enormous pressure to assume responsibility, both economically and politically, for the revitalisation of the African continent. In addition Mandela was regarded as a supreme symbol of peace and reconciliation and the international community looked to him to resolve Nigeria’s woes. Mbeki’s soft approach to Mugabe has been the target of international speculation and criticism, especially in light of Mbeki’s stated commitment to the African Renaissance and good governance in Africa. The successes and failures of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy in these two situations are discussed. Notable findings are Mandela’s shift from quiet to coercive diplomacy during the Nigerian crisis and the negative consequences of that decision. The implications of this undertaking are considerable because it was South Africa’s use of coercion and its subsequent failure in Nigeria that prompted Mbeki’s government to pursue only quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. / Mr. P.P. Fourie Prof. D.J. Geldenhuys

South Africa plays a very important role on the African continent, both politically and economically. She is often the main protagonist behind various peace-making efforts both regionally and continentally, and now she plays an even more important part in the African Union. In July 2012 South African candidate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was elected as chairperson of the African Union Commission, in an election which highlighted a need to investigate the perception of South Africa in the African Union. South African foreign policy has gone through various stages, from being internationally isolated during the apartheid era to being on the forefront continentally during the successive post-apartheid presidents. The electoral discourse in 2012 however, highlighted some divergent opinions on South African foreign policy which this study investigates. What was identified during the election campaign was a possible negative perception of South African foreign policy, both politically and in terms of the private sector. The study sought to investigate how South Africa is perceived on the African continent, and in order to reach a conclusion it performed a policy analysis as well as a qualitative discourse analysis of the statements given during the election. The policy analysis contextualises and explains South African foreign policy agendas and choices, and the discourse analysis sought to reveal any negative perceptions of South African foreign policy. The findings of the study are that there is a general negative perception of South Africa and her foreign policy in Africa, due to several reasons, which will be discussed in the following study. The negative perceptions stem from the Eastern region, the Western region, as well as from South Africa itself, through political analysts and experts.

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Security (war or peace), economy, technological progress, cultural development and issues of identity are some of the aspects that characterise the nature of relations between countries. Traditionally, the objectives of a country’s foreign policy concern security and welfare. But, the search for national prestige, for autonomy or for a change in the world’s power relationships or ideological re-orientation can all inform the foreign policies of many states.1 South Africa is no exception; during the stewardship of Prime Minister BJ Vorster, his objective was the launching of a policy of détente. As a consequence, South Africa was subjected to continuous external criticism. At the insistence of the discrimination apartheid policy, South Africa was excluded from a wide range of intergovernmental agencies and conferences, was isolated by the international community and became the object of an economic boycott by the vast majority of African states. It therefore was clear that the increasing hostility towards South Africa’s domestic policy would isolate the country further. The world’s reaction to South African’s domestic policy demonstrated that foreign opinion had an influence on domestic policy, and that it imposed constraints on the conduct of foreign policy. To extricate itself from this situation, South Africa initiated the policy of rapprochement called détente policy during Vorster’s time in office. Vorster had no illusions about the need for safety in South Africa, thus his main ideal as Prime Minister was to establish normal and friendly relations with African states. Vorster hoped to improve South African’s international position by improving relations with Black Africa through the policy of détente. It is with regard to this policy, undertaken during the period of the African continent’s rejection of South Africa’s race discrimination policies and this country’s exclusion from the community of African states, that the present study investigates and analyses South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon from 1969 to 1994, viewed from South African and French source material. In other words, this study analyses the interaction that took place in the past with regard to the South African government’s relations with the governments of Gabon and the Ivory Coast, which directed human activities in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. This investigation and analysis were undertaken in order to understand why the Ivory Coast and Gabon became involved with South Africa when the African community and even the international community had called for the isolation of this country due to its apartheid policy, and how these relations would improve and be strengthened in the future.

The 1960's and the 1970's marked a great Pan-African movement in Africa, that saw the liberation of most African states. This Pan-African movement, was spearheaded by a quest to unite Africa, and to abate foreign occupation. Amidst the spirit of unity, lay a promise of an organization that would embody the hopes and aspirations of a continent undergoing a re-birth; a progression towards self-determination, economic development and integration, and the maintenance of peace. Therefore, the inception ofthe Organization of African Unity (OAD) was not only a symbol of a unifying force for Africans, but a diplomatic platform that would promote African needs on the international arena. In effect the OAU, at its inception, was for specific ideals that would guarantee liberation and unity of African states. The outcome of these ideals would be greater regional economic integration and the achievement of peace and stability. These ideals mirrored the structural definition of regional organization, with the inclusion of a Commission for Mediation Arbitration and Conciliation under the OAU Charter, to handle disputes among member states. However, the mere fact that this commission lacked the political wherewithal to resolve conflicts, by its sheer lack of a standing peacekeeping force, contributed to the inefficiency of the organization to play an effective role in conflict management. This study attempts to examine the role ofthe OAU in settling disputes. The study sought to accomplish this, in the following manner. Firstly, an investigation into the nature of conflict and why it persists in Africa was conducted. Further, an examination ofthe tools that practitioners utilize not only to study conflict, but to prevent, manage and resolve it, was done. During the investigation it was found that, although the OAU's greatest successes have come from preventive diplomacy, its structural foundations limit the capabilities of the organization to become more relevant. The Charter of the OAU alludes vaguely to the settlement of disputes, but without an executive political decision-making body able to deploy peacekeepers, its principles are largely meaningless. Amidst the growing concerns, the OAU as a matter of survival, developed initiatives it hopes will make it more effective and relevant. The focus ofthe study was the evolving role ofthe OAU, from its inception to its new role as an instrument of conflict resolution. Most of the scholarly work conducted on the OAU, is concerned with depicting a terminal organization, with little or no hope of surviving. Little emphasis is placed on prescribing remedies on how to improve and restructure the organization. The findings included, inter alia, that the organization is faced with enormous challenges, as the sources of conflict are varied and complex. Africa is now the landscape of collapsed states, economic stagnation, environmental degradation, disease and chronic conflicts. The OAU shoulders much ofthe responsibility for not sanctioning governments that contribute to the decay and suffering of the African peoples. Most ofthe criticism of the OAU, stem from the inability of the organization to play an effective role in resolving conflicts in Africa. Most of Africa's conflicts stem from a lack of political legitimacy, lack of democratic institutions, uneven distribution of resources, ethnic tensions and economic stagnation. Until such problems are addressed, Africa will continue to host the world's deadliest conflicts.