O objetivo da presente pesquisa é examinar qual a associação entre quatro diferentes tipos de conflitos de agência previamente estudados pela literatura de governança: entrincheiramento do gestor, consumo de perquisites, decisões de liquidez e tomada de risco. Para tanto, inicialmente detalharam-se a origem e as diferenças entre esses quatro conflitos estudados. A seguir, fez-se a revisão de diferentes mecanismos de governança corporativa potencialmente capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Também se identificaram, ao nível do país, índices de proteção à riqueza e aos direitos dos investidores acionistas e credores que a literatura anterior comumente sugere serem capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Ao todo, foram analisadas 7.994 firmas de 35 países entre os anos 2010 e 2013 (aproximadamente, 22.000 observações-ano). Ao longo do trabalho, cinco diferentes hipóteses de pesquisa foram discutidas e testadas. Resumidamente, encontraram-se evidências consistentes de que gestores entrincheirados mantêm maiores níveis de liquidez e que maiores níveis de liquidez estão associados com maior consumo de perquisites. Há evidências também de que o entrincheiramento do gestor, via alta concentração de propriedade acionária e via participação no conselho de administração, altera suas preferências de consumo de perquisites e de risco. Em geral, essa tese sugere que os conflitos de agência estão associados e que, especialmente, o entrincheiramento do gestor altera suas preferências em relação aos três outros conflitos. / The purpose of this research is to investigate what is the association between four agency con icts that are studied by previous corporate governance literature: managerial entrenchment, perquisites consumption, cash holdings and risk-taking. Initially, I detail the source and di erences between these agency con icts. Then, I discuss different types of governance mechanisms that are potential candidates to mitigate these con icts. Furthermore, I collect and discuss country-level investor protection indices that relate to the protection of shareholders' and the creditors' rights, and that help to mitigate these con icts. The nal sample contains 7.994 rms from 35 countries analyzed from 2010 until 2013 (almost 22.000 year-observations). I discuss and empirically test ve hypothesis. In a nutshell, there is consistent evidence that entrenched managers choose higher levels of cash holdings, and that cash holdings are positively associated with perquisites consumption. There is also evidence that managerial entrenchment, either via high managerial ownership concentration or via CEO duality, changes managers' preferences over the consumption of perquisites and risk-taking. In general, this thesis suggests that di erent agency con icts are associated and that entrenchment a ects managerial preferences over the three remaining conflicts.

This study examines the role of three institutional factors (regulative; normative and cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions) in addressing agency problems of Australia. In the wake of the series of corporate collapses of current decade, director and executive remuneration was identified as one of the major causes behind these scandals. The Australian government and other related organisations made both regulative and non-regulative institutional reforms to manage this agency conflict. These reforms, encapsulated in Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act 2004 demanded an increased level of disclosure of director and executive remuneration particularly, the disclosure of performance based salary. Subsequently, these amendments provided an opportunity through a non-binding vote to shareholders to participate in executive remuneration decisions. This study proposes a new synthesis of institutional and agency theories by examining how institutional interventions addresses agency conflicts in the Australian context. A conceptual model is developed to measure both the conjoined and distinctive institutional impact on the disclosure level of director and executive remuneration in Australia. To measure and quantify the aforementioned impact a mixed method research strategy was used. First, content analysis as an investigative tool was used to develop a disclosure index which determined the level of disclosure of director and executive remuneration from top 100 Australian listed entities. Second, a conceptual model, positing the relationships between independent and dependent variables was verified through an econometric analysis of collected data, performed through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 15. The findings of this research reveal that there exists a significant difference between the levels of disclosure in the pre and post stages of the introduction of the CLERP Act 2004. This result highlights the significance of regulatory intervention in addressing agency conflicts. The study also indicates that regulative and normative pillars have a higher impact than the culture-cognitive pillar on disclosure practices of Australian firms. In light of these results, the new blend between agency and institutional theories highlight the role of different institutions, particularly the government, in stabilising the organisational practices for good governance and creating national competitive advantages.

This study examines the role of three institutional factors (regulative; normative and cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions) in addressing agency problems of Australia. In the wake of the series of corporate collapses of current decade, director and executive remuneration was identified as one of the major causes behind these scandals. The Australian government and other related organisations made both regulative and non-regulative institutional reforms to manage this agency conflict. These reforms, encapsulated in Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act 2004 demanded an increased level of disclosure of director and executive remuneration particularly, the disclosure of performance based salary. Subsequently, these amendments provided an opportunity through a non-binding vote to shareholders to participate in executive remuneration decisions. This study proposes a new synthesis of institutional and agency theories by examining how institutional interventions addresses agency conflicts in the Australian context. A conceptual model is developed to measure both the conjoined and distinctive institutional impact on the disclosure level of director and executive remuneration in Australia. To measure and quantify the aforementioned impact a mixed method research strategy was used. First, content analysis as an investigative tool was used to develop a disclosure index which determined the level of disclosure of director and executive remuneration from top 100 Australian listed entities. Second, a conceptual model, positing the relationships between independent and dependent variables was verified through an econometric analysis of collected data, performed through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 15. The findings of this research reveal that there exists a significant difference between the levels of disclosure in the pre and post stages of the introduction of the CLERP Act 2004. This result highlights the significance of regulatory intervention in addressing agency conflicts. The study also indicates that regulative and normative pillars have a higher impact than the culture-cognitive pillar on disclosure practices of Australian firms. In light of these results, the new blend between agency and institutional theories highlight the role of different institutions, particularly the government, in stabilising the organisational practices for good governance and creating national competitive advantages.

O objetivo da presente pesquisa é examinar qual a associação entre quatro diferentes tipos de conflitos de agência previamente estudados pela literatura de governança: entrincheiramento do gestor, consumo de perquisites, decisões de liquidez e tomada de risco. Para tanto, inicialmente detalharam-se a origem e as diferenças entre esses quatro conflitos estudados. A seguir, fez-se a revisão de diferentes mecanismos de governança corporativa potencialmente capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Também se identificaram, ao nível do país, índices de proteção à riqueza e aos direitos dos investidores acionistas e credores que a literatura anterior comumente sugere serem capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Ao todo, foram analisadas 7.994 firmas de 35 países entre os anos 2010 e 2013 (aproximadamente, 22.000 observações-ano). Ao longo do trabalho, cinco diferentes hipóteses de pesquisa foram discutidas e testadas. Resumidamente, encontraram-se evidências consistentes de que gestores entrincheirados mantêm maiores níveis de liquidez e que maiores níveis de liquidez estão associados com maior consumo de perquisites. Há evidências também de que o entrincheiramento do gestor, via alta concentração de propriedade acionária e via participação no conselho de administração, altera suas preferências de consumo de perquisites e de risco. Em geral, essa tese sugere que os conflitos de agência estão associados e que, especialmente, o entrincheiramento do gestor altera suas preferências em relação aos três outros conflitos. / The purpose of this research is to investigate what is the association between four agency con icts that are studied by previous corporate governance literature: managerial entrenchment, perquisites consumption, cash holdings and risk-taking. Initially, I detail the source and di erences between these agency con icts. Then, I discuss different types of governance mechanisms that are potential candidates to mitigate these con icts. Furthermore, I collect and discuss country-level investor protection indices that relate to the protection of shareholders' and the creditors' rights, and that help to mitigate these con icts. The nal sample contains 7.994 rms from 35 countries analyzed from 2010 until 2013 (almost 22.000 year-observations). I discuss and empirically test ve hypothesis. In a nutshell, there is consistent evidence that entrenched managers choose higher levels of cash holdings, and that cash holdings are positively associated with perquisites consumption. There is also evidence that managerial entrenchment, either via high managerial ownership concentration or via CEO duality, changes managers' preferences over the consumption of perquisites and risk-taking. In general, this thesis suggests that di erent agency con icts are associated and that entrenchment a ects managerial preferences over the three remaining conflicts.

O objetivo da presente pesquisa é examinar qual a associação entre quatro diferentes tipos de conflitos de agência previamente estudados pela literatura de governança: entrincheiramento do gestor, consumo de perquisites, decisões de liquidez e tomada de risco. Para tanto, inicialmente detalharam-se a origem e as diferenças entre esses quatro conflitos estudados. A seguir, fez-se a revisão de diferentes mecanismos de governança corporativa potencialmente capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Também se identificaram, ao nível do país, índices de proteção à riqueza e aos direitos dos investidores acionistas e credores que a literatura anterior comumente sugere serem capazes de mitigar esses conflitos. Ao todo, foram analisadas 7.994 firmas de 35 países entre os anos 2010 e 2013 (aproximadamente, 22.000 observações-ano). Ao longo do trabalho, cinco diferentes hipóteses de pesquisa foram discutidas e testadas. Resumidamente, encontraram-se evidências consistentes de que gestores entrincheirados mantêm maiores níveis de liquidez e que maiores níveis de liquidez estão associados com maior consumo de perquisites. Há evidências também de que o entrincheiramento do gestor, via alta concentração de propriedade acionária e via participação no conselho de administração, altera suas preferências de consumo de perquisites e de risco. Em geral, essa tese sugere que os conflitos de agência estão associados e que, especialmente, o entrincheiramento do gestor altera suas preferências em relação aos três outros conflitos. / The purpose of this research is to investigate what is the association between four agency con icts that are studied by previous corporate governance literature: managerial entrenchment, perquisites consumption, cash holdings and risk-taking. Initially, I detail the source and di erences between these agency con icts. Then, I discuss different types of governance mechanisms that are potential candidates to mitigate these con icts. Furthermore, I collect and discuss country-level investor protection indices that relate to the protection of shareholders' and the creditors' rights, and that help to mitigate these con icts. The nal sample contains 7.994 rms from 35 countries analyzed from 2010 until 2013 (almost 22.000 year-observations). I discuss and empirically test ve hypothesis. In a nutshell, there is consistent evidence that entrenched managers choose higher levels of cash holdings, and that cash holdings are positively associated with perquisites consumption. There is also evidence that managerial entrenchment, either via high managerial ownership concentration or via CEO duality, changes managers' preferences over the consumption of perquisites and risk-taking. In general, this thesis suggests that di erent agency con icts are associated and that entrenchment a ects managerial preferences over the three remaining conflicts.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / O mercado de capitais brasileiro se caracteriza pela alta concentração de poder nas mãos de poucos acionistas controladores. No Brasil, a existência de ações preferenciais sem direito a voto enseja o surgimento de conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários, agravado pelo fato de que o controle pode ser exercido com uma participação relativamente pequena sobre o total de ações emitidas pelas companhias. A concentração de propriedade permitiria a possibilidade de expropriação dos direitos dos minoritários. Diversos estudos empíricos vêm sendo realizados ao longo dos últimos anos com o objetivo de avaliar a influência da estrutura de propriedade das ações sobre o valor de mercado das companhias. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho pretende trazer novas contribuições, com ênfase na participação de ações preferenciais na estrutura de propriedade. Neste trabalho, usando uma amostra de empresas de capital aberto negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA, a partir de teste de diferença de médias, rejeita-se a hipótese de igualdade de valor entre empresas que só possuem ações ON em sua estrutura de propriedade, em relação às que possuem ambos os tipos, ON e PN. Em continuidade, usando modelos de regressão linear, encontra-se relação negativa estatisticamente significativa entre valor de mercado das empresas e variável utilizada para caracterizar a estrutura de propriedade, especificamente, a diferença entre o percentual de participação dos acionistas não controladores no total de ações PN e o percentual de participação dos acionistas controladores no total de ações PN. / The capital market is characterized by high concentration of power in the hands of few controlling shareholders. In Brazil, the existence of preferred shares without voting rights has motivate the emergence of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, compounded by the fact that the control can be exercised with a relatively small share of the total shares issued by companies. The concentration of ownership would allow the possibility of expropriation of minority rights. Several empirical studies have been conducted over the past year in order to evaluate the influence of the structure of ownership of shares on the market value of companies. In this context, this thesis intends to bring new contributions, with emphasis on the participation of preferred shares in the ownership structure. In this work, using a sample of public companies traded at BM&FBOVESPA, from the test mean difference, rejects the hypothesis of equal value among companies that have only voting shares in its ownership structure in relation to that have both types, and preferred. Continuing, using linear regression models, is statistically significant negative relationship between market value of companies and variable used to characterize the ownership structure, specifically the difference between the percentage of participation of minority shareholders in total PN and percentage of ownership of the controlling shareholders of preferred shares in total.

This thesis comprises of three chapters. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Managerial Risk Shifting.' The second essay is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Product Market Competition' and is joint work with Professor Matthew T. Billett and MiaoMiao Yu. The third essay is sole-authored and is titled `Merger Waves, Pseudo Market Timing, and Post-Merger Performance.' Chapter one examines agency conflicts around violations of bank loan covenants. Recent evidence shows that corporate policies change significantly following financial covenant violations. These changes are attributed to increased creditor influence over borrowing firms in ways that benefit both shareholders and debtholders. In this essay, I investigate whether shareholders engage in activities counter to creditors' interests following violations. I find that the expected negative relation between volatility and investment reverses for firms once they violate a covenant, consistent with risk-shifting behavior. This behavior is more pronounced in firms with high CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility and firms with high CEO equity ownership. Moreover, I document a significant increase in firm risk in the year following the violation. Overall, these findings suggest that even in the presence of increased creditor control risk shifting still occurs. The prior conclusions that shareholder-debtholder incentives are congruent at violations do not appear to be the case. Chapter two documents that debt covenants have a profound impact on firms' product market behavior. By examining financial covenant violations from 1996 to 2007, we show that once firms violate a covenant, they experience a substantial decrease in their market share. We also show that firms exhibit poor long-term abnormal returns following covenant violations. In contrast, their rivals grow market share and exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns after their peer firm violates a covenant. Overall, these findings suggest that creditor influence over firms have dramatic effects on product market outcomes and rival firm behavior. Chapter three questions whether managers time the market when they make merger decisions. Merger and acquisition waves seem to correspond with market tides, cresting with bull markets. A contentious debate exists over whether this trend indicates managerial market timing ability. Pseudo market timing, introduced by Schultz (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483-517), provides an alternative hypothesis to explain abnormal performance following events even when managers cannot time the market. I find that acquiring firms which use stocks as the method of payment exhibit negative long-run abnormal returns in event-time, but not in calendar time. Simulations reveal that even when ex ante expected abnormal returns are zero (i.e. managers have no market timing ability), median ex post performance for acquirers is significantly negative when event-time is used. These findings support pseudo market timing as an explanation for acquiring firm underperformance in the context of stock mergers.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / O mercado de capitais brasileiro se caracteriza pela alta concentração de poder nas mãos de poucos acionistas controladores. No Brasil, a existência de ações preferenciais sem direito a voto enseja o surgimento de conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários, agravado pelo fato de que o controle pode ser exercido com uma participação relativamente pequena sobre o total de ações emitidas pelas companhias. A concentração de propriedade permitiria a possibilidade de expropriação dos direitos dos minoritários. Diversos estudos empíricos vêm sendo realizados ao longo dos últimos anos com o objetivo de avaliar a influência da estrutura de propriedade das ações sobre o valor de mercado das companhias. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho pretende trazer novas contribuições, com ênfase na participação de ações preferenciais na estrutura de propriedade. Neste trabalho, usando uma amostra de empresas de capital aberto negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA, a partir de teste de diferença de médias, rejeita-se a hipótese de igualdade de valor entre empresas que só possuem ações ON em sua estrutura de propriedade, em relação às que possuem ambos os tipos, ON e PN. Em continuidade, usando modelos de regressão linear, encontra-se relação negativa estatisticamente significativa entre valor de mercado das empresas e variável utilizada para caracterizar a estrutura de propriedade, especificamente, a diferença entre o percentual de participação dos acionistas não controladores no total de ações PN e o percentual de participação dos acionistas controladores no total de ações PN. / The capital market is characterized by high concentration of power in the hands of few controlling shareholders. In Brazil, the existence of preferred shares without voting rights has motivate the emergence of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, compounded by the fact that the control can be exercised with a relatively small share of the total shares issued by companies. The concentration of ownership would allow the possibility of expropriation of minority rights. Several empirical studies have been conducted over the past year in order to evaluate the influence of the structure of ownership of shares on the market value of companies. In this context, this thesis intends to bring new contributions, with emphasis on the participation of preferred shares in the ownership structure. In this work, using a sample of public companies traded at BM&FBOVESPA, from the test mean difference, rejects the hypothesis of equal value among companies that have only voting shares in its ownership structure in relation to that have both types, and preferred. Continuing, using linear regression models, is statistically significant negative relationship between market value of companies and variable used to characterize the ownership structure, specifically the difference between the percentage of participation of minority shareholders in total PN and percentage of ownership of the controlling shareholders of preferred shares in total.

This paper investigates how family ownership affects firm performance among Swedish publicly listed firms during the Covid-19 pandemic. The period of interest is the second quarter of 2020 which is argued to be the period of the largest impact on the economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. During this period, we hypothesize that firm performance is influenced by family ownership due to agency conflicts. Our findings suggest that family firms with a present founding family member in the management outperform other firms in general. However, firm performance is not affected by family ownership during the Covid-19 period. We also consider different aspects of family ownership such as the level of stake controlled by the family, and whether the family firm uses a dual-class share system. Inconsistent with our hypotheses, our results show that a moderate stake controlled by the family is not associated with higher performance, and family firms that use the dual-class share system do not suffer in performance. Overall, our findings indicate that the Covid-19 pandemic did not impact firm performance contrary to our expectations. Lastly, this paper highlights an issue of sensitivity in the results depending on the family firm definition and the chosen measure for firm performance.

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Este trabalho investigou, numa amostra de 656 observaÃÃes, correspondente a 207 companhias abertas no Brasil, a relaÃÃo entre fontes de dÃvida e conflitos de agÃncia, no perÃodo de 2009 a 2013. A emissÃo de dÃvida tende a sinalizar informaÃÃes positivas sobre a empresa, tendendo reduzir a probabilidade de conflitos de agÃncia. Gestores, portanto, captariam recursos com base na percepÃÃo do mercado e investidores, por sua vez, usariam as fontes de dÃvida na composiÃÃo de suas expectativas. Indagou-se se hà sinalizaÃÃo para os gestores das reaÃÃes de acionistas minoritÃrios em suas decisÃes de investimento, no sentido de orientar sua escolha de dÃvida. Concomitantemente, verificou-se o efeito da escolha da dÃvida em relaÃÃo à atenuaÃÃo de custos de agÃncia potenciais e, consequentemente, de reduÃÃo de tais conflitos. Foram consideradas fontes de dÃvida bancÃria privada, bancÃria governamental e de colocaÃÃo pÃblica. A percepÃÃo de conflitos de agÃncia foi verificada atravÃs do valor de mercado das firmas, da liquidez na negociaÃÃo de suas aÃÃes e do nÃvel de assimetria informacional; proxies de risco e de investimento minoritÃrio, portanto, da probabilidade de conflitos de agÃncia. A literatura propugna que os bancos teriam vantagens sobre a dÃvida de colocaÃÃo pÃblica no monitoramento das firmas; investidores pegariam carona dessas vantagens como forma de minimizar o risco de seus investimentos. A relaÃÃo entre as variÃveis representativas das fontes de dÃvida e da percepÃÃo de conflitos foi testada por meio de anÃlise de regressÃo com dados em painel. Nesta anÃlise, diferentes argumentos levam a crer que a percepÃÃo de conflitos pode influenciar as polÃticas de financiamento; isto pode ser questionado na medida em que o investidor minoritÃrio pode ter utilizado a existÃncia de determinada fonte como determinante da sua decisÃo de investimento. Uma fonte comum de problemas de endogeneidade à a provÃvel determinaÃÃo simultÃnea das variÃveis que torna enviesados e inconsistentes os estimadores. Para tanto, foi utilizada abordagem por MQ3E que leva em conta as variÃveis endÃgenas. As evidÃncias mostram que os gestores tomam suas decisÃes de financiamento com base na percepÃÃo do mercado, uma vez que o valor de mercado e a liquidez das aÃÃes foram significantes sobre suas decisÃes. Por outro lado, investidores minoritÃrios utilizam-se das fontes de dÃvida na composiÃÃo de suas expectativas em relaÃÃo à firma. No entanto, no cenÃrio brasileiro, nÃo se constata preferÃncia explÃcita por dÃvida bancÃria ou emissÃo pÃblica de dÃvida, no sentido preconizado pela literatura. O sentido das relaÃÃes evidenciadas conduz à interpretaÃÃo de que a percepÃÃo do mercado nÃo à relevante na captaÃÃo por dÃvida bancÃria governamental, enquanto apresenta sentido positivo para as fontes bancÃria privada e de colocaÃÃo pÃblica, indicando que gestores optam por ambas as fontes frente à reaÃÃo positiva do mercado. Na ocorrÃncia de reaÃÃes negativas, nÃo se justificaria utilizar fontes de dÃvidas na perspectiva de sinalizar decisÃes voltadas a garantir direitos de minoritÃrios. Os achados corroboram ainda que o ambiente brasileiro, com forte atuaÃÃo de bancos governamentais, pode ter inibido funÃÃo de sinalizaÃÃo da fonte bancÃria, bem como o desenvolvimento da emissÃo e colocaÃÃo pÃblica de tÃtulos corporativos. / This work investigated in a sample of 656 observations, corresponding to 207 public companies in Brazil, the relationship between debt and agency conflicts, from 2009 to 2013. Issuance of debt tends to signal positive information about the company, tending to reduce the probability of agency conflicts. Managers therefore borrow funds based on the perception of the market and investors, in turn, would use the debt sources in the composition of your expectations. Asked whether there are signs for the managers of minority shareholders reactions in their investment decisions, to guide your debt choice. There was the effect of the debt choice with regard to mitigating potential agency costs and hence reduce such conflicts. Sources of private bank debt, government banking and public placement were considered. The perception of agency conflicts was checked by the market value of firms, the liquidity in the trading of its shares and the level of information asymmetry, proxies of risk and minority investment and therefore of agency conflicts. The literature argues that the banks would have advantages over the debt of public placement; investors would take ride these advantages in order to minimize the risk of their investments. The relationship between the variables representing sources of debt and the perception of conflict was tested by regression analysis with panel data. In this analysis, different arguments suggest that the perception of conflict can influence the funding policies; this may be questioned to the extent that the minority investor may have used the existence of the source as decisive investment decision. A common source of endogeneity is the simultaneous determination of the variables that makes biased and inconsistent estimators. Therefore, it was used by MQ3E approach that considers the endogenous variables. Evidence shows that managers make their funding decisions based on the perception of the market, since the market value and the liquidity of the shares were significant on their decisions. On the other hand, minority investors are used for debt sources in the composition of their expectations for the firm. However, the Brazilian environment, are not found explicit preference for bank debt or public debt issuance, as advocated in the literature. The meaning of the demonstrated relationship leads to the interpretation that the market perception is not relevant in the capture by government bank debt, while presenting positive direction for private and public placement bank sources, indicating that managers opt for both front sources the positive reaction market. When the reactions are negative, there is no justification to use sources of debt in view of signaling decisions aimed at ensuring minority rights. The results corroborate although the Brazilian environment, with strong performance of government banks, may have inhibited the banking source signaling function, and the development of the issue and public placement of corporate bonds.