The problem with which this investigation is concerned is that of determining the existing and ideal perceived roles of college financial aid directors in Texas, the preparation of financial aid directors, the scope of their work, status, degree of job satisfaction, and attitudes toward selected financial aid concepts. A self-report questionnaire, which had been validated by a selected panel of financial aid directors, and for which reliability had been established by the test re-test method, provided the necessary data for the research report. Replies were received from more than seventy-five per cent of the financial aid directors in the colleges of Texas. Chapter I, Introduction, includes the subject of the study, purposes, research questions, background and significance, definition of terms, basic assumptions, instruments, and procedures for analysis of data. Chapter II is the review of related research. Chapter III gives procedures for collection and treatment of data. Chapter IV contains the report of the responses to the questionnaire, and Chapter V contains a summary of the findings, the conclusions reached, recommendations, and implications for further study.

"This study is an analysis of the services of the Travelers Aid Society of Miami. The purpose of the study was to determine what types of requests are made of the agency, the extent to which the agency fulfills these requests, and the extent to which referrals are made to other community resources. Material which points out the interaction between National Travelers Aid Association and the Travelers Aid Society of Miami has been presented as a background for the study, in order to give the reader an appreciation of the services made possible by this interaction. The functions and policies of the local agency have also been included"--Introduction. / Typescript. / "May, 1950." / "Submitted to the Graduate Council of Florida State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts under Plan II." / Advisor: Margaret B. Bailey, Professor Directing Paper. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 27).

Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.

Previous research has not specified the circumstances under which foreign aid may increase the probability of armed conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to address this gap by employing a theoretical framework in which foreign aid produces incentives for a rent-seeking scramble among elites. A set of conditions affecting the likelihood of armed conflict are identified and tested on global data in a series of statistical analyses. Paper I argues and finds that foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict in states where there are few constraints on executive power, allowing for a scramble for rents. Paper II proposes and finds a threshold effect of aid, such that the likelihood of armed conflict increases only when aid has reached a certain level. Paper III suggests and demonstrates that sudden negative changes in aid flows enhance the risk of armed conflict as well as coup attempts, as aid shortfalls accelerate distributional conflict over aid rents. Paper IV claims and shows that civil wars are less likely to be terminated by settlement in the form of elections when conflict parties are dependent on rents. In sum, this dissertation contributes by theoretically specifying and empirically identifying conditions under which foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict.

Foreign aid is the subject in development economics that created controversies about its influences on the economy of the recipient countries. This study is an attempt to explain the effects that aid may have on trade, with a focus on the trade costs associated with the creation of business ties. Tied aid creates incentives for the developing countries to keep positive trading relationships with their donors, mainly because of the diminishing trad-ing costs associated with long term contacts. Subsequently, programs related to infra-structure and trade enforcement have been launched, that work towards the integration of the Least Developing Countries into the world economy.This study includes the analysis of the trade flows and foreign aid disbursement be-tween the “Group of Seven” countries (G7) and the Least Developing Countries, for a time span of 22 years (1988-2009). The results show that aid does have a significant ef-fect on the trade flows between the developed and developing countries. The explana-tion to this is related to the trading costs and the infrastructure development that tends to diminish the costs linked to distance- and border-related issues, and the sunk costs of market research and entry. In accordance, the distance coefficient is smaller after 1997, as result of decreased trade costs and increased export flows from recipients to donors.

Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.

This research examines the gap between the socio-political and economic reality of Palestine, under Israeli Occupation, and the perceptions, assumptions and limitations of small aid donors like Switzerland in a colonial context. It looks at how global and Swiss aid is formulated and dispensed to fragile ‘non-states’ like Palestine. My thesis found that aid in general is ineffective, with Swiss aid in particular being modest, lacking robustness and failing to respond to the colonial context that prevents Palestine from profiting the most from international aid. In addition, Swiss aid is afflicted by many shortcomings that have been identified by contemporary research: a large part of aid is tied; consultations with local partners are limited, excluding, by and large, civil society; and time constraints are such that current programs are generally designed on a relatively short-term basis.

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