The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) promised a new and democratic Turkey in the 2002 general elections, and it succeeded in winning the elections of 2002, 2007, and 2011. Everyone lauded the democratization process in Turkey under the AKP, calling it the “Turkish model.” Yet, with the prolonging rule of the AKP, cracks in the Turkish democracy gradually appeared, ranging from politicized trials to media repression. The situation in Turkey continued to worsen at an increasing pace under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leading to the major Gezi Park protests last summer. The erosion of the AKP’s commitment to Turkish democracy is evident, as is Turkey’s democratic backsliding. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive landscape of domestic events in Turkey that demonstrate democratic backsliding by identifying major issue areas where this trend is most prominent. These key issues where democratic backsliding becomes most apparent in Turkey are divided into five categories: media freedoms, the judiciary, corruption and graft, the nature of the opposition, and civil liberties. These five categories will be examined through narratives, which provide crucial insight into the strategies used by the AKP to undermine the consolidation of liberal democracy in Turkey. The findings from the critical case study of Turkey can be instrumental in preventing the trend of democratic backsliding in other developing countries.

In the 2002 national elections in Turkey, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) won a majority of parliamentary seats and the leadership of all government ministries. Viewed by many voters as an alternative to both Turkey’s Kemalist establishment and the country’s Islamist political movement, this self described ‘conservative democratic’ party composed of former Islamist politicians and political neophytes sought to establish a Muslim political identity that was neither Islamist nor secular. This dissertation explores the discourse used by AKP politicians as they navigated several highly charged issues involving the religion-state relationship in Turkey. By examining what geographies AKP politicians articulated in discussing issues of religion and state, how they constructed Islam and the state through these articulations, and how these constructions compare to Kemalist and Islamist versions, this research strives to understand how these politicians are negotiating a moderate religious identity within a context of fundamentalist-secularist polarization. The research also presents an example of how recent changes observed in modern state spatiality are propagating beyond the economic dynamics usually studied. Drawing on statements made by AKP politicians in newspaper reports, legislative debates, and individual interviews, this project examines issues such as imam hatip schools, headscarves, the role of the Directorate of Pious Works, and Turkey’s geopolitical relationships to suggest answers to its research questions. The project concludes that a combination of religious and neoliberal logics is operating within the statements of the AKP politicians studied. By appealing to the individuality of religious choice, these AKP politicians differentiated their party from the deadlock of the Kemalist-Islamist polarity. Their appeal to individual choice suggests that the answer to providing the best welfare for the population is to reduce the state’s involvement in normal processes of everyday space and allow for God and the market to work their respective magics. Within their statements, the state retains a position as a source of knowledge, supporter of research, provider of information, and protector of order. However, the state loses its position as visionary leader and social engineer.

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Vers fin de 2002 et début 2003, la Turquie a adopté une diplomatie active au Moyen-Orient dans un cadre de désordre et de déséquilibre de force entre les différentes puissances. Notre point de départ est l'arrivée d'une nouvelle élite en tant qu'événement instigateur et accélérateur de la reconstruction du rôle de puissance régionale. L'analyse de la politique arabe de la Turquie a recours aux notions du «rôle national» et de «puissance régionale» comme un binôme complémentaire visant à déterminer les préceptes fondateurs de la politique régionale turque en termes de source de projection, de dynamiques d'action et d'intérêt national. A partir de ce cadre théorique et de notre enquête de terrain, nous présentons une analyse critique de la littérature et une reconsidération des fondements épistémologiques et ontologique du processus de conceptualisation en Relations Internationales, notamment du terme de « puissance régionale ». L'apport de cette thèse au niveau méthodologique, en termes de définition d'un cadre conceptuel approprié à la théorisation et aux spécificités des études de cas traités, permet de reformuler la politique arabe en tant que dynamique de renaissance d'une nouvelle Turquie. En affirmant un rôle de puissance régionale, l'AKP dispose d'un répertoire d'action plus affirmé et autonome qui concilie les exigences du rôle régional avec ses alliés occidentaux et voisins d'une part ainsi que ses intérêts nationaux d'autre part. La politique arabe présente un microcosme de la politique étrangère turque et détermine comment la Turquie a émergé en tant que puissance régionale au niveau global, à partir de l'embryon militaro-séculier / By the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, Turkey adopted an active diplomacy in the Middle East in a context of instability and persistent rivalry between different powers. This study considers the arrival of a new political “conservative” elite as an instigator and accelerator event in the reconstruction of the Turkish role as a regional power. The analysis of the Arab policy of Turkey is based on a conceptual framework that relies on two complementary notions, the “national role” and the “regional power.” Both determine the founding precepts of the Turkish regional policy in terms of source of projection, dynamics of action and national interest. In light of this theoretical framework and the field work undertaken on the Arab policy, this study adopts a critical analysis of the literature. By reconsidering the conceptualization process in the International Relations discipline, the thesis focuses on the term of “regional power role” in order to conceal the epistemological and ontological deficiencies in different theoretical concepts that aim to understand world politics like “regional power.” Accordingly, this study provides a different method in theorizing by formulating a conceptual framework that is more adapted to global politics' reality in terms of considering the specificities of the different cases and the various configurations of regional powers. By relying on the “regional power role”, the Arab policy analysis reveals the emergence of a new Turkey. A more assertive and autonomous diplomacy is adopted by the AKP that conciles the exigencies of this role with its Western allies and neighbours from one side and its national interests from the other side

Magistro baigiamajame darbe išanalizuota kurdų tautinė mažuma Turkijos Respublikoje 2003–2012 m. Pirmoje darbo dalyje apibrėžiama tautinių mažumų samprata Turkijos Respublikoje. Antroje dalyje ištirtos kurdų tautinės mažumos politinių ir kultūrinių teisių išplėtimas 2003–2012 m. bei išanalizuota ES ir AKP įtaka vykdomoms reformoms. Trečioje darbo dalyje palyginta kurdų tautinės mažumos padėtis istoriniu ir politiniu aspektais Turkijos ir Irako Respublikose. / This Master‘s thesis analyzes the situation of the Kurdish minority in the Republic of Turkey during the period of 2003–2012. The first part of the thesis defines the concept of national minorities in the Republic of Turkey. The second part of the thesis examines the improvement of political and cultural rights of the Kurdish minority during the period of 2003–2012, also defines the influence of EU and AKP on the reforms. In the third part of the thesis the Kurdish national minority in Turkey and Iraq is compared in the historical and political context.

Zugl.: Passau, Univ., Diss., 2007

This thesis aims at analyzing the EU policy of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma partisi - Justice and Development Party) based on the concepts of Euroscepticism and Europragmatism. Related to that aim initially the Euroscepticism and conjoint concepts are considered. Furthermore, Euroscepticism in Turkey is discussed at public and political party levels. To what extent the EU policy of AKP has undergone a change since it came to power in 2002 is discussed. Moreover the EU policy of MGH (Milli G&ouml / r&uuml / s Hareketi - National Outlook Movement), a political movement from which AKP emanated is discussed. Looking at their EU policy, it is discussed to what extent AKP differs from the National Outlook Movement. Literature review and discourses of the party officials showed that the Political Islam in Turkey has been in a transformation process since 28 February Process and in this process EU has formed an anchor for the Political Islamists. AKP that separated from the Political Islam movement has also been affected by this transformation process. AKP has given support for the EU process if it serves to domestic goals of the party. However since 2005 due to the internal and external factors AKP&rsquo / s commitment to the EU process has declined.

Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss. 2005

This dissertation problematizes the populism – national identity relationship looking at contemporary Turkey, where populism was combined with an increasingly Islamic, conservative nationalism under the rule (2002-present) of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its personalistic leader R. T. Erdoğan. It demonstrates how populism can play a strategic role in the elite-led promotion of alternate conceptions of national identities. The underlying premise is that the issues of populism, its effects and implications on political institutions and competition, when and how populism becomes successful cannot be understood independently of nationalism as a sociological and political phenomenon and of the specific ideas populism serves. Combining data collected on the field through elite interviews and participant observation with other sources, I show that populist (people-worshipping and anti-establishment) leadership and mobilization have been primary agents in the AKP’s construction of a competitive-authoritarian political landscape in Turkey and in the government-sponsored imposition of a religiously-colored nationalism. With inter-temporal and within-case comparisons and process-tracing, I first put AKP dominance in Turkey in historical perspective, and then identify a central causal mechanism that accounts for the pace and intensity of Turkey’s authoritarian drift since the party’s second term. I situate AKP’s abandonment of initial promises of European Union-oriented pluralist reforms in (two) major power struggles that significantly heightened the costs of losing power while diminishing incentives for genuinely democratizing reform. I demonstrate that mutual distrust between Turkey’s secular state elite and Islamist political elite spiraled into an acute political confrontation starting in 2007, wherein the incumbents de-legitimized and pacified opponents with a combination of legal and extra-legal methods, and a populist meta-narrative that framed this struggle in terms of Turkey’s democratization and prosperity versus the privileges of a narrow elite alien to the values of the heartland. I then evaluate critical implications, like how the incumbents and their partners crossed a critical threshold for state-capture and top-down Islamization by 2011, subsequently attaining a proto-hegemonic orientation (i.e. towards the replacement of the existing pluralistic democracy) and cartel party status (i.e. privileged access to state-regulated channels of communication). I explain that the particular ways in which this new elite achieved their supremacy and their arbitrary transformation of society led to cross-class civic opposition, erupting in 2013 at the Gezi Park protests (and more recently culminating in a grassroots appreciation of secularism). Third, I discuss the impact of the intra-Islamist conflict that also surfaced in 2013, after the colluding parties started fighting over the spoils of state-capture. In the face of such crises and souring relations with the West, the AKP leadership employed a strategic narrative combining populist antagonism and polarization with suspicious-minded, anti-Western nationalist perspectives which frame pro-democracy opposition as foreign-orchestrated initiatives aiming to suppress the national will, foment instability, and derail AKP’s quest to end Western domination over Turkey. Late-stage populist rule, in this case, is characterized by the equation of party survival to national survival and the manufacturing of consent for authoritarianism through nationalism. The findings advance the limited literature on populism in power, showing that the disappearance of an establishment to rally against does not mean that populism withers away and that populism can remain potent thereafter via attachment to various ideologies, and that we are better off seeing populism as something that actors do (as opposed to what they are); e.g. to differentiate themselves from alternatives, to win or securitize elections, to rationalize the reorganization of power relations, to avoid accountability, to keep party ranks unified, and critically, to promote new identities. / 2023-10-25T00:00:00Z

Cette thèse met en perspective l’influence qu’exerce l’héritage ottoman sur les relations entre la Turquie et les pays régionaux et insiste sur l’importance de cet aspect dans l’analyse de la politique étrangère turque. Les acteurs politiques à forte référence religieuse ont toujours porté un discours glorifiant le passé ottoman. Ils ont développé une relecture romantique de l’histoire ottomane qui, d’un côté, a toujours été en décalage avec les recherches universitaires et le discours officiel en Turquie, et de l’autre, diamétralement opposée à la rhétorique dominante dans les autres anciens territoires ottomans partagés entre une vingtaine de pays. Ce travail de recherche montre que les gouvernements AKP, qui ont des origines idéologiques remontant à ces acteurs, se sont appuyés essentiellement sur la perception nationaliste et religieuse de l’histoire pour développer un discours de réhabilitation de l’héritage ottoman dans leur politique étrangère depuis 2002. / This dissertation puts into perspective the influence of the Ottoman heritage on relations between Turkey and regional countries and shows the importance of this aspect in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Political actors with strong religious views have always been different from other in the political space due to their discourse glorifying the Ottoman past. They have developed a romantic vision of Ottoman history which, on the one hand, has always been out of academic research and official discourse in Turkey, and on the other, diametrically opposed to the dominant rhetoric in the other ancient Ottoman territories shared between some twenty countries. This research shows that AKP governments, which have ideological origins going back to these actors, have relied primarily on the nationalist and religious perception of history to develop a discourse on the rehabilitation of the Ottoman heritage in their foreign policies since 2002.