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In this thesis, we use a wide cross-sectional sample of both privately held and publicly listed European banks over the period 1999 to 2008 to analyse the role played by bank shareholder incentives in the performance of banks and, ultimately, on the capital allocation efficiency of the economy as a whole. In our first essay, we use the entire range of Bankscope and Amadeus Top 250,000 to construct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in banks for each year. We show that about 62 per cent of the ultimate largest shareholders of banks are diversified investors, holding on average equity investments from thirteen companies in their portfolio. We exploit this heterogeneity to investigate the impact of their portfolio diversification on bank risk-taking. Our results show that the relationship between portfolio diversification and bank risk-taking is both statistically significant and economically sizeable. Overall, these findings contribute to the literature by providing novel evidence on the characteristics of bank shareholders’ portfolios and by studying an explicit channel through which shareholders’ incentives for risk-taking affect the banks’ risk. In our second essay, we build on our previous evidence to further investigate whether the level of diversification of bank shareholders has any effect on the efficiency of capital allocation in the economy. We aggregate our data at regional level, using information on the address where companies and banks have their headquarters and identify regions based on Eurostat Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) definitions. Our results indicate that capital appears to be allocated more efficiently in regions where banks are controlled by (more) diversified shareholders. In particular, a change in value-added growth increases capital investment by approximately 8 per cent of its mean in regions where banks are controlled by undiversified shareholders, while it increases capital investment by almost 21 per cent in regions where banks are controlled by shareholders with diversified portfolios. These findings contribute to the literature by studying a specific novel channel through which financial development, in the form of bank shareholders’ diversification, affects the real economy. Lastly, in our third essay we combine our detailed micro-level data on ownership with commercial loans market data from Dealscan to evaluate evidence of related lending in Western European banks. In doing so, we are able to explicitly identify related loans and provide original evidence of related lending and preferential lending terms. We show that 14 per cent of banks in our sample engage in related lending, and that firms borrowing from their related banks have lower costs and higher access to credit. Given these findings, we then proceed to analyse the effect of related lending in bank performance. Our tests show that banks participating in related lending experience an increase in average returns of 11 per cent. Results are both statistically significant and economically sizeable. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence in support the information asymmetry view of related lending, suggesting that in countries with strong rule of law related lending may become a relevant mechanism for informational capital accumulation for banks, allowing them to make more profitable lending decisions.

This dissertation work focuses on evaluation of the performance and credibility of domestic pension funds. It includes information about pension systems in six selected countries in the world, specifically Chile, Hungary, Switzerland, Poland, Sweden and Slovakia, and culminates with a proposal for pension reform in the Czech Republic. The evaluation of the performance of pension funds is based on experience with measuring performance in twenty-three countries of the world processed for the OECD and cites original basis materials for proposals for the regulation of pension funds in the Czech Republic. Setting of indicators is preceded by an analysis of measurements of performance by the Association of Pension Funds in the Czech Republic and the Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs. The most important proposed indicators include the actual result in relation to the participants' funds, which captures the influence of changes in the market values of financial assets, and the indicator of competence covers obligations, reflecting the influence of changes in costs during subsequent periods, which include yet undistributed commission for mediators of pension insurance. For a comparison of benefits and risks, mutual funds denominated in CZK were selected, which were verified as a suitable alternative to long-term saving. The method of evaluation of pension funds itself is based on explanation, evaluation and selection of favourable indicators for determining the rating of domestic pension funds, which clients of pension funds could use as a method for evaluating the credibility and benefits of a specific domestic pension fund for the purpose of securing it in retirement age.

「促進民間參與公共建設法」賦予民間機構從事開發交通建設所需用地，藉以提高交通建設之財務自償能力。回顧目前國內所推動之高速鐵路及捷運建設BOT案，均藉由土地開發收入以挹注建設成本，誠然所引發公共論壇的焦點環繞在土地開發利益議題上。惟土地開發收入取決於開發規模及代理人努力效果等因素，在政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱下，恐衍生委託代理問題與權力宰制。 審視現行法令賦予私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度，包括政府和所有權人合作開發、政府徵收開發、所有權人申請開發等多樣性之土地開發方式。面對具提高不動產價值之捷運場站土地開發，研究思維理應從單向滿足民間機構對土地開發需求外，亦需同時考量維護所有權人參與之權益，各方最佳的策略與報酬，並非獨立於他人的行動之外，其間之策略組合報酬主要涉及土地開發方式之權益分配率及開發回饋金，捷運場站開發制度存在策略賽局關係。 因此，如何建構兼具代理規範、參與決策及均衡結果為導向的制度經濟分析模型，已成為推動民間參與捷運場站土地開發之關鍵所在。本研究首先，嘗試以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論分析方法，作為民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度之立論基礎；其次，深入分析土地開發之代理與權力交互效果，重新詮釋資源配置效率問題；其三，研擬民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型，經由制度賽局均衡結果以達成各方自由選擇下之同意；最後，進行案例模擬分析。 本研究所獲致之結論包括：(1)民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度得以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論一窺全貌；(2)制度的賽局均衡觀得以降低因徵收土地開發之代理與權力交互關係對資源配置效率之衝擊；(3)模擬分析民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型具可操作性並可運用於實務界。再者，本研究所提出之建議包括：(1)建構政府與民間機構之代理模型俾以降低委託代理問題；(2)建構政府與所有權人之制度賽局模型俾以達成自願交易；(3)建構代理規範與制度賽局之整合模型以維護所有權人參與土地開發之權益。 / “Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure Projects” provides a mechanism for the private sector to develop the land for any public infrastructure project so that the financial self-liquidating ratio may be increased. The financial concept of BOT projects in Taiwan, such as HSR and MRT, is to recoup the cost of the infrastructure project by land development revenues. Indeed, the public concerns focus on the revenues, which depend on the institution and scale of development. However, the revenues depend on the scale of development and effect of the agent’s efforts. While the information asymmetry exists, there may arise the issues of agency and power control. The institution of the MRT station development provides a diversity of land development, including cooperation development, expropriation development and application development. The development issue has switched from government-led development approaches to the interaction between the government and landowners. As for the payoff function of their strategy combination, it depends on the right distribution rate and feedback payment. In the MRT station development institution exists a form of strategic game. Therefore, how to establish an institutional economic analysis model takes agency norm, and involves decision-making and equilibrium, which forms the criterion, serving as a key to promote the private participation in MRT station development. This study attempts: First, to analyze the private participation in MRT station development based on the agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. Second, to explore the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. Third, to establish an integrated model of both the agent and the game, which by equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions reach a mutual agreement among the government, private sector, and landowners. Finally, case simulation. It is concluded that, (1) the institution of the private participation MRT station development may be fully reviewed by agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. (2) the equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions may reduce the impact on the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. (3) by case simulation found that the integrated model of both agent and game is available. It is suggested that, (1) to establish an agency model for both the government and private sector serves to solve agency issues. (2) to establish an institutional game model for both the government and landowner functions as voluntary exchanges. (3) to establish an integrated model of both agent and game helps to keep landowner on the rights of participation in MRT station development.