本研究探討財務年報公布時間點的早晚是否對股票報酬率有定價的能力。我們透過盈餘管理、訊號效果與資訊不對稱理論推論財務年報公布時間點的早晚會與下一年的股票報酬率有相關。本研究的樣本來自1995年到2016年所有上市上櫃公司（但不含金融股）的財報資料及市場資料。 實證結果顯示沒有充分證據能說明財務年報公布時間點的早晚會對股票報酬率有定價的能力。此結果支持Fama (1970)提出的效率市場假說(Efficient-market hypothesis)，即當證券市場中的公司股價完全反映出包括公司財務資訊與公布時間點的差異等所有可以獲得的信息帶來的影響，我們就認為市場為效率市場。即使是在較早公布的資訊中好消息的比重較高的情況下，投資人對提早公布財務年報的公司進行投資也無法獲取較高的報酬，反映出公布時間的早晚對股票報酬率不具定價的能力。 / This study examines the relation between the early or late annual report disclosure and the changes of the return on portfolios over time. Empirical results suggest that the stock returns are not significantly related to the disclosure time of annual report. The fact that financial characteristics and stock returns are not related to the sooner or later annual report disclosure supports the Efficient-market hypothesis. However, in the long run, we did not find the annual report disclosure with the predictive power of the systemic risk of companies. Furthermore, firms with early disclosures are more likely to beat analysts' prediction than firms with late disclosures, but we still do not find such disclosure with significant pricing power of stock returns.

近期許多針對中國大陸的研究顯示，關聯交易除了是一個重要的盈餘管理工具外，也同樣是控制股東挹注與挪用公司資源的主要手段，此外中國與關聯方有關的資訊披露規定在近年來也有非常明顯的變化。基於前述兩項原因，本文首先整理相關法規的延革，接著引用一家上市企業的年度報告做為個案分析。此項個案分析的結果顯示上市公司很可能因控制股東的安排，而將資源輸往與控制股東有關的關聯方或形式上獨立的非關聯方。換言之，控制股東可藉隱匿關聯交易資訊或關聯交易隱形化的方式進行對上市企業的掏空行為。 / Recently, many studies have shown that related party transaction in China is an important tool of earnings management, and it also has been approved to be a primary mean for controlling shareholders propping up or tunneling the company. Therefore, because of the two reasons given above, the thesis studies and systematizes changes of related party disclosure requirements in China, and does analysis on a selected listed company’s annual report as an example of related party transaction disclousure. The analysis finds that, through related party transactions, controlling shareholder may tunnel the listed company and benefit the selected parties which are directly or indirectly controlled by controlling shareholder. That is, controlling shareholder can tunnel through invisible related party transactions or through concealment of transaction information from stakeholders.