The credit rating industry is characterised by the high concentration of a small number of firms and, allegedly, this concentration stems from certain anticompetitive behaviours made manifest by the dominant firms in the industry. Therefore, as has yet to be done in empirical research, the purpose of this study is to carry out an exploration of the antitrust behaviours supposedly perpetuated by agents in the credit rating process for debt finance. The aim is to determine what influences, if any, the interactions and relationships in the rating process have on the sustenance of the oligopoly in the rating industry and on impeding new rating agencies trying to enter the market. Through the application of thematic analysis, this study aims to gather evidence on the behavioural motivations of rating analysts and underwriters in the rating process. Furthermore, the theoretical framework suggests notching and tying to be the anticompetitive behaviours that strengthen the oligopoly. Hence, the study finds that the drivers of anticompetitive notching in the rating process are the taking of haircuts and mapping, the guise of protecting investors’ interests, punitive ratings and a quid pro quo rating norm. Similarly, it finds that the enablers of anticompetitive tying are continuous dealing in the rating process, covert negotiation, repeat rating requests, ancillary services and the regulatory overdependence on credit ratings. In addition, this thesis explores the impediments of new rating agencies trying to enter the credit rating industry and finds that new rating agencies face peculiar market, regulatory and organisational barriers. Firstly, the market barriers comprise arbitrage, economic rents, investor preference and the issuer-pay model. Secondly, the regulatory barriers are discretionary regulation, new regulations and the designation of nationally recognised statistical rating organisation status. Lastly, the organisational barriers include down-trading, inadequate funding, the lack of geographic spread, low added intellectual value and a narrow product and service scope. Finally, this research recommends for regulatory authorities to agree to a harmonised convention on the recognition of credit rating agencies that may lead to the emergence of new robust agencies. It also proposes the standardisation of mapping practices in the notching process to reduce rating variance among credit rating agencies. Lastly, the research offers evidence of notching for competition and tying through informal services that may substantiate antitrust liability for possible antitrust intervention.

Les pratiques anticoncurrentielles se sont multipliées d’une façon préoccupante. Face à ce risque, le législateur national et celui de l’Union européenne ont opté pour un système répressif basé sur une diversité des sanctions. Des sanctions administratives, pénales et civiles sont ainsi imposées à l’encontre des auteurs des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Toutefois, le recours aux sanctions civiles et pénales demeure parcimonieux. Les sanctions administratives, notamment les amendes et leur augmentation constante constituent la clé du système de sanction. Afin de lutter efficacement contre les comportements anticoncurrentiels, une sévérité accrue est observée ces dernières années. Dans le même temps les entreprises sont incitées à mettre rapidement fin à ces comportements par le biais des procédures négociées. La recherche d’un effet dissuasif, a conduit donc les autorités de la concurrence à adopter un système de sanctions de plus en plus effectif. Une effectivité qui passe par la sévérité des sanctions et par l’incitation. Ce système a, néanmoins, suscité de nombreuses critiques, notamment contre la hausse spectaculaire du niveau des amendes. Des critiques qui montrent que le système de sanction actuel, essentiellement fondé sur les sanctions administrative, n’est pas assez dissuasif à cause des limites imposées par le droit -principes généraux de droit-, ou par la conjoncture économique -la crise-. Dans ce contexte, la place de la sanction pécuniaire comme modalité principale de répression des pratiques anticoncurrentielles mérite d’être repensée. C’est ainsi qu’il convient d’exploiter d’autres pistes afin de renforcer la lutte contre ces pratiques. / Nti-competitive practices have multiplied in a warning way. Facing this risk, the national legislator and the EU one opted for a repressive system based on a variety of sanctions. Administrative, criminal and civil sanctions are thus imposed against the perpetrators of anticompetitive practices. However, the use of civil and criminal penalties remains sparse. Administrative sanctions, especially fines and their constant rise, are the key to the sanction system. In order to the effectively fight against anticompetitive behavior, increased severity has been observed in recent years. At the same time companies are encouraged to bring a speedy end to these behaviors through the negotiated procedures. Looking for a deterrent, thus led the competition authorities to adopt a more effective system of sanctions. An effectiveness depending on the severity of sanctions and incentives. This system, however, raised many criticisms, particularly against the dramatic increase in the level of fines. Criticisms which suggest that the current penalty system based primarily on administrative sanctions is not enough of a deterrent because of the limitations imposed by the law - General Principle’s right- or by the economic situation -the crisis-. In this context, the financial sanction as main mode of repression of anticompetitive practices should be rethought. Thus it is appropriate to exploit other avenues to strengthen the fight against anti-competitive practices.

As profundas mudanças trazidas pela sociedade da informação, em especial o advento da Internet, tiveram enorme impacto sobre as interações humanas, modificando a forma como as pessoas se relacionam e consomem bens e serviços. Nesse contexto, surgem inúmeros serviços prestados por empresas baseadas na rede mundial de computadores. Características destes novos mercados como o uso de plataformas de múltiplos lados, o uso intensivo de novas tecnologias, a presença de efeitos ou externalidades de rede, a interligação entre serviços distintos, o oferecimento de serviços de forma gratuita ao consumidor e o entrelaçamento entre os diversos serviços prestados, desafiam conceitos tradicionais do direito concorrencial como mercado relevante, poder de mercado e venda casada. Faz-se necessária, assim, a adaptação da metodologia de análise antitruste, por meio da analise dos fundamentos teóricos que dão suporte à sua aplicação, considerando-se as particularidades presentes nesses mercados. O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar o controle de condutas nesses novos setores de Internet por meio da análise das particularidades econômicas desses novos setores e as consequências desse enfoque sobre a análise antitruste. / The deep changes brought by the information society, especially the rising of the Internet, caused an enormous impact over human interactions, changing the way people relate and the way people consume goods and services. As a consequence of this new reality, services provided by web based companies emerged. Some characteristics of those new markets, such as the use of multiple side platforms, the intensive use of new technologies, the existence of network effects or network externalities, the connection of distinct services, the offer of zero price services and the deep connection between the services, challenge traditional concepts of antitrust law, like relevant market, market power and tying. Therefore, traditional antitrust analysis and its theoretical foundations must be reviewed, considering the particularities of those markets. The main objective of this study is to analyze the conduct control on these new Internet sectors, considering its economic particularities and the consequences of these view on antitrust analysis.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tatiana Coutinho Ferreira.pdf: 906809 bytes, checksum: 56f3f99d3b459aa73182fb701ff09ed3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-08 / The present work is an attempt to evaluate the decisions rendered by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, the administrative body responsible for defending free competition in Brazil related to industrial property and anticompetitive conducts. We select a series of judgments delivered between 1994 and 2012, period in which the liberalization of internal market allowed the exercise of free enterprise and competition. In order to provide a better understanding of the issue, we performed a brief study approaching the industrial property as a competitive advantage face to traditional views that see it as a Right in Rem or Monopoly legally assured. / A presente dissertação buscou analisar as decisões proferidas pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, órgão ao qual compete a defesa da livre concorrência no Brasil, relacionadas à propriedade industrial e às condutas anticompetitivas. Foram selecionados acórdãos proferidos entre 1994 e 2012, período em que a liberalização do mercado interno permitiu o exercício da livre iniciativa e da concorrência. Para melhor compreensão do tema, realizou-se breve estudo da propriedade industrial como vantagem competitiva em contraposição aos tradicionais entendimentos que a classificam como Direito Real ou Monopólio legalmente assegurados.

As profundas mudanças trazidas pela sociedade da informação, em especial o advento da Internet, tiveram enorme impacto sobre as interações humanas, modificando a forma como as pessoas se relacionam e consomem bens e serviços. Nesse contexto, surgem inúmeros serviços prestados por empresas baseadas na rede mundial de computadores. Características destes novos mercados como o uso de plataformas de múltiplos lados, o uso intensivo de novas tecnologias, a presença de efeitos ou externalidades de rede, a interligação entre serviços distintos, o oferecimento de serviços de forma gratuita ao consumidor e o entrelaçamento entre os diversos serviços prestados, desafiam conceitos tradicionais do direito concorrencial como mercado relevante, poder de mercado e venda casada. Faz-se necessária, assim, a adaptação da metodologia de análise antitruste, por meio da analise dos fundamentos teóricos que dão suporte à sua aplicação, considerando-se as particularidades presentes nesses mercados. O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar o controle de condutas nesses novos setores de Internet por meio da análise das particularidades econômicas desses novos setores e as consequências desse enfoque sobre a análise antitruste. / The deep changes brought by the information society, especially the rising of the Internet, caused an enormous impact over human interactions, changing the way people relate and the way people consume goods and services. As a consequence of this new reality, services provided by web based companies emerged. Some characteristics of those new markets, such as the use of multiple side platforms, the intensive use of new technologies, the existence of network effects or network externalities, the connection of distinct services, the offer of zero price services and the deep connection between the services, challenge traditional concepts of antitrust law, like relevant market, market power and tying. Therefore, traditional antitrust analysis and its theoretical foundations must be reviewed, considering the particularities of those markets. The main objective of this study is to analyze the conduct control on these new Internet sectors, considering its economic particularities and the consequences of these view on antitrust analysis.

Le morcellement de l'environnement des paiements de détail entre les 25 (et plus) systèmes nationaux différents des États membres, constitue un obstacle à l’achèvement du marché intérieur, porte atteinte à l’intégration monétaire européenne, et diminue l’efficacité économique de l’Union européenne (UE). Pour répondre à ces problèmes, le secteur bancaire a créé l’Espace unique de paiement en euros (SEPA). Le SEPA est un espace dans lequel tous les agents économiques peuvent effectuer et recevoir des paiements en euros, depuis le même compte, que ce soit à l’intérieur de leur pays ou bien entre deux pays différents, dans les mêmes conditions et avec les mêmes droits et obligations.Cette thèse, qui s'intéresse à la construction du SEPA, s'inscrit dans le champ de l'économie industrielle. Elle répond à trois interrogations : Pourquoi a-t-il fallu établir le SEPA ? En quoi consiste-t-il ? Quel sera son impact sur l’environnement des paiements de détail en euros ?Le premier chapitre présente l’environnement des paiements de détail en Europe suite à l’instauration de la monnaie unique. En utilisant les théories économiques sur les industries de réseaux, il expose la marche vers l’unification de cet environnement.Le second chapitre offre une vision détaillée du SEPA. Il présente ses effets à travers une analyse coûts – avantages, puis expose l'état de sa mise en place.Enfin, le troisième chapitre dévoile les effets non escomptés du SEPA. En mobilisant les apports de la littérature sur les marchés bifaces, il traite des commissions d’interchange et des possibilités de pratiques anticoncurrentielles dans l'industrie de paiement par carte. / The fragmentation of the retail payments environment between the 25 (or more) differentmember states's national systems constitutes an obstacle to completing the internal market,undermines the European monetary integration and reduces the economic efficiency of theEuropean Union. In response to these problems, the banking industry created the SEPA.SEPA is the area where all economic actors are able to make and receive payments in euros,within Europe, whether between or within national boundaries under the same basicconditions, rights and obligations, regardless of their location.This thesis, which focuses on the SEPA building, is in the field of industrial economics. Itaddresses three questions : Why was it necessary to establish the SEPA ? What does it consistof ? What will its impact on the retail payments environment in euros be ?The first chapter presents the retail payments environment in Europe after the introduction ofthe single currency. By using economic theories on network industries, it describes theunification's steps of this environment.The second chapter provides a detailed vision of the SEPA. It explains its effects through acosts-benefits analysis, then shows the state of its implementation.Finally, the third chapter reveals the unplanned effects of SEPA. By raising the contributionof the literature on two-sided markets, it treats interchange fees and the possibility ofanticompetitive behavior in the card payment industry.

The objectiv of my dissertation is mainly to introduce the problems of economic competition to the readers and to refer to the incidents of anti-competitive practices. In the introduction I defined the European Community from the historical aspect and I named all the legislative rules and contracts, that are pivotal to the European Community. In order to define in more profound terms I applied myself to Treaty of the establishement of the European community (articles 81 and 82 EC). Moreover, the readers can gain insights into various forms of violating the rules of economic competition such as abuse a position of dominance, dumping, mergers and acquisition, cartels, developing countries, ect. The practical part is based on the most serious anti-competitive practices in the European Community, which was handled by the European Commission, European Court of First Instance and by the antimonopol offices. At the end of my work, there are some practical tips for the companies, which either consciously or unconsciously behave anti-competitively which influences the common European market. The main sources of my dissertation were the basic treaties of the European Community, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam and treaty of Nice.

On this paper, the author disserts on the notion of recommendations as a method of collusion. First, he approaches it based on comparative law (Europe and Latin-America) and precedent case law from INDECOPI, followed by defining how the term is (and should be) understood in Peruvian regulations as a horizontal agreement (cartel). It also analyzes in which instances said application has been inaccurate and the issues surrounding it. Finally, the author illustrates the complexity of framing recommendations as vertical agreements in the absence of “collusion between two or more parties” / En este artículo, el autor nos presenta la figura de las recomendaciones como práctica colusoria. Empieza por darnos una aproximación acorde a derecho comparado (Europa y América Latina) y desarrollo jurisprudencial de INDECOPI, para posteriormente definir cómo se aplica (y debería aplicarse) dicha prohibición como práctica colusoria horizontal (carteles) en nuestra legislación. En este punto, se analiza también los supuestos en los cuales dicha aplicación ha sido incorrecta y los problemas alrededor de esta. Finalmente, el autor demuestra la complejidadde enmarcar las recomendaciones como una práctica colusoria vertical debido a la falta del elemento de colusión de agentes económicos.

Pendant longtemps, le non-professionnel a été considéré comme un professionnel dont la situation de faiblesse était comparable à celle du consommateur et il était protégé comme tel. Or, le juge européen a défini le consommateur comme « visant exclusivement la personne physique ». Cela a conduit le juge français à nuancer sa position ; le non-professionnel est défini comme la personne morale n’exerçant pas d’activité professionnelle. De son côté, la notion de petit professionnel a été consacrée par les textes relatifs au droit de la consommation et au droit de la concurrence. Si ces contractants faibles sont protégés c’est avant tout parce qu’ils peuvent être marqués par une situation de faible économique, technique ou juridique. En tout état de cause la protection n’est accordée que par détermination de la loi et elle doit rester circonstanciée. Dans tous les cas, la protection de ces contractants est spécifiée par l’absence de standardisation car elle ne peut être calquée sur le modèle de protection du consommateur. Partant, la protection de ces contractants faibles est nécessaire contre les abus contractuels. Ainsi, le non-professionnel est essentiellement protégé contre les clauses abusives par l’appréciation du déséquilibre significatif dans les contrats de consommation. Alors que le petit professionnel est protégé par le contrôle du contenu du contrat et surtout contre toutes sortes d’abus dans les pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Aussi, les mécanismes de l’information prévus par le droit de la consommation, le Code civil ou ceux prévus au profit de l’acquéreur non-professionnel ou des non-avertis peuvent être étendus au profit du non-professionnel et du petit professionnel. / For a long time , the non-professional was considered as a professional whose weakness was comparable to that of the consumer and was protect as such. However, the European judge has defined the consumer as « exclusively targeting the natural person ». This led the french judge to qualify his position ; the non-professional is defined as the legal person not exercising a professional activity. For his part, the notion of small business has been enshrined in the text relating to consumer and competition low. If this weak contractors are protected it is primarily because they can be marked by a weak economic, technical or legal situation. In any case, protection is granted only by the determination of the law and must remain detailed. In all cases, the protection of this contractors is specified by the lack of standardization because it can not be modeled on the model of consumer protection. Therefore, the protection of these weak contractors is necessary against contractual abuses. Thus, the non-professional is essentially protected against unfair terms by appreciating the significant imbalance in consumer contracts. While the small business is protected by the control of the content of the contract and especially against all kinds of abuses in anti-competitive practices. Also, the information mechanisms provided by consumer law, the civil Code or those provided for the benefit of the non-professional purchaser or uninformed can be extended to the benefit of the non professional and the small business.

Le contrôle juridictionnel des droits fondamentaux, en matière de procédures applicables aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles, s'inscrit dans un contexte marqué par l'affirmation de la dimension répressive et la diversification des modalités de mise en oeuvre du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Par ailleurs, la protection des droits fondamentaux constitue un impératif incontournable au sein de l'ordre juridique de l'Union européenne. Les juridictions de l'Union sont confrontées à deux enjeux principaux.Le premier, essentiellement procédural, réside dans l'encadrement du déroulement et de l'articulation des procédures servant la mise en oeuvre effective des articles 101 et 102 TFUE. Les juges de l'Union doivent concilier, d'une part, la protection des droits fondamentaux dont le respect sous-tend le caractère équitable des procédures et, d'autre part, la préservation de l'efficacité des procédures. Sur ce point, l'amélioration progressive de la protection des droits des entreprises n'épuise pas une priorité accordée aux impératifs d'efficacité et d'effectivité.Le second défi, de nature institutionnelle, tient au respect des exigences découlant du droit à un procès équitable. Le maintien du système institutionnel au sein duquel la Commission concentre différents pouvoirs est subordonné à l'affermissement d'un contrôle juridictionnel répondant à certains impératifs. Ainsi,un droit fondamental commande une intensification du contrôle exercé sur certaines décisions. En outre, les droits fondamentaux constituent des instruments utiles,permettant aux juges de l'Union de consolider un contrôle juridictionnel approfondi et objectif. / The judicial control of fundamental rights, in the field of EU antitrust proceedings, has developed in a context characterized by the increasing importance ofthe repressive side and the diversification of procedures serving the enforcement of EU provisions applying to anticompetitive conducts. Besides, the protection of fundamental rights has become an unavoidable imperative within the EU legal order.The EU courts are expected to cope with two main challenges.The first one is essentially procedure-oriented and lies in the way the various procedures applying to articles 101 and 102 TFUE are to be legally carried on and combined. The EU judicature is supposed to reconcile, on the one hand, the protection of fundamental rights that strengthen the fairness of procedures and, on the other hand, the quest for procedural efficiency. In that respect, the progressive enhancement of the protection of stakeholders' rights does not completely compensate for the priority still granted to the objectives of efficiency and effectiveness. The second one rather is of an institutional nature and regards the respect of the structural requirements stemming from the right to a fair trial. The upholding ofthe current institutional system that provides the EU Commission with substantial powers depends on the capabality of the control exerted by the EU courts to meet certain requirements in terms of completeness and intensity. Thus, a fundamental principle appears to be the initial driving force of a significant strengthening of the judicial control. Moreover, fundamental rights have proven to be instrumental in enabling the EU judges to deploy an in-depth and objective control.