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Aristotle argues in Chapter 2 of Book I of the Politics that the polis exists by nature. I argue that this notion of a natural polis, what I call the Naturalness Thesis, is fundamentally important to Aristotle's political philosophy. The Naturalness Thesis is discussed in only one place by Aristotle, and it is found alongside two further claims—the claim that humans are the most political animal and the claim that the polis is naturally prior to the individual. Together these three ideas constitute Aristotle's political naturalism. I begin by examining the relationship between the Naturalness Thesis and the other two claims. I argue that the Naturalness Thesis is the central idea in Aristotle's political naturalism. I then proceed to defend the argument Aristotle gives in support of the Naturalness Thesis from David Keyt's critique of it. Keyt argues that Aristotle's argument is unsuccessful and that, furthermore, Aristotle himself has reason to believe the polis exists by art rather than nature. Because of this, Keyt believes that there is a blunder in Aristotle's political naturalism. I argue that it is Keyt, and not Aristotle, who blunders. Keyt makes the mistake of interpreting Aristotle's account of the rise of the polis out of the village and household as an account of three distinct social arrangements. As I see it, Aristotle is instead suggesting that village, household, and polis are three stages in the development (or growth) of one thing, namely the polis. That is, households and villages are essentially the same (they contain the same form) as the polis, though they are underdeveloped. Finally, I expound on the Naturalness Thesis by interpreting Aristotle's account of the rise of the natural polis from a number of perspectives. First, the account is sociobiological: Aristotle's polis is literally a naturally living thing. Second, the account is historical: it alludes to other accounts of prehistory and reveals Aristotle's ascription to the theory of a perpetual rise and fall of civilization. Third, the account is ethical: it seeks to break down the distinction between nomos (=law) and phusis (=nature) to ground politics in nature. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-15 19:10:03.993

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Ο Αριστοτέλης μετά την πραγμάτευση της ποίησης και του έπους στην Ποιητική του, προσθέτει ένα κεφάλαιο – το 25ο – όπου πραγματεύεται το ειδικό θέμα των αντιρρήσεων που εκδήλωσαν ορισμένοι κριτικοί ενάντια στην ποίηση την ομηρική και το θέμα των αρχών πάνω στις οποίες θα βασισθούν οι απαντήσεις προς τους κριτικούς του Ομήρου. Η ύπαρξη ενός τέτοιου κεφαλαίου κρίνεται ως χρήσιμη καθώς αντικείμενο της ποίησης δεν αποτελεί μόνο η διδαχή της φύσης της ποίησης, αλλά, επίσης, η ορθή κριτική των ποιητικών έργων. Οι λανθασμένες ερμηνείες πολλών αμφίβολων αποσπασμάτων αυτού του κεφαλαίου οφείλονται στo ότι δεν λαμβάνονται υπόψη από τους κριτικούς του Ομήρου τα Πορφύρια ζητήματα (σχόλια), τα οποία περιλαμβάνουν τα ομηρικά προβλήματα του Αριστοτέλη και των μεταγενέστερων Περιπατητικών. / Aristotle interpretating Homer defends him from Homer's opponents and accusers.

Θέμα της παρούσας διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι η παρουσίαση της θεωρίας του Αριστοτέλη για το πρώτο κινούν ακίνητο στο βιβλίο Λ (12ο), του έργου του "Μετά τα Φυσικά". Η πραγμάτευση του ζητήματος της ουσίας του πρώτου κινούντος ακινήτου, καταλαμβάνει κατά κύριο λόγο τα κεφάλαια 6,7 και 9 του βιβλίου Λ και παρουσιάζει ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον και πρωτοτυπία, γι’ αυτό και δικαίως απασχόλησε αρκετούς σχολιαστές. Στις απόψεις μερικών απ’ αυτών γίνεται αναφορά και στην παρούσα εργασία , σε μια απόπειρα να επεξηγηθούν, να τονιστούν αλλά και να "φωτιστούν", βασικά σημεία του αριστοτελικού κειμένου, όπως ακόμη και να διερευνηθούν κάποια από τα ερωτήματα που τυχόν εγείρει. / --

This thesis proposes a solution to the fourteenth puzzle stated in Aristotle's Metaphysics Book 3, Chapter 6. For the most part I rely on Metaphysics Books 7 and 8 to find a solution and I treat the essences of natural beings in the context of a naturalized metaphysics. I conclude that essences are at once particular and universal. What is novel about my solution is that it allows Aristotle to maintain three important theses: (1) substance is particular, (2) knowledge is of universals, (3) the law of contradiction. I claim that Aristotle is able to maintain theses 1 and 2 without contradiction by giving matter a significant role to play in the solution. As a secondary task, I evaluate Aristotle's claim that essence is primary substance in the Metaphysics. I conclude that the right to the title of primary substance belongs to the following candidates in this order: sensible substances, essences, matter. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

This dissertation re-examines a set of long-standing problems that arise from Aristotle’s defense of kingship in the Politics. Scholars have argued for over a century that Aristotle’s endorsement of sole rule by an individual of outstanding excellence is incompatible with his theory of distributive justice and his very conception of a political community. Previous attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction have failed to ease the deeper tensions between the idea of the polis as a community of free and equal citizens sharing in ruling and being ruled and the vision of absolute kingship in which one man rules over others who are merely ruled. I argue that the so-called “paradox of monarchy” emerges from misconceptions and insufficiently nuanced interpretations of kingship itself and of the more fundamental concepts of community, rule, authority, and citizenship. Properly understood, Aristotelian kingship is not a form of government that concentrates power in the hands of a single individual, but an arrangement in which free citizens willingly invest that individual with a position of supreme authority without themselves ceasing to share in rule. Rather than a muddled appendage tacked on to the Politics out of deference to Macedon or an uncritical adoption of Platonic utopianism, Aristotle’s defense of kingship is a piece of ideal theory that serves in part to undermine the pretensions of actual or would-be monarchs, whether warrior- or philosopher-kings. / text