In many conflict-ridden countries, food insecurity prevails. However, the relationship between food insecurity and armed conflict onset is a complex one, and scholarly attention has increasingly been directed towards furthering our understanding of its nature. In this study, the proposition is brought forth that the effect of food insecurity on armed conflict onset should be contingent on certain features of the economic, social and political environment. Specifically, it suggests that (i) food insecurity should increase the risk of armed conflict onset by generating deprivation in absolute terms, and (ii) that the risk should be heightened when such insecurity disproportionally affects certain groups in society. The latter point pertains to the level of horizontal inequality – i.e. inequality at the group level –, the presence of which is expected to compound the risk of food insecurity leading to armed conflict onset by adding a relative dimension of deprivation to the absolute. A logistic regression analysis is employed using global data for the years 1961 to 2009. The findings do not support the hypothesized relationship. Rather, although food insecurity does increase the risk of armed conflict in cases where the level of horizontal political inequality is low, it decreases the risk in cases where it is high. This indicates that the impact of food insecurity on the risk of armed conflict indeed is contingent on certain features of the political environment, which calls for conditionality to increasingly be taken into account in future research on the relationship between food insecurity and armed conflict onset.

This paper examines the hypothesis that a change in the elite increases the probability of armed conflict onset. The paper combines the newly constructed WhoGov dataset on cabinet members, with UCDP data on armed conflicts and rebel group. It analyzes changes in the retention rate among cabinet members and average years in cabinet, and how they affect armed conflict – measured as armed conflict onset and rebel group onset. A linear regression model, with country- and year fixed effects, in addition to time-varying control variables, is applied to test the main hypothesis. In addition, three heterogeneity tests are conducted. First, the paper examines whether there are any differences between democracies and autocracies. Second, it examines the differences between changes in cabinet size (widening or shrinking). Third, it analyzes if the effects are bigger for large changes in the elite. Four main conclusions are reached in the paper. First, the results indicates that a decrease in retention rate increases the probability for both conflict and rebel onset. The magnitudes of the estimated effects seem to be sizeable. They are larger in conflict onsets than rebel onsets, in relation to their respective means. Second, for armed conflict onset, the results are driven by autocracies. Third, the probability for armed conflict is larger following a large change in the elites (retention rate). Fourth, no difference in changes to cabinet size is observed.