本研究旨在探討中國大陸如何運用經濟工具與菲律賓、越南應處南海爭端。參照Keohane及Nye非對稱互賴理論（asymmetrical interdependence）提出之敏感性（sensitivity）、脆弱性（vulnerability）概念，本研究分析中國大陸自1997年採取「魅力攻勢（Charm Offensive）」策略，為其創造可供運用經濟誘因（economic attraction）及經濟脅迫（economic coercion）之戰略空間，期能使菲、越等經濟實力相對弱勢國家，在領土爭端方面知所退讓。然而，從經濟誘因之敏感性以觀，研究發現菲、越兩國例證，均無以支持經濟誘因能說服相對弱勢國家減緩聲索之論述。針此，研究者提出「信任（trust）」或可作為補強Keohane及Nye分析框架要項之一；意即中國大陸與其經濟夥伴之間若政治信任不足，則中國大陸欲藉提供經濟誘因，促其經濟夥伴在領土爭端有所退讓，勢必存在相當難度。另從經濟脅迫之脆弱性以觀，研究發現菲、越兩國例證顯示，有別於運用實質性手段（substantive measures）施壓造成之短期損失，採取象徵性手段（symbolic measures）所映射之高度風險與不確定性，對於威懾經濟實力相對弱勢國家，可能更具效力。 / This study explores how China has employed economic instruments in handling South China Sea disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam. Borrowing Keohane and Nye’s notations of sensitivity and vulnerability in asymmetrical interdependence, this study analyzes how China’s charm offensive strategy developed since 1997 has created tactical spaces for China to utilize economic attractions and economic coercions in making her weaker economic partners to concede in territorial disputes. In terms of sensitivity to economic attractions, nevertheless, findings in both cases fail to support the argument that economic incentives would persuade the weaker parties to refrain their claims. I argue that one of the missing elements in Keohane and Nye’s analytical framework is “trust”. Without sufficient political “trust” between China and her economic partners, economic attractions to induce concessions could hardly work. In terms of vulnerability to economic coercions, findings in both cases suggest that compared to the substantive measures stressing the short-term loss, the symbolic measures projecting to high degree of risks and uncertainties might be more effective to deter the weaker parties.