Background: Over the years the EU, the US and the rest of the world have experienced several devastating financial crises. As a result of the Great Recession and several accounting scandals the EU-commission added new proposals of regulations. The Commission carried out a proposal to restrict the non-audit services to audit clients with the purpose to achieve improved audit quality and a more competitive market, which was later approved by the European Parliament.   Purpose & Problem:  The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate how non-audit services to audit clients affect the audit quality and with that information evaluate the opinion divergence between the regulators and the practitioners, on providing non-audit services to audit clients and its effect on audit quality. Method: Our intentions were to compare collected evidence and earlier reports with fresh intake of raw data along with statements from several interview subjects from different positions such as the EU-commission and audit firms. By gathering information from both company personnel and state-working staff in the area of auditing, we obtained sufficient information on the thesis empirical findings we did also take part of professional bodies like IFAC and FAR.   Conclusion: Our conclusion is that both regulators and practitioners chose to define audit quality based on their own interests. We believe that this creates an opinion divergence. In order to resolve this conflict of interest, there is a need to agree on a universal definition of audit quality. To be more particular a definition that leave no room for ambiguities and misinterpretation regarding both practitioners and regulators.

Yes / This study aims to provide a better understanding of the role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in restoring public trust in audit profession in the UK. It analyses the views of partners in the Big 4 audit firms on this role. This study identifies three main strategies to promote trust and enhance the choice of auditors in the UK audit market. These strategies are improving audit quality, increasing the transparency of the big audit firms and reducing the barriers to competition in the audit market. The findings suggest that partners of the Big 4 believe that the FRC's projects effectively participate in improving audit quality as well as providing wider information about the audit firms to the public. However, different actions need to be taken to enhance the choice in the market.

This paper discusses the ability of models on cheap talk, and of audit and liability regulations, to provide analytically-based assessment of credibility of management forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings. While credibility is linked to restrictive conditions in pure market settings, regulatory enforcement does not necessarily contribute to forecast credibility. Key findings imply that ex ante approaches, including audit and tort liability in general, as well as partly verifiable disclosures supplementing the forecast and safe harbour provisions in particular can contribute to forecast credibility. Overall results suggest that the usefulness of managerial forecast disclosure should not be overestimated, as neither market nor regulatory mechanisms can overcome the problems related to non-verifiability.