The purpose of this paper is to research the relationship between people submitting themselves to their parents¡¦ authoritarian parenting and their managers¡¦ authoritarian leading, and research the reason of family experience extending to company organizations. Conclusions of this research show that the more parents educate their children by authoritarian parenting style, the more their children submit themselves to authoritarian parenting. The younger generation of people are belong to, the lesser their parents educate them by authoritarian parenting style. The more managers lead their subordinates by authoritarian leadership, the lesser their subordinates are satisfied with the interaction of their managers, and the lesser their subordinates submit themselves to their authoritarian leading. The more people submit themselves to their parents¡¦ authoritarian parenting, the more they submit themselves to their managers¡¦ authoritarian leading. The degree of different generation of people submitting themselves to parents¡¦ authoritarian parenting are the same, and submitting themselves to manager¡¦s authoritarian leading are the same, too. The degree of parents¡¦ authoritarian parenting is more than manager¡¦s authoritarian leading, and the degree of people submitting themselves to parents¡¦ authoritarian parenting is lesser than they submitting themselves to manager¡¦s authoritarian leading. The more stimulus generalization effect, people are easier using metaphor to compare family with company organization.

The aim of this study is to examine what conflict management practices that were employed in Burundi by the state around the electoral crisis of 2015. This will be done by applying the Authoritarian Conflict Management Framework. The study is qualitative, desk and case study and the data has been analyzed according to the method abduction as redescription and recontextualization. The result of the study shows that the Burundian state has adopted several conflict management practices to control political opponents. The state presents itself as democratic and under attacked by "enemies of the state" and "terrorists" as they call the opponents in the official discourse on Twitter. This discourse occurs simultaneously as the state security forces are dehumanizing the opponents in compounds where the opponents are being ill-treated and tortured. Another result explains why the Burundian security forces are enjoying impunity despite their human rights violations against the opponents within the mentioned compound. Despite violent actions, the state has also turned to a practice that gave development initiatives to diaspora to engage in, in order to restrict the diasporas political influence. A last main result questions the long-lasting stability of the contemporary government of Burundi, as the neopatrimonialism system has not only provided stability but also been a factor that triggered the 2015 political crisis.

Despite the low success rate indicated by scholarly assessments, economic sanctions remain a commonly used foreign policy tool. Why do policymakers often turn to economic sanctions with great hope and enterprise in spite of their unimpressive success record? What determines a sanction outcome? Does the internal political dynamic of target matter in this case? How does it relate to different regime type? Hence this thesis examines the conditional relationship between the presence of domestic political opposition in the target state and sanction success conditional on the regime type by using data covering 763 US-imposed sanctions from 1945 to 2006. The findings suggest authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to sanctions than their democratic counterparts in the presence of internal dissent groups in most cases. General Strikes are the best strategy to aid sanctions and coerce policy changes in authoritarian regimes. The presence of Guerrilla Warfare has the greatest substantive and statistical impact on sanction success. Consistent and organized internal dissent groups pose treats to the authority by weakening domestic stability or partnering with sender countries to push for policy changes.

Authoritarian elections present a dilemma for opposition political parties. Should the opposition participate in elections that are largely unfair? Should the opposition boycott the elections or resort to extra-electoral means? What explains the choice of strategy among key opponents of a regime? The goal of this project is to further our understanding of the opposition's strategic choices in authoritarian elections. Focusing on a strategy - boycotting - that occurs more often under authoritarian regimes, this dissertation builds a framework for understanding the set of strategies adopted by opposition parties in authoritarian elections. In particular, I develop an incomplete information model of opposition strategies to explain when opposition forces willingly participate in elections, when they engage in an electoral boycott. The predictions of the model are evaluated with both qualitative and quantitative methods. I first examine the predictions of the model using case studies of Jordan and Algeria, constructing narratives of elections and opposition strategies in each country. Second, I test the propositions derived from the model cross-nationally using a unique dataset of every national-level election (both parliamentary and presidential) held between 1990 and 2008. A central argument of the dissertation is that the opposition's perceptions of regime legitimacy are an important determinant of its strategic decisions. Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates how changes in the opposition's beliefs concerning the legitimacy of the regime drive changes in the strategies adopted.

<p>Chapter 1: Forcing Consent: Information and Power in Non-Democratic Elections. Why do governments hold elections that lack credibility? What explains variation in repression levels across non-democratic elections? While the literature has suggested many explanations for elections in autocracies, it has not yet provided a theory that would explain both the incidence of non-democratic elections and the variation in their degree of competitiveness. In this paper, we build an informational model of non-democratic elections explaining when elections may stabilize an autocrat's rule and when they may fail to do so. We argue that to achieve stability, elections must yield a sufficiently high vote-share for the incumbent and be optimally repressive. The degree of optimal repression is shown to increase with the incumbent's expected popularity. The model is then applied to explain some stylized facts about non-democratic elections and to derive a set of novel research hypotheses about the effects of non-democratic elections, variation in electoral repression, and fraud technology. We test the chief implication of the model using an original dataset on political arrests in the Soviet Union. We find that even if elections present no choice, they reduce the expression of anti-government sentiments. </p><p>Chapter 2: A Ballot Under the Sword: Political Security and the Quality of Elections in Autocracies. What explains the democratic quality of elections outside established democracies? We argue that when a government does not have to convince the opposition of its wide support in the society, it holds repressive elections. Conversely, when a government needs to send a strong signal about its popularity, it takes a riskier strategy of holding more competitive, and hence more informative elections. Using cross-national panel data, we find that the incumbents facing political insecurity -- measured through the incidence of economic crises and coup threats -- tend to hold higher quality elections than their more secure counterparts. In addition, via structural equation modeling, we find evidence that economic crises affect the quality of elections only indirectly through increased political insecurity. These findings reject the conventional view that autocrats use electoral repression when they are afraid of losing due to low expected support. This analysis has important implications for modernization theory and for understanding the role of political and economic instability in the democratization process.</p><p>Chapter 3: The Calculus of Dissent: Rigged Elections, Information, and Post-Election Stability. Why do some elections result in concession speeches while others spiral into protests, riots, and conflicts? This paper draws attention to the informational content of the electoral process and its outcome. We argue that elections induce stability when they communicate that the winners are truly popular and derive several novel predictions as to when such communication can succeed or fail. First, unfair elections lead to instability only if they are won by slim margins. Second, excessively large victory margins increase instability \emph{irrespective} of the unfairness of elections. The theory is then applied to explain the incidence of post-election protests across the world and the patterns of mandate denial in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that structural conditions (e.g., poverty and ethnic diversity) contribute little to post-election instability. Instead, the quality of elections and their results affect post-election politics in an interactive and non-linear fashion as predicted by the model. </p><p>Chapter 4: An Experimental Study of Fraudulent Elections and the Post-Election Protests. How can a winner of elections marred by fraud and voter intimidation convince the loser that he has large support in the society? Using an experimental setting, this paper studies how the information about election results and the competitiveness of the electoral process affect citizens' beliefs about the true popularity of the government and, subsequently, the success of a protest. We theoretically derive and evaluate the following hypotheses: (1) There will be no information update if elections are sufficiently manipulative and are won with great margins; (2) There will be positive updating in elections with medium levels of manipulation and high vote margin for the government; (3) There will be negative information updating if elections are highly manipulative but do not yield high margin for the government. We find relatively strong support for the first two hypotheses but none for the last one. The study also points to difficulties in studying rigged elections experimentally. The first difficulty has to do with the heterogeneity of the experimental population and the second one with the operationalization of electoral manipulation in a laboratory environment.</p> / Dissertation

This dissertation considers the impact of voter exit on the survival of incumbent regimes. I argue that voters exit the political process as a result of emigration or political violence. Using the example of Zimbabwe, I argue that ZANU-PF benefited from the exit of nearly four million Zimbabweans who emigrated outside the country in response to declining economic conditions and who exited the political system as a result of violence.

Political parties have been a common feature in non-competitive political systems, but their fates following an opening of electoral competition vary widely. Some parties continue to be able successfully compete for power, while many others languish as second-class political parties for decades. This dissertation seeks to answer the questions on this variation based on the institutional and organizational characteristics of these parties during the non-competitive era. Parties that play a major role in the non-competitive regime should be more likely to survive after an opening of competition, and parties that are able to reform anti-democratic legacies will be more able to translate their resources into future electoral success. This project builds on a literature that is rich in regional and sub-regional case studies by developing a global approach based upon comparable institutional qualities of non-competitive political systems and their ruling political parties. I also move away from the transitions literature and its focus on democracy, and instead focus on continuity and change in political parties after a time of major political change and the outcomes of that process. I develop an original, global database of 105 different regimes and 136 parties and their successors and their performance in elections ranging from 1975-2013. I find that parties which are a central institutional feature of the non-competitive regime are likely to survive regardless of their electoral success, while parties that play only a minor supporting role in the prior regime are dependent on continued electoral victories in order to survive for any significant period of time.

The literature on authoritarian politics emphasises the threat unexpected shocks such as economic downturns or political and security challenges pose for regime stability. However, we know relatively little about how incumbents can influence the process by which citizens evaluate government performance and attribute blame in non-democratic regimes. To gain insights into these questions, I study how government responses to collective shocks to citizen income and security influence support for electoral authoritarian regimes, i.e. those that combine authoritarian practices with multiparty elections. I propose that when shocks make information about government performance publicly observable, illiberal governments can take action that moderates or ameliorates their effect on the levels of support they enjoy. Little constrained by constitutional rules, critical media or coalition partners, electoral authoritarians can use tactical redistribution to appease the discontented electorate on the one hand and propaganda to manipulate attributions of responsibility for the shock on the other. Repression against opposition parties and activists in this context is used rarely, and only after targeted transfers and propaganda have failed to prevent support from eroding and crowds from taking to the streets. The thesis illustrates arguments with the case of contemporary Russia - an electoral authoritarian regime with high levels of personalist rule - and leverages evidence from government and citizen responses to natural disasters, economic downturns, terror attacks and electoral protests. Empirical analysis combines original datasets on the framing of economic news in Kremlin-controlled media, the forced dismissals of government actors, the provision of tactical redistribution, and the use of repression against opposition parties and activists with over 60,000 responses from nationally and regionally representative public opinion surveys. Bringing new data and evidence from individual-level surveys to bear on the debate of how non-democratic governments manage public opinion, the thesis makes an original contribution to scholarship on authoritarian vulnerability and resilience.

I theorize that a sub-set of states build and maintain authoritarian organizations (AOs) that exist to protect and reinforce authoritarian practices and values. First, I offer a logic for understanding AOs and their contributions to their member states. Second, I develop a framework that hypothesizes a range of benefits that an AO might offer its member states, identifying both material benefits (that contribute to repression and co-optation behaviors) and ideational benefits (that legitimize autocratic behavior) that an AO might provide. Finally, I assess three contemporary AOs: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Qualitative evidence shows that AOs most successfully contribute to the ideational side of the dictator’s toolkit, particularly by co-opting civil society into a structure set and maintained by authoritarians, and legitimizing authoritarian rule via distorting authoritarian practices, bandwagoning mutual rhetorical support at the international level, and challenging democracy as a norm of governance, chipping away at the Third and Fourth Waves of democratization. My research challenges the dominant understanding of IOs as generally democratizing actors, by identifying a subset of IOs that deliberately perform against this expectation. This research agenda also furthers our understanding the dictator’s toolkit by adding an international component to explanations of how non-democratic governments survive and counter democratizing pressures at home and abroad. / Political Science

In the theory part of this thesis will examine the connection between politics and sport, including the politicization of major sport events and the particular role of non-democratic states as host nations. In the empirical part, three case studies (Summer Olympics Beijing 2008, Winter Olympics Sochi 2014, and FIFA World Cup Qatar 2018) will be analyzed in the light of how they have influenced (or have the potential to influence) reforms, the adoption of democratic structures, and the human rights situation.