This dissertation studies the immediate reception of von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. It focuses on how economists (and other scientists, such as mathematicians) reacted to von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s axiomatization of expected utility theory. Such study employs book reviews the Theory of Games received, articles authored by mathematically-proficient readers who followed von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s lead of axiomatizing choice under uncertainty, and articles that cited the later. The main conclusions are threefold. First, to understand the history of the Theory of Games\' reception it is unavoidable to consider how secondary sources acted as disseminators of its premises, results, and method. Second, many skilled authors reflected on von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s book. Most economists who used that literature in an axiomatic framework cited such contributions to borrow and adapt assumptions. Those who applied results directly generally used less-sophisticated mathematical tools and were not proof-driven. Third, while the independence axiom is a necessary condition for expected utility theory, economists struggled to understand how von Neumann and Morgenstern used it. It was not clear where the Theory of Games hid that assumption. After economists discovered the independence axiom, they did not find an immediate use for it / Esta dissertação estuda a recepção imediata do Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, de von Neumann e Morgenstern. Seu foco reside em como economistas (e outros cientistas, tais como matemáticos) reagiram à axiomatização da teoria de utilidade esperada composta por von Neumann e Morgenstern. Tal estudo se vale de resenhas do Theory of Games, artigos autorados por leitores proficientes em matemática que seguiram a deixa dos autores de axiomatizar teoria de escolha sob incerteza e, por fim, artigos cujas citações incluem trabalhos destes leitores habilidosos. Há três conclusões principais. Primeiro, para entender a história de recepção do Theory of Games, é importante considerar que fontes secundárias agiram como disseminadores de premissas, resultados e o próprio método do Theory of Games. Segundo, muitos leitores capazes refletiram sobre o livro de von Neumann e Morgenstern. A maioria dos que usaram tal literatura a fizeram de acordo com o método axiomático, citanto aqueles artigos para reproduzir ou adaptar hipóteses. Dentre os que os citaram para aplicar seus resultados diretamente usaram ferramentas matemáticas menos sofisticadas e não tinham como objetivo a produção de demonstrações formais, em geral. Terceiro, enquanto o axioma de independência é uma condição necessária para a teoria de utilidade esperada, economistas tiveram dificuldades em compreender como von Neumann e Morgenstern usaram-no. Não estava claro para eles onde o Theory of Games o havia escondido. Uma vez que os economistas descobriram o axioma, não encontraram uso imediato para ele

The central question of this thesis is: what is mathematics about? The answer arrived at by the thesis is an unsettling and unsatisfying one. By examining two of the most promising contemporary accounts of the nature of mathematics, I conclude that neither is as yet capable of giving us a conclusive answer to our question. The conclusion is arrived at by a combination of historical and conceptual analysis. It begins with the historical fact that, since the middle of the nineteenth century, mathematics has undergone a radical transformation. This transformation occurred in most branches of mathematics, but was perhaps most apparent in geometry. Earlier images of geometry understood it as the science of space. In the wake of the emergence of multiple distinct geometries and the realization that non-Euclidean geometries might lay claim to the description of physical space, the old picture of Euclidean geometry as the sole correct description of physical space was no longer tenable. The first chapter of the dissertation provides an historical account of some of the forces which led to the destabilization of the traditional picture of geometry. The second chapter examines the debate between Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert regarding the nature of geometry and axiomatics, ending with an argument suggesting that Hilbert’s views are ultimately unsatisfying. The third chapter continues to probe the work of Frege and, again, finds his explanations of the nature of mathematics troublingly unsatisfying. The end result of the first three chapters is that the Frege-Hilbert debate leaves us with an impasse: the traditional understanding of mathematics cannot hold, but neither can the two most promising modern accounts. The fourth and final chapter of the thesis investigates mathematical structuralism—a more recent development in the philosophy of mathematics—in order to see whether it can move us beyond the impasse of the Frege-Hilbert debate. Ultimately, it is argued that the contemporary debate between ‘assertoric’ structuralists and ‘algebraic’ structuralists recapitulates a form of the Frege-Hilbert impasse. The ultimate claim of the thesis, then, is that neither of the two most promising contemporary accounts can offer us a satisfying philosophical answer to the question ‘what is mathematics about?’.